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Summary 
Accounting and auditing is closely related to the quality of data. Two important 
elements supporting the quality of information are internal controls and 
materiality. Inspired by Simons (1994), these elements can be considered “basic 
building blocks”. Internal controls are perhaps the most important element, as they 
ensure that information used for management purposes has the required quality 
(Kinney, 2000). This information can be used as a basis for preparing the external 
financial reporting (COSO, 2013) and as a prerequisite for establishing 
information-based management control systems (MCS) (Simons, 1994). When 
regarding management controls as a package, internal controls are part of the 
administrative controls and often formalised in policies and procedures (Malmi 
and Brown, 2008). 
The level of controls should be guided by the need for reliable information. These 
considerations are linked to another “basic building block”, namely the concept of 
materiality. The basic meaning of materiality is “that there is no need to be 
concerned with what is not important or with what does not matter” (Bernstein, 
1967). Gaining an understanding of these concepts is important in order to answer 
the question “when is enough – enough?” The information should be both reliable 
and relevant, but there is also the cost to consider, since companies spend 
considerable resources on the design, implementation and operation of 
administrative controls and financial reporting (Carney, 2006). It is also important 
to understand these concepts when performing an audit of the internal controls 
embedded in the company systems and processes (Kinney et al., 2013), as well as 
when preparing an annual report. The overall objective of this thesis is to add to 
the understanding of the role of internal controls and materiality. The three articles 
included aim at meeting this objective by analysing selected areas within 
accounting and auditing: 
Article #1 - To what extent, how and why do internal control audits affect 
internal controls? 
Based on a case study in a large financial institution it is examined to what extent, 
how and why audits performed by an internal audit function (IAF) affect internal 
controls. The case study included a review of the management letters reporting the 
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result of the internal control audits for the period 2008 – 12. The result reveals that 
30% of auditors’ recommendations initiate an implementation of new internal 
controls, 60% relate to weaknesses in existing controls, and 10% can be referred to 
insufficient documentation. 
To explain how and why the audits affect internal controls, an analysis of the 
interaction between auditors and client was performed. The analysis was based on 
a combined audit/client interaction model (Saltario, 2012; Fernley et al., 2011), 
and the result showed that the interaction in the management letter process is 
primarily a fact-based exchange of information. The outcome of the process, 
which are recommendations for improvement of existing or implementation of 
new internal controls, should be considered a joint product. The regulatory 
requirements are blamed for the burdensome work with improvement and 
implementation of news internal controls. However, it seems that the improved 
level of internal controls would have been implemented regardless of the 
regulatory pressure since it adds value from both an audit and a business 
perspective. 
Article #2 – Financial crisis and administrative controls: An institutional 
theory perspective. 
The financial crisis in Iceland was of an extraordinary magnitude, as all the banks 
went bankrupt and a few days later were re-established. The three Icelandic banks 
were compared with three Danish banks in order to identify and distinguish the 
crisis-driven response from ordinary market-driven reactions. The three Danish 
banks managed the financial crisis without specific governmental support. Based 
on a case study of these six banks, the changes made to the administrative controls 
(Malmi and Brown, 2008) were viewed through an institutional lens, focusing on 
the sources and embeddedness of change (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Burns and 
Scapens, 2000). 
The analysis shows that all the banks have established a number of formalised and 
visible changes, which can be verified by audits and inspections from the 
Financial Supervisory Authorities (FSA). The most significant difference is that 
the Icelandic banks after the financial crisis have increased the risk management 
functions to a size five times as large as is the case in Denmark. Further, as an 
extraordinary action they established new values immediately after the financial 
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crisis. The analysis indicates that more detailed regulatory requirements, which 
have been common practice for a long time (Franks et al., 1997; Van der Stede, 
2011), will not improve the effectiveness of controls. Further improvements have 
to rely on managements’ use of cultural controls to direct employees’ behaviour 
(Erkens et al., 2012). 
Article #3 – Disclosure materiality: An analysis of stakeholders’ perception 
Preparer and auditors decide what to disclose in the annual report. These decisions 
are made behind closed doors (Fernley et al., 2011), and the users only see the 
final result as presented in the annual report (Brennan and Gray, 2005). Based on a 
case study it is illustrated how preparer and auditors perceive materiality. This 
perception is compared to the way users view materiality of the notes included in 
the annual report. 
Preparer and auditors primarily assess materiality on the basis of size of amounts. 
This assessment is comparable with the evaluation of misstatements (Eilifsen et 
al., 2014-B). As a second step they consider if the development from prior year 
deviates from an expected trend. Finally they consider if the disclosure adds value 
to the user. This assessment approach is misaligned with the current standards 
guiding materiality (IASB, 2015). An important response from the analysts is that 
they only to a limited extent use the disclosures as presented in the annual report. 
The main reasons are that the information required for the financial analysis is 
provided in the quarterly statements or communicated at meetings with the 
companies (Brown et al., 2015). Consequently it is concluded that preparers’ and 
auditors’ perception of materiality is not aligned with that of the users of annual 
reports when assessing disclosure materiality. 
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Resume på dansk (Summary in Danish) 
Regnskab og revision er tæt knyttet til kvaliteten af data, og der er to væsentlige 
elementer der understøtter datakvaliteten, nemlig interne kontroller og 
væsentlighed. Inspireret af Simons (1994) kan disse elementer betragtes som 
"grundlæggende byggesten". Interne kontroller er nok det vigtigste element, da de 
har til formål at sikre at data der anvendes til ledelsesmæssige formål har den 
nødvendige kvalitet (Kinney, 2000). Disse data kan anvendes som grundlag for 
udarbejdelsen af ekstern finansiel rapportering (COSO, 2013) og som basis for 
etablering af ledelsessystemer (Simons, 1994). Hvis ledelsessystemer defineres 
som en pakke, udgør de interne kontroller en del af de administrative kontroller 
som ofte er dokumenteret i politikker og procedurer (Malmi og Brown, 2008). 
Kontrolniveauet bør være bestemt af behovet for pålidelige data. Sådanne 
overvejelser er tæt knyttet til en anden af de "grundlæggende byggesten", som er 
væsentlighed. Grundlæggende betyder væsentlighed "at der ikke er grund til at 
være bekymret over det der ikke vigtigt eller det som er ligegyldigt" (Bernstein, 
1967). En forståelse af disse begreber er vigtig for at kunne besvare spørgsmålet: 
"hvornår nok er nok”. Informationerne skal være både pålidelige og relevante, 
men omkostningerne skal også tages med i betragtning, da virksomhederne 
anvender betydelige ressourcer på design, implementering og drift af 
administrative kontroller og finansiel rapportering (Carney, 2006). Forståelse er 
også vigtig når der skal udføres revision af de interne kontroller, der er en del af 
virksomhedens systemer og processer (Kinney et al., 2013), og ved udarbejdelse 
af årsregnskabet. Det overordnede formål med denne afhandling er at bidrage til 
forståelsen af den rolle, interne kontroller og væsentlighed spiller. De tre artikler 
der indgår i afhandlingen søger at opfylde dette formål gennem analyser af 
udvalgte områder inden for regnskab og revision: 
Artikel # 1 - I hvilket omfang, hvordan og hvorfor påvirker revisionen af 
intern kontroller de interne kontroller? 
Baseret på et casestudie i en stor finansiel virksomhed er det undersøgt i hvilket 
omfang, hvordan og hvorfor revision udført af en intern revision påvirker de 
interne kontroller. Casestudiet omfattede en gennemgang af resultatet af revision 
af interne kontroller rapporteret i management letters for perioden 2008 – 12. 
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Resultatet viser, at 30% af revisors anbefalinger medfører implementering af nye 
interne kontroller, 60% vedrører svagheder i eksisterende kontroller, og 10% kan 
henføres til utilstrækkelig dokumentation. 
For at forklare hvordan og hvorfor revisionen påvirker de interne kontroller blev 
der gennemført en analyse af interaktionen mellem revisorer og klient. Analysen 
er baseret på en kombineret revisor/klient interaktionsmodel (Saltario, 2012; 
Fernley et al, 2011). Resultatet af revisionen, som er en anbefaling af nye eller 
forbedring af eksisterende kontroller, skal anses som en fælles beslutning. De 
regulatoriske krav bliver brugt som et alibi for det ressourcekrævende arbejde med 
forbedring af eksisterende og implementering af nye kontroller. Det tyder 
imidlertid på at forbedringerne både giver en revisionsmæssig og 
forretningsmæssig værdi, og at de ville have været gennemført uanset de 
regulatoriske krav. 
Artikel # 2 - Finanskrisen og administrative kontroller: Et institutionelt 
teoriperspektiv. 
Den finansielle krise i Island havde et ekstraordinært omfang, da alle bankerne gik 
konkurs og få dage senere blev reetableret. De tre islandske banker er blevet 
sammenlignet med tre danske banker for at adskille den krisedrevne reaktion fra 
den ordinære markedsdrevne reaktion. De danske banker er alle kommet gennem 
den finansielle krise uden individuel statsstøtte. Baseret på et casestudie af disse 
seks banker er ændringerne i de administrative kontroller (Malmi og Brown, 2008) 
blevet analyseret i et institutionelt perspektiv med fokus på årsagen til 
ændringerne og forankringen af disse (DiMaggio og Powell, 1983; Burns og 
Scapens, 2000). 
Analysen viser, at alle banker har implementeret en række formaliserede og 
synlige ændringer, der kan verificeres af revisionen og Finanstilsynet. Den 
væsentligste forskel er, at de islandske banker efter finanskrisen har udvidet risk-
management funktionerne, så de er fem gange så store som i Danmark. Endvidere 
har de umiddelbart efter finanskrisen som en ekstraordinær handling fastsat nye 
værdier. Analysen indikerer tillige at yderligere regulatoriske detailkrav, som har 
været praksis i lang tid (Franks et al, 1997; Van der Stede, 2011), ikke vil medføre 
mere effektive kontroller. Yderligere forbedringer skal i stedet baseres på 
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ledelsens brug af kulturelle kontroller til påvirkning af medarbejdernes adfærd 
(Erkens et al., 2012). 
Artikel # 3 – Noter og væsentlighed: En analyse af interessenternes opfattelse 
Virksomhederne og revisorerne beslutter hvad der skal oplyses i årsrapporten. 
Disse beslutninger træffes bag lukkede døre (Fernley et al., 2011), og brugerne 
kan kun se resultatet heraf i årsrapporten (Brennan og Gray, 2005). Baseret på et 
casestudie er det undersøgt hvordan virksomheder og revisorer opfatter 
væsentlighed. Denne opfattelse er sammenholdt med brugernes vurdering af 
væsentlighed på grundlag af noterne til årsrapporten. 
Virksomheder og revisorer vurderer primært væsentlighed på grundlag af 
beløbsstørrelser. Dette svarer til vurderingen af regnskabsmæssige fejl (Eilifsen et 
al., 2014-B). Sekundært overvejer de om udviklingen fra tidligere år afviger fra 
den forventede trend. Endelig overvejes det om oplysningerne giver værdi for 
brugerne. Denne tilgang er ikke i overensstemmelse med de gældende 
vejledninger om væsentlighed (IASB, 2015). En vigtig respons fra analytikerne er 
at de kun i begrænset omfang bruger noterne i årsrapporten. De væsentligste 
årsager hertil er, at de nødvendige informationer fremgår af kvartalsmeddelelserne 
eller modtages på møder med selskaberne (Brown et al., 2015). Det kan derfor 
konkluderes, at virksomhedernes og revisorernes opfattelse af væsentlighed ikke 
svarer til brugernes opfattelse. 
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1. Background, motivation and objective 
Control of other people’s work has been used in a variety of contexts for more 
than 5,000 years. A number of examples have been identified from the 
Mesopotamian and Egyptian civilisations through the Dark Ages to the present 
day (Lee, 1971). Even though it has been an integrated part of doing business 
for centuries, very little has been written about internal control as a separate 
topic for a long time. In the early 20th century, auditors did however start 
writing about the subject under the heading “General system of internal check” 
(Dicksee, 1905). Later these controls were referred to as internal controls, 
which is the accepted terminology today (COSO, 1992). In a wider management 
control perspective, controls can be defined as: “The process by which 
managers ensure that resources are obtained and used efficiently and efficiently 
in the accomplishment of the organization’s objectives” (Anthony, 1965). 
Internal controls may be considered a subset of management controls (Simons, 
1994), and they can be used to influence the behaviour of employees (Flamholtz 
et al., 1985). 
My personal experiences with internal controls started more than 30 years ago 
when we performed process audits according to Skinner and Anderson (1966). 
This work accelerated from 1995 when AICPA adapted COSO’s definition of 
internal control by issuing SAS 78 (COSO, 1992; AICPA, 2002). Following 
SAS 78, the “Big 6” audit firms introduced system-based audit approaches. One 
example was the implementation of “System Assurance – A Practical 
Approach”, which was rolled out globally by Price Waterhouse. This approach 
aimed at evaluating the systems risk “analysing and testing controls in the 
components being system assured”. The guidelines aimed at changing the 
traditional audit focus to a more control-based approach. This was a response to 
the growing use of ERP systems and the corresponding increase in the number 
and complexity of enterprise transactions. Especially the release of SAP R/3 in 
1992 initiated this change in the audit approach. 
The next major event that had an impact on the attention to control was the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). According to sections 302 and 404, the 
companies should establish a documented system of internal control and issue 
quarterly and annual reports including specific statements regarding internal 
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control. On an annual basis, this reporting is subject to audit. My personal 
experience from several SOX implementation projects and audits is that almost 
all companies designed and documented the controls based on an approach 
which could have been formulated as “rather safe than sorry”. This resulted in 
high costs of implementing and operating the controls (Carney, 2006). This is 
also supported by the anecdotes that internal control audits will result in 
recommendations for improvements or implementation of new controls. 
Further, the implementation of more modules to e.g. SAP gave rise to an 
increasing number of controls. In the financial area, Basel requirements, 
including operational risk, have also required significant managerial attention 
(Power, 2005). In all material aspects, control has been a fast growing area and 
as such it has – and still do - required huge attention and resources (Carney, 
2006). To support this work, frameworks have been issued guiding the design, 
implementation and operation of controls (COSO, 2004; COSO, 2013). Both 
COSO’s internal control and enterprise risk management framework suggest a 
structured risk assessment prior to the implementation of internal controls. This 
requires consideration of likelihood and impact combined with risk appetite 
when making decisions regarding controls. In addition, materiality should also 
be considered regarding reporting (IASB, 2015). But why is it that definitions 
and fundamental concepts regarding risk and controls are unclear? (Aven, 2012; 
Power, 2009). And why are the borders blurred between internal controls and 
management controls? (Merchant and Otley, 2006; Scannell et al., 2013). 
These considerations initiated the PhD project “Quality of information: The role 
of internal controls and materiality”. The overall ambition when starting the 
project was to answer the question “When is enough enough – and who make 
such decisions?” The answer is of importance when considering the design, 
implementation and operation of controls. Hopefully, the analyses of the role of 
internal controls and materiality included in this thesis add to the understanding 
of this overall question. 
The rest of this section is organised as follows: Section 5 includes a description 
of the relation between internal controls and management accounting and 
controls systems (MACS). Section 6 describes the research method, and in 
section 7 the study findings are presented. Finally, in section 8 contributions 
and implications are summarised. 
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2. Internal controls: Management accounting and controls 
systems 
Definitions regarding risk and controls are unclear (Aven, 2012; Power, 2009), 
and borders between internal control and management controls are blurred 
(Merchant and Otley, 2006; Scannell et al., 2013). In order to clarify definitions, 
the relations between internal controls and MACS have been reviewed. 
A control should serve a purpose such as mitigating risk or pursuing an 
opportunity. The distinction between risk and opportunities is closely linked to 
the definition of risk. Risk can be classified by a negative, neutral or broad 
definition, illustrated by the following examples (Raz and Hillson, 2005): 
Negative definition Neutral definition Broad definition 
“the chance of injury or 
loss” 
“a combination of the 
probability of an event and its 
consequence” 
“a combination of the 
probability of an event and its 
consequence … consequences 
can range from positive to 
negative” 
 
Table 1 - Examples of risk definitions 
Independently from the definition, risk can be described by the terms likelihood 
and consequences (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981). Based on a negative definition, 
risk is expressed as expected loss. Related to the finance literature, expected 
loss is used when measuring value at risk (Jorion, 2007). There is also a visual 
similarity between value at risk and the negative definition, since both terms 
focus on the left side of e.g. a normal distribution. Expanding the visual view to 
cover the broad risk definition, which also includes positive consequences, this 
will be presented by the whole distribution.  In this situation, likelihood and 
consequence will express the expected value. In relation to the management 
controls, the expected value could be defined as a budget, which is a part of the 
cybernetic controls (Malmi and Brown, 2008). In the finance and statistical 
literature it is assumed that both likelihood and consequence and thus risk can 
be quantified. This is, however, not a prerequisite, since it is generally assumed 
that risk should be measurable but not necessarily quantifiable (Knight, 1921). 
Further, the purpose of risk quantification is not a goal in itself, but rather a 
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means to provide input to an underlying decision (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981). 
Quantification of risk can, however, be helpful both for business managers and 
auditors in their effort to access controls (Huang et al., 2013). An assessment 
based on a cost benefit analysis might serve as an input for a decision regarding 
design, implementation and operation of control activities. The cost of a specific 
control could be compared to the benefit of the expected improvement in the 
level of controls. If data are insufficient or unavailable, it is perhaps not possible 
to quantify the risk. Further, if an event has never occurred, it is impossible to 
quantify the likelihood that it will happen. In these situations it is, however, by 
definition (Knight, 1921) possible to measure risk by classifying likelihood and 
consequences on a subjective basis. As an example, the classification scale can 
be measured from rare to almost certain and from insignificant to catastrophic 
(Walke et al., 2011).  
From a management perspective, risk-taking and management of risk are seen 
as part of the business strategy process, and it is an integrated part of the 
management control process to consider uncertainties (Simons, 1990). MCS are 
adopted to assist managers in decision-making and thereby in achieving desired 
organisational goals (Chenhall, 2003). This indicates that management controls 
at the core control level (Flamholtz et al., 1985) consider risk on the basis of a 
broad definition. As an example, managers have a tool like Levers of Control at 
their disposal to manage risk. At the detailed level, such controls depend on 
reliable information, which is considered an important prerequisite since 
management controls can be considered: “Formal information-based routines 
and procedures used by managers to maintain or alter patterns in organizational 
activities.” (Simons, 1987). 
The quality of information depends on well-functioning internal controls which 
are considered an essential foundation for controlling risks in all organisations 
(Simons, 1999). Internal accounting controls are designed to ensure data 
integrity and are the most “basic building block”. The link between the strategic 
objectives at the top and the internal control at the bottom can be illustrated in 
the following way by using Simon’s definitions (Simons, 1994): 
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Figure 1 - Link between business strategy and internal controls 
The business strategy is supported by management controls, e.g. Levers of 
Control, which consist of information-based routines and procedures. Reliable 
information requires that the necessary internal controls have been 
implemented. This chain between business strategy and control activities should 
not be considered a one-to-one set of links but rather a set of one-to-many links. 
This view is supported by the guidance established as part of the Sarbanes-
Oxley implementation projects, including a mapping between control activities 
at the bottom and financial reporting at the top (IT Governance Institute, 2004). 
It is worth noting the distinction between “internal accounting controls” and 
“internal controls”. This can be explained by the development in the definition 
of internal controls. In 1957 it was suggested that internal controls should be 
divided into three groups, Internal Administrative Controls, Internal Accounting 
Controls, and the original term used by Dicksee in 1905, which was Internal 
Check (Byrne, 1957). SAS No.1 from 1972 indicated that accounting controls 
were the primary types of controls with which the auditor was to be concerned 
(Heier et al., 2004). The Minahan Report also used the term accounting control, 
which is concerned with “… reliability of financial statements and with the 
broad internal control objectives of authorization, accounting, and asset 
safeguarding” (AICPA, 1979). Another comment from this report tried to stop 
the discussion regarding the definition of elements of internal control: “From a 
management viewpoint (and that of many interested third parties), the 
distinction between accounting and administrative controls is usually not 
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recognized or even acknowledged … more often than not, academic when it 
comes to establishing, maintaining, and evaluating internal accounting 
controls”. The release of SAS No. 55 in 1988 did not make a distinction 
between administrative controls and accounting controls. Rather, it discussed 
the concepts of internal control in a broader sense called a control environment 
(Heier et al., 2004). This auditing standard was followed by COSO’s “Internal 
Control – Integrated Framework” in 1992 (COSO, 1992). The framework used 
the term “internal control” instead of “internal accounting controls”. 
In the management control area, Simons recognised this change. In the 1999 
paper “How risky is your company”, a boundary to management controls was 
established by defining internal control as: “The checks and balances that 
safeguard assets and ensure reliable information.” (Simons, 1999). Further, it is 
mentioned that internal controls do not vary with strategy but are an essential 
foundation for controlling of risk. In line with Simons, Merchant and Otley 
consider internal controls primarily as an audit term designed to prevent or to 
detect errors at the transaction level and as such an important aspect of the 
overall management control system (Merchant and Otley, 2006). 
Since the first release in 1992, COSO’s definition of internal control has been 
considered the most important and  has been widely supported by practice 
(Kinney, 2000; PCAOB, 2011). In the latest version of the framework, internal 
control is defined as (COSO, 2013): 
“Internal control is a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, 
management and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance 
regarding the achievement of objectives related to operations, reporting and 
compliance.” 
The definition includes the word “objective” and not the more specific “control 
objective”, which is used by a number of other frameworks, both management 
controls and internal controls (Pfister, 2009). A “control objective” is often 
related to a compliance requirement and therefore by nature normatively 
describes what needs to be done. A business objective by nature describes what 
should be done – a distinction between “need” and “should” (Sadiq et al., 
2007). 
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“Reasonable assurance” is a well-known audit term which according to the 
International Framework for Assurance Engagements can be used as a basis for 
a positive conclusion in an assurance report e.g.: “in our opinion internal control 
is effective, in all material respects” (IFAC, 2004). If the design of internal 
controls meets the “reasonable assurance” requirements and the processes have 
been quality assured (or audited) at a level comparable with this term, it should 
be expected that the output fulfils the objectives defined for that specific 
process. Comparing the management controls requirements to COSO’s 
definitions of internal controls, it seems that if “reasonable assurance” can be 
provided, the prerequisite for the information-based systems is established. 
Therefore, accounting control or internal control is still considered a 
fundamental or essential means to provide reliable information for management 
control purposes. 
A risk assessment is a required phase when making decisions regarding controls 
(Scannell et al., 2013). It is therefore notable that none of COSO’s frameworks 
includes a definition of a risk assessment. Other frameworks and guidelines do, 
however, include definitions. ISO has issued a specific document “Risk 
management – Risk assessment”, which includes a definition of risk assessment 
(IEC/FDIS 31010, 2009): “The overall process of risk identification, risk 
analysis and evaluation”. Almost all definitions of risk assessment in the 
literature include an estimation of likelihood of occurrence and possible impact 
(Kern et al., 2012) and a prioritisation in order to be able to choose suitable 
management actions (Hallikas et al., 2004). At a more specific level, the risk 
assessment process should provide the information required to determine an 
optimal balance between cost of control and benefits from control activities 
(Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005). It may be necessary to adjust this rather precise 
objective, since accurate estimates of likelihood may not always be available, 
and the decision-making may be based on a more subjective foundation (Manuj 
and Mentzer, 2008). Risk assessment can therefore be considered an assessment 
of uncertainties related to the determination of both likelihood and impact. In 
that respect it may be the case that uncertainties have to be assessed by a 
combination of objective and subjective information where judgment is used to 
approximate the risk (Tummala and Schoenherr, 2011). 
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The purpose of risk quantification is not a goal in itself but rather a means to 
provide input for an underlying decision; in this respect it is easier to compare 
alternatives measured by numbers than qualitative terms based on subjective 
judgments. If, however, a probabilistic approach is not possible, alternative 
tools such as risk analysis can be used to get a reasonable estimate suitable for 
decision-making (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008). Researchers in other fields of 
science challenge this approach, since the use of risk assessment when 
knowledge about likelihood and consequence is lacking is potentially 
misleading (Stirling, 2007). Further, a quantified risk assessment cannot be 
considered a traditional scientific method, since it is not possible to make 
accurate estimates and predictions (Cumming, 1981). It can even be claimed 
that risk assessment is an art rather than a science (Weinberg, 1981). Despite 
these comments, the objective of a risk assessment should be kept in mind, 
which is to help decision-makers, but not necessarily serve as the sole basis for 
decision-making. Considering the general level of materiality, business needs a 
different set of methods and models compared with e.g. nuclear science or 
medicine (Aven, 2012). In such a situation it could be argued that tools and 
methodologies should be selected with due respect to the required level of 
precision. If the control activities in question are related to the accounting area, 
materiality is, although not scientific by nature, a term which includes 
professional judgment. Following this view, the essence of a risk assessment is 
to answer three questions (Apostolakis, 2004): 
 What can go wrong? 
 How likely is it? 
 What are the consequences? 
 
3. Summary 
To summarise the above considerations regarding controls, there seems to be 
the general understanding that internal control is a process (COSO, 2013). This 
process includes at least two elements – a risk assessment and the control 
activities (Kern et al., 2012). The main purpose of a risk assessment is to answer 
the question: “What can go wrong?” (Apostolakis, 2004). Further, the risk 
assessment should estimate the likelihood and impact in order to establish a 
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basis for prioritisation of the resources used to mitigate the risk or achieve the 
objectives (Hallikas et al., 2004). 
In defining the borders between internal control (COSO, 2013), risk 
management (COSO, 2004) and management controls (Simons, 1987), it seems 
that the overall objective of internal controls is to fulfil the control objectives 
(Pfister, 2009) and thereby ensuring reliable information for management 
purposes (Simons, 1999). Based on this view, internal controls are primarily 
designed to prevent or detect errors at the transaction level (Merchant and 
Otley, 2006). 
This view on internal control is based on a negative definition of risk (Raz and 
Hillson, 2005). Internal controls either work as planned and thus fulfil the 
control objectives at the required level of assurance, or do not perform as 
planned and thus introduce a potential negative impact on the quality of the 
information. 
An accounting system is designed to support decision-making by providing 
management information, which is the input to management accounting 
(Simons, 1994). As this information should be reliable, quality requirements are 
defined that are ensured by internal controls. This way a link is established to 
the audit practice (Eilifsen et al., 2014-B) and the various levels of assurance 
(IFAC, 2004). These considerations also establish a link between management 
accounting systems (MAS), MCS and internal controls: 
MAS Information
MCS
Internal controls
 
Figure 2 - Relation between internal control, MAS and MCS 
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4. Research method 
The overall objective of this thesis is to explore the role of internal control and 
materiality related to the quality of information. This is done in three different 
areas: 
 To what extent, how and why do internal control audits affect internal 
controls? 
 Financial crisis and administrative controls: An institutional theory 
perspective 
 Disclosure materiality: An analysis of stakeholders’ perception. 
 
As little is known in all three areas, case studies have been used to explore the 
details (Eisenhardt, 1989). This method is appropriate, since the focus is on a 
real-life situation aiming at answering how and why questions (Yin, 2009). It is 
recognised that case studies require additional work in order to verify and 
generalise the conclusions presented (Scapens, 2004). To support the 
generalisation of the findings the individual papers include a contextual 
description (Parker and Northcott, 2016). These descriptions are prepared with 
due respect to the confidential agreements entered with the respondents. The 
aim of the research approach is to “verstehen” and “explain patterns” regarding 
the research questions and the research paradigm is based on an interpretive 
estipimology and a relativistic ontology (Ryan et al., 2002). These 
considerations might be be classified as “middle-range” thinking (Laughlin, 
1995). 
The primary source of empirical data was semi-structured interviews (Kvale 
and Brinkmann, 2009). In all the case studies it is, however, also the underlying 
arguments, descriptions and stories of the respondents that are important. 
Therefore the semi-structured interviews were supported by a responsive 
element (Rubin and Rubin, 2012). This approach requires that the researcher 
has detailed knowledge about the subject and the industry (Morse and Field, 
1995; Richards and Morse, 2012). The required experience also makes it 
possible during the interviews to evaluate the answers in a pragmatic context 
(Kvale, 1994). 
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In two of the case studies, the interviews were recorded and transcribed. In the 
last case study tape recording was not allowed. Instead notes were taken during 
the interview and memos prepared after the meetings. The transcribed 
interviews and the memos were coded according to the organising frameworks. 
In all the cases, the information is considered confidential by the respondents. 
Due to the confidentiality agreements we were not allowed to remove internal 
information from the premises (except memos and recorded interviews). To 
deal with the confidentiality requirements and to get sufficient evidence that the 
observations and quotes used in the papers fairly present the facts, relevant 
sections were reviewed by the respondents. This procedure also ensured that 
any misunderstandings were corrected and helped mitigating some of the 
challenges regarding a single case study, including the risk of a biased data 
collection (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Further, other sources of 
information, both internal documents and publicly available documents, were 
used to verify the interviews. Finally, during the case studies we were allowed 
to be at the respondents’ premises, which provided on-site observations. This 
allowed to some extent for data source triangulation (Yin, 2013). 
 
5. Presentation of findings 
Based on the case studies, different aspects of the roles of internal controls, 
administrative controls and materiality have been explored. 
The role of internal controls 
The role of internal controls was analysed on the basis of a single case study of 
the management letter process (Manson et al., 2001) in a large financial 
institution. The process audit is performed by an IAF, which is organised in 
such a way that they are not involved in any other roles besides auditing 
(Arenka and Sarens, 2015). This role is defined and supported by local 
regulatory requirements (BEK, 2013). In addition, the employees have the same 
qualifications as found in a Big 4 audit firm. Consequently, they perform 
internal control audits at the same quality level as that of external audits 
(Stefaniak et al., 2012). 
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To explore to what extent the internal control audits affect the controls, a 
detailed review of the management letter reporting for 2008 – 12 was 
performed. This part of the case study showed that 30% of the 
recommendations in the management letters resulted in the implementation of 
new internal controls. The remaining 70% related to improvements of existing 
controls including requirements for preparation of further documentation. 
To explore how the internal control audit affects the internal controls, the 
interaction between auditor and client was analysed. In order to perform the 
analysis, a combined audit/client interaction model was established utilising 
existing theories (Fearnley et al., 2011; Salterio, 2012). In the combined 
interaction model, both auditor and client behaviour is classified on a scale from 
permissive over argumentative to insisting. The combined behaviour is 
classified as exchange of information, discussion or negotiation. The outcome 
of the interaction can be a client, auditor or joint product. 
Based on the analysis of the interactions in the management letter process it 
seems that IAF in general is argumentative in the direction towards being 
insisting. The client is generally argumentative. The combined behaviour is an 
exchange of information in which the quality of arguments and documentation 
presented at the meetings determines the outcome of the interaction. The 
outcome, which is the decision on implementation of new or improvements of 
existing controls as presented in the management letters, is classified as a joint 
product.  This co-operation between auditor and client has been seen for a 
number of years regarding the annual report (Antle and Nalebuff, 1991). Since 
the audit of internal controls support the financial audit (Kinney et al., 2013), it 
seems that the total audit of the company should be considered a joint product. 
The result of the internal control audits is reported to the audit committee in the 
management letters together with a summary in the long form audit report 
(BEK, 2013). It seems that the audit committee and thus the board of directors 
respect the management letter process since they generally take note of the 
result. This could be explained by the fact that client employees at various 
levels in the organisation have been involved and agreed on the result of the 
interactions. This can also be seen as a management letter process with strong 
internal controls. Even though they respect the result, the board of directors 
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have an impact on the management letter process through “Tone at the Top” 
(Lail et al., 2015), based on a desire to have well-controlled business processes 
(Sarens et al., 2009). 
Why do internal control audit affect internal controls? The analysis of the 
contextual features, which are included in the combined audit/client interaction 
model, indicates that the regulatory regime is the main challenge due to the risk 
of being caught (Fearnley et al., 2011). This might be expected, since the 
summarised result of the management letter process is reported to FSA in the 
long form audit report (BEK, 2013). FSA is seen as a burden and by part of the 
organisation considered a “dark cloud”. Therefore it seems a logical 
consequence to establish a defence complying with the regulatory requirements 
(Van der Stede, 2011). This might also be a convenient explanation of why it is 
necessary to spend considerable resources on improvement of existing and 
implementation of new controls. However, this is only the explanation on the 
surface. When analysing the result, it turns out that the improved level of 
controls adds both significant audit and business value. Further, it seems that 
the improved level of control would have been established independently of the 
regulatory requirements. 
Based on the case study, the joint effort of improving the level of internal 
controls is driven by a desire from both auditors and client to have well-
controlled information. In this case the role of internal controls is twofold; by 
assuring well-controlled business processes (Sarens et al., 2009) it helps 
mitigating the audit risk (Eilifsen et al., 2014-B) and provides reliable 
information for management purposes (Simons, 1994). 
The role of administrative controls 
Besides being viewed as an individual element, internal controls are also part of 
administrative controls and included in the package of management controls 
(Malmi and Brown, 2008). To analyse the role of administrative controls in a 
crisis situation, a multiple case study was performed involving three Icelandic 
and three Danish banks. The Icelandic banks were hit hard by the financial 
crisis, whereas the Danish banks selected for comparison (Gissequist, 2014) 
managed the crisis without specific governmental support. The analysis was 
performed by viewing the identified changes to the administrative controls 
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through an institutional lens. The lens included the drivers of change (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983) and the level of embeddedness (Burns and Scapens, 2000). 
The re-establishment of the Icelandic banks a few days after they went bankrupt 
included a replacement of the executive board and the board of directors in each 
of the banks.  The new managements decided to implement a number of 
changes to administrative controls (Malmi and Brown, 2008) assisted by other 
employee groups (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007). These changes were 
compared to the Danish banks in order to identify the additional actions 
initiated in Iceland. Additional changes were identified in the following areas: 
 “Tone at the Top” and values 
 Operation of IT 
 Risk Management function 
 Policies and procedures 
 
As an immediate response to the reconstruction, the Icelandic banks initiated an 
implementation of new values. It seems that the new values, supported by the 
“Tone at the Top”, have given rise to a behavioural change (Walker, 2009; 
Erkens et al., 2012). However, compared with the Danish banks, the 
maintenance of the values is not an integrated part of the ordinary strategic 
process and has at present not reached a level of reproduction (Burns and 
Scapens, 2000). 
In the area of IT, the operational models have remained un-changed in both 
Iceland and Denmark. All the Icelandic banks operate their IT in-house, 
whereas all the Danish banks have outsourced these services. As a consequence, 
the Icelandic banks have an average of 75 additional IT-staff employed. The 
changes in the external reporting requirements (Basel, 2014) have had a 
different impact. In order to manage the changing reporting requirements, the 
Icelandic banks have hired additional support staff in a number of functions. In 
total this accounts for an average of 10 – 15 additional employees.  
An area where significant differences have been identified is the risk 
management function. Even though both countries are governed by the same 
regulatory requirements and perform the same tasks (Basel, 2011), since the 
financial crisis the risk management functions in Iceland have grown from an 
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average of 5 to 30 fulltime employees. In Denmark the average number of 
employees has been stable at the level of 5. Both countries respond to the 
coercive pressure (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) from FSA supported by a 
mandatory review by IAF. Further they copy other banks and thus expose 
themselves to a mimetic pressure. In addition, the Icelandic risk management 
practices have managed to establish a normative pressure, since the board of 
directors followed the recommendations from the risk management 
professionals regarding establishment and staffing. This combined pressure 
(Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006) have resulted in a situation where the risk 
management functions are institutionalised. As a consequence it seems that 
“…it is difficult to remove power” (Danish CEO) and that the staffing levels 
should be considered permanent. Consequently the additional staffing should be 
considered a fixed cost going forward. This is supported by the view that 
institutionalised functions are difficult to change (Burns and Scapens, 2000). 
Policies and procedures is an area where there have been significant changes in 
the regulatory requirements (Van der Stede, 2011). The level of formalisation 
had different starting points in Iceland and Denmark. At present the Icelandic 
banks seem to have difficulties in moving from enacting to reproduction. The 
difficulties can be explained by the fact that fundamental changes are more 
difficult than evolutionary changes (Zoni et al., 2012). In Denmark most of the 
policies and procedures had been documented prior to the financial crisis, and 
changes in regulatory requirements have resulted in a situation where 
procedures are encoded as a mechanical response without a clear business-
driven need, which leads to ineffective solutions (Munir et al., 2013). Further, 
the need for encoded rules seems to be replaced by employees’ experience (Van 
der Steen, 2011). This is an indication of institutionalisation (Burns and 
Scapens, 2000). In both countries, policies and procedures are seen as a 
management tool (Flamholtz et al., 1985; Margison, 2002). Although the 
literature on management controls sees policies and procedures as important for 
changing behaviour, the managers consider culture to be more important. This 
indicates that the use of administrative controls as a management tool should be 
combined with the use of cultural controls. It also indicates that there might be 
limitations as to how much reliance can be placed on policies and procedures – 
and consequently on internal controls (Eilifsen et al., 2014-B). 
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There are a number of areas in which changes have been implemented in both 
countries. New regulatory requirements have initiated significant changes 
regarding formal lines of authority. Furthermore, FSA issued orders to IAF on 
mandatory reviews in this area. The responses, which are the same in both 
countries, are seen as a combination of coercive (regulatory) and normative 
(IAF) pressure (Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006). Even though both management and 
employees see these changes as “too much time is spent on ticking the boxes”, 
and resistance should be expected, the combined pressure has resulted in a 
reproduction (Burns and Scapens, 2000). 
It should be expected that pressure may lead to the implementation of 
ineffective solutions or difficulties (Munir et al., 2013; Zoni et al., 2012). The 
implementation of code of conduct is an example of this. Since all the banks 
have implemented a code of conduct, it may be classified as a result of a 
mimetic pressure (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Despite the fact that it is 
formalised, many employees have not read it, and it may therefore be 
considered as a minor encoding (Burns and Scapens, 2000).  
The Icelandic banks have introduced a number of visible changes to the 
administrative controls, including formalisation of policies and procedures, and 
have hired additional risk management staff. Since these changes have been 
documented, they can be verified by auditors and FSA. Therefore they serve the 
purpose of dealing with the coercive pressure (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) in 
order to re-establish trust (IMF, 2014; Jännäri, 2009). The changes also initiated 
a behavioural change (Walker, 2009; Erkens et al., 2012), and internal controls 
were used to support this. Depending on the level of institutionalisation (Burn 
and Scapens, 2000) the role of internal controls differs. When controls become 
institutionalised, formal rules tend to be replaced by employees’ experience 
(Van der Steen, 2011), and further improvements have to rely on cultural 
controls (Malmi and Brown, 2008). Consequently the role and effectiveness of 
internal controls as a tool to assure reliable information depend on the level of 
institutionalisation. 
The role of materiality 
As part of the thesis, the role of materiality regarding disclosures in the notes to 
the annual report has been analysed. Based on a case study it has been explored 
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how materiality regarding disclosures is perceived by preparers, auditors and 
users. The annual report is the result of an interaction between preparer and 
auditors (Brennan and Grey, 2005). A key issue in this interaction is whether 
users would change their decisions depending on whether an item of 
information is included or omitted (IASB, 2010). In this respect it is necessary 
to understand what decisions the information is used for and consider the 
thresholds. The decisions therefore depend on the user, and sell-side analysts 
are considered one of the most advanced groups of users (Brown et al., 2015). 
Preparer and auditors have the same perception of materiality. This might be 
explained by the fact that during their careers, many of the preparers have 
worked as auditors for one of the Big 4 audit firms. This common 
understanding includes a tendency to consider sell-side analysts as the most 
important users. When preparer and auditors assess disclosure materiality, they 
use a three-step model: 
 Is the disclosure or the related line item quantitative material? 
 Is there a significant change to the disclosure or related line item compared 
with previous years? 
 Does the disclosure add value to the user? 
 
If the answer to one of these questions is yes, the disclosure is material. 
In the first step the sizes of the current year figures are used as thresholds. 
These thresholds can be based on the financial statement, the related line item 
or individual lines in a specification. The assessment is comparable with the 
approach used when misstatements are evaluated. The difference is that 
evaluation of misstatements is based on standardised thresholds (Eilifsen et al., 
2014-A), whereas assessments of disclosure materiality are context specific and 
more judgmental.  
In the second step the figures are compared with prior year, based on the same 
types of amounts as the first step. If the development deviates from an expected 
trend it is likely that the related disclosures are assessed as material. In a 
situation where the absolute change from prior year is immaterial, a large 
relative change can be assessed as material. 
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The third step includes qualitative characteristics, and it is assessed if the 
disclosure adds value to the user. The qualitative characteristics include a 
number of company specific elements related to the financial report. Examples 
are information about risks and uncertainties, accounting policy choices, 
expectations or stewardship. It is also considered whether the disclosure is read 
and understood by the user or if it is too complicated. This assessment does not 
include a consideration of whether the information is used as input to a financial 
analysis or if it might have an impact on buy, sell or hold decisions. Therefore 
preparers’ and auditors’ considerations about users’ needs for information are 
different from the actual needs. As a consequence, preparer and auditors do not 
follow the long standing key requirements regarding “influence” on “users” 
“decision” (Kohler, 1957; Barker et al., 2013; EFRAG, 2012; IASB, 2015). 
The response from the sell-side analysts regarding the actual use of the 
disclosures as presented in the annual report was that most of the information is 
available from other sources, primarily quarterly statements, the company’s 
website and investor relations (Brown et al., 2015; Cole et al., 2009). It was 
however a surprise that some of the sell-side analysts stated that they did not 
use the notes in the annual report at all, but only the primary financial 
statement. When disregarding the annual report as a medium and focusing 
exclusively on the disclosed information – irrespectively of what source they 
came from – the assessment is consistent. As a consequence of the use of Excel 
to store information, sell-side analysts only focus on current year to update the 
models. Standard text, boilerplate and prior-year figures are not used. Further, if 
the results of the financial analysis do not meet expectations, it is assumed that 
management provides an explanation in the first part of the annual report, and 
not in the notes. 
There is a risk that immaterial information might obscure useful or relevant 
information (IAASB, 2014). These considerations are however not seen as a 
major problem, since the sell-side analysts simply do not use irrelevant 
disclosures. 
When making decisions on what information should be disclosed in the annual 
report the concept of materiality should be applied to ensure that the users get 
relevant information. Based on the case study, the perception of materiality 
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between preparer and auditors differ from the users’ actual needs for 
information. Consequently the required information is not provided, and the 
users consult other sources to find the information. 
 
6. Contributions and implications 
The thesis contributes in the areas analysed to an understanding of the role of 
internal control and materiality regarding the quality of information. 
The role of internal and administrative controls 
The most important “basic building block” is internal control. The purpose of 
internal control is two-fold, as part of an internal control audit it provides audit 
assurance by mitigating the overall audit risk related to the annual report 
(Eilifsen et al., 2014-B). Further, it ensures that reliable information is available 
for management purposes (Simons, 1994); this includes MCS as well as internal 
and external reporting. Even though substantial costs are involved in the design, 
implementation and operation of internal controls (Carney, 2006), it seems that 
it is a joint decision between auditors and client to improve the level of controls. 
Such decisions are made as an outcome of the management letter process, 
which results in a joint agreement of improvement of existing or 
implementation of new internal controls. 
Internal controls are part of administrative controls (Malmi and Brown, 2008), 
and they can be used to change employees’ behaviour (Walker, 2009; Erkens et 
al., 2012) and as a response to the financial crisis. The changes in Iceland were 
primarily of a coercive nature (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) since the banks had 
to re-establish trust (IMF, 2014; Jännäri, 2009). To deal with this pressure, a 
number of visible and documented changes were implemented, which is a 
prerequisite for auditing and inspection by FSA. These initiatives can also be 
seen as compliance with changes to the regulatory requirements (Van der Stede, 
2011; Franks et al., 1997). However, the role of the administrative controls is 
also a management tool, which can support the establishment of a taken-for-
granted behaviour (Burns and Scapens, 2000). This can also be considered a 
prerequisite for changing the cultural controls and thus the values (Walker, 
2009; Erkens et al., 2012). To succeed with changes to the values developed in 
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the banks (Birnberg and Snodgrass 1988), the employees should therefore 
establish a taken-for-granted behaviour. 
The role and effectiveness of internal controls depend on the level of 
institutionalisation (Burn and Scapens, 2000).The impact is reduced when the 
employees have experience with the processes (Van der Steen, 2011), and 
further improvements in the level of controls have to rely on cultural controls 
(Malmi and Brown, 2008). 
Besides contributing to the understanding of when and how internal controls 
should be used to change employees’ behaviour, the analysis also considers 
relations to the regulatory requirements. These requirements have an impact on 
decisions regarding internal controls, but not at the detailed level. Detailed 
requests for further formalisation will only be an administrative compliance 
burden without adding to the level of controls. Instead it seems that informal 
information from other financial companies, e.g. IAF sharing experiences 
regarding FSA, has an impact on the scope of the internal control audit. 
Consequently, FSA should focus more on principle-based regulation rather than 
the long lasting practice of seeking to establish detailed rules (Franks et al., 
1997). This has an impact on the definition of requirements in favour of 
principle-based regulation aiming at affecting management’s approach to the 
overall level of controls rather than the details (Ho et al., 2013). This potential 
change is also supported by the behaviour of the employees; despite their 
complaints about FSA, they respect internal controls, which is supported by the 
“Tone at the Top” (Lail et al., 2015). 
IAF has indicated that they use additional resources due to pressure from FSA 
but that this is difficult to measure. However, it could be of interest for future 
research to explore the nature and magnitude of this burden, which might be 
considered an indirect cost of regulatory compliance. How much additional 
work, in excess of what is needed to mitigate the audit risk (Eilifsen et al., 
2014-B), does IAF deliver due to FSA? At the company level it could also be of 
interest to explore if the administrative burden of regulatory requirements is 
mainly related to internal controls considered as a “basic building block”, or 
rather to management controls, including liquidity, capital and reporting 
requirements. 
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Further, it is important for the banks to know when to focus on administrative 
controls as a management tool and when to use other management controls. The 
banks seek to balance compliance with regulatory requirements, a business-
driven need for satisfactory controls and optimisation of the resources used. It 
could therefore be of interest for further research to analyse how the 
configuration of management controls can be optimised. As a basis for this 
research it might be beneficial to gain an understanding of how the total 
package of management controls (Malmi and Browns, 2008) has been used as a 
response to the financial crisis. 
The role of materiality 
Another important “basic building block” is materiality. Preparer and auditors 
assess materiality regarding disclosures in three steps. This assessment is 
primarily based on tools for misstatements rather than omissions, which may be 
due to lack of guidance. Consequently the result of the assessment is not aligned 
with users’ requirements for information, and too many disclosures are 
presented in the notes to the annual report, which indicates an information 
overload (EFRAG, 2012). This also supports the view that clarification 
regarding the use of disclosure materiality is needed (IASB, 2015). These 
findings should be used when standard setters develop new guidance on 
disclosure materiality. The result also indicates that the annual report as a 
source of information competes with the company’s website and questions to 
investor relations (Brown et al., 2015). If analysts need additional information, 
they prefer to search the company’s website or other sources rather than the 
annual report. In that respect they consider information made available at the 
company’s website as credible, even though it may not be subject to external 
audit. 
There are a number of important implications of these findings. First, they raise 
the question of why Danish listed companies prepare an average of 46 pages of 
disclosures when there is a limited use and value of this? Furthermore, there 
seems to be a need for alignment between the users’ needs for information, 
which are based on input to the financial analysis, and the preparers’ and 
auditors perception of disclosure materiality. IASB’s draft practice statement 
(IASB, 2015) does not address this difference clearly. 
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The annual report has a long tradition, and the auditors have seen it as the most 
important assurance object. If users depend on other sources of information, 
preparers and auditors might consider if the companies’ websites should be the 
main focus for assurance services going forward. These implications could be 
of interest for further research. Additionally a quantification of the potential for 
cutting clutter (FRC, 2011) seems to have immediate interest. 
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Abstract 
Based on a single case study in a large financial institution the paper examines 
a) the extent to which, and b) how and why internal control audits performed by 
internal audit affect internal controls. The study includes a review of 
management letters for the period 2008 – 12 reporting the result of the internal 
control audits. The review revealed that 30% of auditor’s recommendations 
gave rise to the implementation of new internal controls. Seen in isolation, this 
indicates that management letters are a source of new internal controls. 
To explain how and why internal control audits affect internal controls, an 
analysis of the audit/client interaction in the management letter process was 
conducted. The analysis showed that the recommendations and improvement of 
existing and implementation of new controls are a joint product between 
auditors and client. The improved level of internal controls adds value both 
from an audit and a business perspective. Further it serves as a defence against 
the regulatory regime. Even though FSA is blamed for the burdensome work 
with internal controls, it seems that the improvements would most likely have 
been implemented regardless of pressure from FSA. The paper seeks to fill a 
gap in the knowledge of auditor impact on internal control and modifies the 
anecdotes that auditors alone are to blame for the growing number of internal 
controls. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent decades, it has been suggested to regulatory authorities and auditors 
that they develop pressure on companies to establish further internal control 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009; Power, 2004; Power 2005). Both the internal 
audit function (IAF) and external auditors (EA) have for a long time been 
assumed to play a key role in relation to reporting on internal control (Maijoor, 
2000; Spira and Page, 2003). The auditors’ recommendations are typically 
reported in management letters, which is a long-standing current practice of 
communicating observations and advice, especially regarding improvements of 
internal controls (Manson et al., 2001). In this respect, internal controls are not 
considered in terms of broad risk management (Spira and Page, 2003) but rather 
at the detailed process level where they are evaluated from an audit perspective 
(Eilifsen et al., 2010) against “control objectives” (AICPA, 2008). 
The assumption that auditors put extensive pressure on companies for further 
internal controls is to some extent based on anecdotes. During my years as an 
external systems and process auditor, we got the following comment from a top 
tier CFO: 
“You always recommend improvements and implementation of new controls in 
your management letters – so you are actually to blame for the growing 
number”. 
There is perhaps some truth in this statement, since we had to be visible to the 
client (recommending improvements) in order to demonstrate value.  
Even though IAF is an important player, they generally do not have a well-
defined role in relation to internal control (Power, 2008; Arena and Sarens, 
2015). This uncertainty should also be seen in the context that with regard 
to both independence and professional qualifications, IAF are of varying 
quality (Arena and Jeppesen, 2010). Despite the importance of IAF, there is 
little academic knowledge about their impact on internal controls (Bame-
Aldred et al., 2013).  To fil this gap, a single case study has been conducted 
aimed at exploring: To what extent, how and why do internal control audits 
affect internal controls? 
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In order to answer this research question, empirical material was collected from 
a case study of an IAF in a large financial institution. This IAF is to a large 
extent organised and staffed and work similarly to EA and is subject to detailed 
regulatory requirements (BEK, 2013). This includes the requirement that IAF 
report exclusively to the board of directors (Arena and Jeppesen, 2010). Further, 
the head of IAF has to be approved by FSA, and an audit agreement governed 
by the audit committee must be established on an annual basis describing the 
distribution of tasks between EA and IAF. In the Group (anonymous name of 
the entity used in the paper), IAF is responsible for the internal control audit, 
including the related management letter reporting. EA is required to do a quality 
review of the work performed by IAF and report the result to the board of 
directors (BEK, 2013). Further, they are required to redo some of the work (ISA 
610, 2013), but according to local practice this can be done as a joint audit in a 
limited area, which reduces the need for additional work (DR and IIA, 2013). It 
is therefore anticipated that the findings of the present paper may be applicable 
not only in an IAF context, but also to the role of auditors in general.  
In order to understand to what extent management letters impact internal 
control, a detailed analysis of the management letters for the period 2008 – 12 
was performed. The analysis included a review of working papers and 
clarifying interviews of audit and client staff. This part of the analysis showed 
that approx. 30% of the recommendations in the management letters result in 
the implementation of new controls. The remaining 70% cover various 
weaknesses in existing controls. The majority of those, 60% of the total 
population, are observations regarding weaknesses in existing procedures, 
design or operational issues (AICPA, 2008). The remaining approx. 10% relate 
to issues where controls are operated as intended but the documentation is 
insufficient. Based on the analysis, auditor’s recommendations in management 
letters should be considered a source of new controls. 
To clarify how and why internal control audits affect internal controls, the 
management letter process was outlined on the basis of an examination of draft 
and final versions of reports, including supporting working papers, 
documentation and minutes. The review was supported by interviews of audit 
and client staff participating in the process. On this basis, a number of 
interactions between auditor and client were identified. These interactions were 
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analysed drawing on theories of auditor-client interaction (Fearnley et al., 2011 
and Salterio, 2012) by combining elements from both theories and using them 
as a basis for structuring the information from the case study. 
How do internal control audits affect internal controls? The analysis shows that 
the interaction between auditor and client is an exchange of information based 
on a primarily argumentative strategy by both parties. The outcome of the 
interaction, which is the result of the internal control audits and the subsequent 
management letter process, is an improvement of existing and implementation 
of new controls. The result should be classified as a joint product based on co-
operation between auditor and client, which improves the level of internal 
controls. 
Why do internal control audits affect internal controls? The impact occurs 
because recommendations for improvement of existing and implementation of 
new controls add value from both an audit and a business perspective. Further 
the improvements serve as a defence against the regulatory regime. This 
defence seems important for everyone in the organisation, and the 
recommendations are often prompted by FSA regulations. The reference to FSA 
concerns, which are often made by auditors and client staff, serves to ensure 
that the organisation takes the recommendations seriously. Moreover, it appears 
convenient to blame FSA and to justify huge efforts and burdensome changes to 
the internal control system with reference to the rigid and mechanistic FSA 
practices and regulations. Even though the defence seems important, the added 
value from both an audit and a business perspective is significant, and 
recommendations would most likely have been implemented regardless of the 
pressure from FSA. It seems that FSA has an impact on the management letter 
process, but not on the implementation of internal controls. This conclusion 
could indicate that FSA should focus on a principle-based regulation and 
pressure rather than seek to establish detailed rules regarding internal controls, 
which is a change to the current trend of more detailed regulation (Ho et al., 
2013). 
Based on a single case study, this paper contributes with a detailed 
understanding of how and why internal control audits impact the internal 
controls system in a financial institution. This also adds a deeper understanding 
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of the management letter process compared with previous studies. Further, the 
paper modifies the anecdotes that auditors alone are to blame for the growing 
number of internal controls. Instead, the paper concludes that the main 
explanation is the cooperation between auditor and client. The result is an 
improved level of internal controls which mitigates both audit and business risk 
– and serves as a defence against the regulatory regime. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the combined 
audit/client interaction model used to analyse the “how” and “why” part of the 
research question. Section 3 contains a description of the method, and section 4 
a description of the Group and audit in the Group. The result of the case study is 
presented in sections 5 – 6, and the final section combines the conclusion and 
discussion. 
 
2. Interaction between internal audit and client 
The result of an internal control audit is reported in a management letter, which 
includes recommendations for improvement of existing or implementation of 
new internal controls (Manson et al., 2001). Although the management letter is 
formally prepared by the auditor, it is also the result of a process involving a 
number of interactions between auditor and client. A description of the 
management letter process in the Group, including the audit/client interactions, 
is illustrated in appendices 1 and 2. 
Interaction between EA and client has been the subject of studies since 1991 
(Antle and Nalebuff, 1991), where issues regarding the audit opinion on the 
financial statement were analysed. Based on the number of citations, there are 
two other important papers in this area: Gibbins et al. (2001) and Beattie et al. 
(2004). Both studies, which have been revised by Salterio (2012) and Fearnley 
et al. (2011), focus on interactions regarding the external audit of financial 
reporting issues. This is different to the case study, where IAF performs the 
internal control audit. The nature of the IAF (Arena and Jeppesen, 2010), 
including independence from the executive board, and the quality of the work 
seem, however, to be at the same level as an EA (Bame-Aldred et al., 2013; 
Stefaniak et al., 2012). The specific setting of IAF is described in section 4.2. 
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Consequently, the conceptual models, Salterio (2012) and Fernley et al. (2011), 
appear to be useful to support an analysis of the question of “how” and “why” 
internal control audits affect internal controls. Based on these studies, the model 
used in this paper is presented in figure 1: 
Exchange of information
Discussion
Negotiation
In
si
st
in
g
A
rg
u
m
en
ti
ve
P
er
m
is
si
ve
Audit behaviour
Combined behaviour
Interaction
Issue
Outcome:
• Client product
• Joint product
• Audit product4
5
6
Regulatory / legal context:
• Mandatory requirement
• Judgmental requirement
• Direct / indirect consequences
• Risk of being caught
General interaction context:
• Tone from the top
• Objectives of parties
Audit / client context:
• Quality of relationship
• Length of relationship
• Level of expertise
• History of issue
• Impact of issue1 2 3
 
Figure 1 - Combined audit/client interaction model based on Salterio (2012) and 
Fearnley et al. (2011). 
At its core, the model has an interaction process (4), (5) and (6), which is 
surrounded by a number of contextual features (1), (2) and (3): 
Core interaction 
The centre of the model describes the core interaction. The interaction starts 
with an “Issue” (4), which is the input to the “Interaction” (5). In relation to 
auditors reporting on internal controls, one issue could be a recommendation, 
and later in the management letter process an audit memo, a management letter 
or the LFAR. The nature of the behaviour ranges from “permissive” through 
“argumentative” to “insisting” for both auditor and client. The insisting 
behaviour can be illustrated by a situation where the auditors, due to 
professional responsibilities or legal requirements, have thresholds which 
cannot be exceeded. As opposed to “insisting”, “permissive” is added to 
describe a situation where one of the parties simply accepts the issue. It seems, 
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however, that a situation where the parties have mixed behaviour should be 
expected (Muninghan and Bazerman, 1990). A mix between “permissive” and 
“insisting” has been labelled as “argumentative”. 
According to Beattie et al., (2000) interaction can range from an “exchange of 
information” through “discussion” to “negotiation”. Of these classifications, the 
only one clearly defined in the literature is “negotiation”, e.g. (Gulliver et al., 
1979). The other two classifications seem to be added based on a graduation of 
the concept “negotiation”. These classifications are used as a description of the 
combined behaviour of auditor and client. 
The “Outcome” (6) can be classified either as a client product, a joint product or 
an audit product (Salterio, 2012). A management letter is by definition an audit 
product, since the auditor prepares and “owns” the document. The same 
argument can be used for the annual report, which is the responsibility of the 
company and thus a client product. Since for a number of years the annual 
report has been considered a joint product (Antle and Nalebuff, 1991), the 
classification of the output should be seen as a description of who has 
influenced the outcome rather than who formally owns the document. 
Contextual features 
The contextual features (1) (2) and (3) are categories of factors that in various 
degrees affect the core interaction. Examples of individual factors have been 
derived from the initial studies (Gibbins et al. 2001; Beattie et al. 2004) and 
related papers from the same group of authors. Examples of these factors have 
been added to each of the contextual features in a “bullet” format. 
The regulatory/legal context (1) has been analysed by Fearnley et al. (2011), 
who compare the result of this study with the initial study by Beattie (2004). 
The “Risk of being caught” has risen in the period between these two studies, 
and this has impacted the behaviour of the client (5) from insisting towards the 
direction of passive acceptance. Another example in the regulatory/legal context 
is the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, according to which auditors have been 
mandated more power, which has resulted in a move from a permissive to a 
more insisting behaviour (Brown and Wright, 2008). 
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Regarding the general interaction context (2), the “tone from the top” (Lail et 
al., 2015) could be a policy by the board of directors on “no surprises”, which 
tends to make the parties more co-operative (Fearnley et al., 2011). An example 
of the impact of “Objectives of the parties” is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, where 
the auditor needs assurance in order to certify the internal controls. On the other 
hand, the cost of controls for complying with auditors’ recommendations can be 
high (Carney, 2006). In this situation, the parties could have differing 
preferences, but should at the same time end up with a joint decision.  
Combined with the above comments, the behaviour of the auditor might be 
insisting, which could affect the possible outcome (6) in the direction of an 
“Audit product”. 
The audit/client context (3) has been analysed in a number of studies. The 
development of this feature was analysed by Fearnley et al. (2011) when 
comparing the result with an early study by Beattie et al. (2000). The impact of 
the audit/client context has been reduced in the period between these two 
studies in favour of the regulatory/legal context. A different result is reported in 
a study on the effect of past client relationship in which it is concluded that the 
impact of the audit/client context is significant (Brown-Liburd and Wright, 
2011). The “History of issue” is inspired by antecedent related to previous 
interaction and its outcome and is closely related to the core interaction 
(Salterio, 2012). As an example, the behaviour chosen when dealing with a 
significant audit difference has been analysed in combination with the result of 
previous interaction (Hatfield et al., 2010). The study indicates that the 
magnitude of the audit difference (“Impact of issue”) has an effect on the nature 
of auditor’s interaction moving in the direction of being more insisting. There 
is, however, also a pull in the opposite direction, since client concession from 
prior interaction could have this impact. The “History of issue” may potentially 
affect behaviour in the direction of either permissive or insisting, depending on 
the result of the previous interaction. It seems that you either cannot or should 
not win them all. 
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3. Method 
The overall goal is to examine a) to what extent and b) how and why internal 
control audits affect internal controls. As little is known about auditor’s impact 
on internal controls, a single case study is used to explore the phenomenon in 
detail (Eisenhardt, 1989). This method is appropriate, since the focus is on a 
real-life situation with a variety of data sources aiming at answering a question 
of “how” and why” (Yin, 2009). The case study also seek to illustrate if the 
specific internal control audit supports the combined audit/client model (figure 
1) (Keating, 1995). Looking at the elements of the research question, the 
approach used to analyse the “extent” part is different compared to that used for 
the analysis of “how” and “why”. The “extent” part is primarily analysed based 
on a review of management letters. Besides addressing the “extent” part, the 
result is also used as a basis for analysing “how” and “why” by gaining a 
general understanding of the management letter process. The main part of the 
investigation of “how” and “why” is, however, based on an analysis of the 
interaction in the management letter process. 
The data sources included documentation, e.g. the management letters, auditors’ 
supporting memos and working papers. Access was also granted to the annual 
customer satisfaction survey, where IAF is evaluated by the client. Furthermore, 
observations from participation in meetings together with interviews of audit 
and client staff are important data sources. The information assessed and 
analysed is considered confidential by the Group. According to the 
confidentiality agreement I was granted free access to information on the 
company's premises. Further I was placed in IAF and collected data alongside 
with the auditors and had immediate access to the staff. This access to 
information allowed for a collection of detailed data, which is supported by the 
case study method. The inherent risk of biased information was reduced by 
access to various data sources, including several knowledgeable informants in 
all areas (Eisenhardt and Graeber, 2007). Due to the terms of the confidentiality 
agreement I was not allowed to remove information from the premises unless 
this had been approved by the head of IAF. To deal with the confidentiality 
requirement and to get sufficient evidence that the observations and quotes used 
in the paper fairly represent the informants’ attitudes, we agreed that the 
relevant sections of the paper should be reviewed by the informants. In addition, 
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a member of the audit team with years of experience in the Group reviewed the 
entire section 6 “Interaction between auditor and client”. This procedure also 
ensured that any misunderstandings were corrected and helped mitigate some of 
the challenges regarding a single case study, including the risk of a biased data 
collection (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
 
3.1. Review – management letters 
A management letter is a well-defined and widely used form of communication 
to make recommendations to the client based on observations made during the 
audit (Eilifsen et al., 2010). According to Manson et al., (2001), a management 
letter is a formal way of communicating advice and comments to management 
in order to: 
 improve the accounting and internal control systems; 
 encourage the adoption of appropriate accounting policies; and 
 improve the general efficiency and effectiveness of the business. 
 
The reporting in the case study only covers the result of the internal control 
audit (first bullet). 
In order to clarify to what extent internal control audits affect internal controls, 
a detailed analysis of the management letter reporting covering the period 2008 
– 12 was performed. On an annual basis, 30 – 35 audit memos are prepared, 
each with 2 – 5 recommendations. For the period reviewed, a total of 404 
recommendations were reported. 
The management letter reporting consists of two documents: an audit memo and 
a management summary. Together they fulfil the definition of a management 
letter (Manson et al., 2001). Furthermore, an LFAR addressed to the board of 
directors is closely related to the management letter process, as it summarises 
the result of the audit. An important element in the management letter is the 
classification of recommendations (Hellman, 2006). A prioritisation into three 
categories (1, 2 and 3) is used in the Group. This is to some extent comparable 
with AICPA’s classifications: “material weakness” (1), “significant deficiency” 
(2) and “deficiency” (3), (AICPA, 2008). Appendix 2 describes the documents, 
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and appendix 3 includes a short version of a management summary as an 
example. 
In the documents reviewed, the only quantitative information is the 
prioritisation of observations. The documents have, however, all been prepared 
in a standardised format, which helps to mitigate the risk related to the validity 
of the extracted data (Tellis, 1997). In order to classify the information by other 
criteria than the prioritisation, a detailed analysis of the wording of the 
observations, risk evaluations and recommendations were performed. Based on 
this, a number of classifications were derived, inspired by a study of 
management letters by Manson et al., (2001). The review of the documents gave 
rise to a number of clarifying questions which were answered on an ongoing 
basis through short interviews with audit staff. 
 
3.2. Management letter process 
In order to understand “how” and “why” internal control audits affect internal 
controls, an analysis of the interaction between auditor and client within the 
management letter process was performed. Since the Group had no description 
of the management letter process, an overview description was prepared, and 
“handshake” symbols were inserted at the places where interaction between 
auditor and client was identified (appendix 1). The description was based on a 
review of the management letters supported by interviews of audit staff 
responsible for the individual process steps. The description of the management 
letter process (appendix 1 and 2) together with the description of the Group and 
audit in the Group (section 4) allows the reader to compare the context with 
other cases (Parker and Northcott, 2016). In addition, I had access to working 
papers including draft and final versions of all documents produced as part of 
the internal control audit. These documents were reviewed when analysing the 
interaction and preparing for the interviews, e.g. in order to understand how 
many changes were made to the documents as a result of the interaction.   
In order to explore the interaction, a number of responsive interviews (Rubin 
and Rubin, 2012) were held with audit and client staff. A responsive interview 
is based on a number of main questions aiming at exploring “how” and “why” 
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internal control audits affect internal control (appendix 4). The follow-up 
questions are not defined before the interviews but rather formulated in direct 
response to the answers provided to the main questions that are aimed at 
establishing a dialogue. In order to support the dialogue and keep the 
conversation focused, the overview of the management letter process (appendix 
1) and the combined audit/client interaction model (figure 1) were used. These 
documents provided for matters raised during the interviews to be related 
directly to the interaction taking place in the management letter process and the 
contextual features. Further the discussion served as a validation of the 
description of the management letter process. 
The main questions addressing the “how” part of the research question are 
based on the core elements of the combined audit/client interaction model 
(figure 1 - numbers 4, 5 and 6). The “how” questions provide information 
whether: 
 the behaviour of auditor and client is: Permissive, argumentative or 
insisting; 
 the combined behaviour of the auditor/client interaction could be seen as an 
exchange of information, a discussion or a negotiation; 
 the outcome should be considered a client product, a joint product or an 
audit product. 
 
At the detailed level, 10 recommendations were selected which, both from an 
audit and a business perspective, could be considered significant. The selection 
was made by the head of IAF and the head of IT-security. The latter has 
previously worked for many years in 1st line functions. The head of IAF and the 
head of IT-security were presented a list of 20 recommendations, identified as 
part of the review of the management letters, which they reduced to 10. The 
selection criteria included the requirements that the recommendations should be 
included in the LFAR, the mitigation of the risk should require significant 
resources, e.g. an implementation project, and both existing and new internal 
controls should be included. Examples of these recommendations are included 
in appendix 3. The recommendations supported the discussion regarding the 
“Outcome” (6), which can be classified as either a joint product, an audit 
product or a client product (Salterio, 2012). 
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The main questions addressing the “why” part of the research question were 
based on the contextual features of the interaction model (figure 1 – numbers 1, 
2, 3 and 4). The “why” questions provided information about what impact the 
contextual features have on the audit/client interaction and on the “outcome”. 
The analysis of the “outcome” also included discussions of the value of the 
recommendations, both from an audit and a client perspective. 
The Group did not allow the use of a voice recorder. Instead notes were taken 
during each interview, and memos were produced immediately after the 
meetings. Furthermore, we agreed that informal follow-up meetings could be 
arranged if required. Since I was located in the internal audit department and 
close to both 1st and 2nd line staff, this opportunity to go back to the 
interviewees was repeatedly used both to clarify issues but also to expand the 
responsive interviews and thereby get more information and a deeper 
understanding. The informal nature of the meetings resulted in interviews of 
more than 30 persons. The main informants were 6 auditors and 5 client 
representatives. 
 
4. Description of the Group 
A summarised description of the Group and audit in the Group based on 
material collected is included below. The description is an addition to the 
general regulatory context applicable to Danish banks (Arena and Jeppesen, 
2010, p. 116). 
 
4.1. The Group 
The Group is one of the local top tier financial institutions with three main 
business areas, mortgage, bank and insurance. Each business area is organised 
into a number of subsidiaries fully owned by a holding company. According to 
local legal requirements, members of the board of directors are not allowed to 
take part in the day-to-day management of the company. It is a further 
responsibility of the board of directors to appoint the head of IAF. The 
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organisational structure is established and governed in compliance with the 
local companies act and requirements of FSA (BEK, 2010). 
The organisation of internal control and risk management activities follows the 
“Three Lines of Defence” model (BIS, 2012): 
 
Figure 2 – Group three lines of defence model (Group internal figure) 
1st line of defence 
The local management of each business area is responsible for identifying, 
assessing and managing risks associated with the performance of their duties, 
and to ensure that satisfactory internal controls are established. They have an 
individual task of fulfilling Group internal policies as well as financial 
legislation and other external requirements. These tasks are not part of the 
incentive system in the Group. The local management refers to the executive 
board.  
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2nd line of defence 
This line includes a number of interdisciplinary departments in the Group, i.e. 
Risk Management, Compliance and IT Security. These departments have the 
responsibility to establish policies and procedures, and monitor that the 
activities are operated according to these requirements, which includes ensuring 
that the internal controls are satisfactory. The 2nd line of defence is organised 
with reference to the executive board. 
3rd line of defence 
IAF must be established with reference to the board of directors, and they are 
not allowed to do any other work than audit (BEK, 2013). It is not a 
requirement but a long-standing local practice that the head of IAF in major 
financial institutions is a state-authorised auditor. The internal audit staff have 
degrees as state-authorised auditors (20%), master’s degrees in auditing (30%), 
master’s degrees in finance (20%) and bachelor degrees in accounting (30%). 
Regarding independence requirements, the local regulation follows the code of 
ethics for professional accountants (IESBA, 2013) in all material aspects. 
Outside the three lines of defence, EA has an independent responsibility for the 
audit opinion on the financial statements. 
 
4.2. Audit in the Group 
In order to understand the nature of IAF and the quality of work delivered, the 
Group has been related to EA’s reliance on IAF. The following framework has 
been used for this evaluation (Bame-Aldred et al., 2013)1: 
 Regulatory environment 
 Environmental factors affecting IAF reliance 
 IAF factors affecting EA’ reliance on the IAF 
 Nature and extent of EA reliance on IAF 
 Outcome effects of EA reliance on the IAF 
                                                     
1 The paper “A summary of Research on External Auditor Reliance on the Internal Audit 
Function (Bame-Aldred et al., 2013) includes a review of academic literature and selected 
practitioner research organised according to the bullets. 
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Regulatory environment 
The regulatory requirements are primarily included in the “Executive order on 
auditing financial undertakings etc. and financial Groups” (BEK, 2013). The 
main requirements are: 
 Appointment and dismissal of the head of IAF must be made by the board 
of directors and reported to FSA. 
 The budget for IAF must be approved by the board of directors. 
 IAF are not allowed to perform any other functions than auditing. 
 The audit must comply with generally accepted auditing standards and be 
performed in accordance with the audit agreement. Specific reference is 
made to ISA 315. 
 EA must perform a sample-based quality review of IAF work and report the 
result to the board of directors in the LFAR. Specific reference is made to 
ISA 610.2 
 
Furthermore, in the year-end LFAR EA must state if the work according to the 
audit agreement has been done and if IAF functions satisfactorily, including 
being independent from the executive board. The LFAR from both EA and IAF 
must be forwarded to FSA after having been formally signed by the board of 
directors (BEK, 2013). 
Environmental factors affecting IAF reliance 
The environmental factors include the governance structure which may mainly 
be evaluated through the relationship between IAF and the audit committee. 
Key elements in this relationship are reporting duties, hiring/termination rights 
and budget control (Abbott et al., 2010). These three issues are all supported by 
regulatory requirements, which results in a strong audit committee oversight of 
IAF. The facts that the Group operates in the financial service sector and that 
the audit committee approves the budget are also indications that the IAF has 
the required resources (Carcello et al., 2005). 
                                                     
2 The references to ISA 315 and 610 are also included in the description of the relation 
between internal and external audit in “The internal audit function in banks” (BIS, 2012). 
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It is also the responsibility of the audit committee to ensure that an audit 
agreement is entered into between EA and IAF (BEK, 2013). According to the 
audit agreement, the internal control audit and the related management reporting 
is the responsibility of IAF. This is a traditional task for IAF (Arena and Sarens, 
2015). In contrast, the audit of the financial statement is primarily performed by 
EA, supported by IAF staff. The co-operation between EA and IAF means that 
it is an integrated financial and internal control audit (Kinney et al., 2013): 
 
Internal control
audit
Control 
weaknesses
Audit opinion
Long form audit 
report
Management 
letter
Financial audit Adjustments & corrections
Audit opinion
Long form audit 
report
Management 
letter
 
Figure 3 – Integrated financial and internal control audit in the Group (inspired by 
Kinney et al., 2013) 
Regarding oversight, FSA also exercises ad hoc supervision. During the case 
study, the head of IAF had a request from FSA about the reporting lines. The 
request was based on a newspaper article which indicated that IAF reported to 
the executive board rather than to the board of directors. Even though the 
newspaper article was based on false information, it initiated the request from 
FSA, which indicates strong monitoring. 
IAF factors affecting EA’s reliance on the IAF 
The primary IAF factors affecting EA’s reliance are competences and quality of 
work. According to the regulatory requirements, EA must perform a sample-
based quality review. In addition, they have to comply with the international 
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standards on auditing, including ISA 610 “Using the Work of Internal auditors” 
(ISA 610, 2013). ISA 610 requires EA to redo some of the work done by IAF. 
According to local practice, which is approved by FSA, this can be done as a 
joint audit in some areas selected by EA. The main objective of this practice is 
to avoid duplication of work (DR and IIA, 2013).  
Nature and extent of EA reliance on IAF 
Based on the result of the quality review and redoing of work, EA decides the 
level of reliance in the work delivered by IAF. Since EA has an independent 
responsibility regarding their audit opinion on the annual report, they have to 
ensure that the required work is done to mitigate the audit risk (Eilifsen et al., 
2010). If additional work is needed, EA must ensure that the necessary 
resources are provided. A review of the audit agreement for 2013, which is 
based on the result of the audit for 2012, showed no indications of additional 
work from EA,  which means that EA plans to rely on the work performed by 
IAF (Arel, 2010). 
Outcome effects of EA reliance on the IAF 
The outcome of the internal control audit from EA’s perspective is reliance on 
the internal controls and recommendations for mitigation of weaknesses (Bame-
Aldred et al., 2013). The agreed sharing of the audit in the Group is consistent 
with the view that IAF has an advantage over EA, since they experience a 
higher level of identification with the client and know the business processes 
better. IAF has a long-term view, since they do not have to consider the renewal 
of the assignment and thus are able to provide a less lenient internal control 
evaluation (Stefaniak et al., 2012). The actual value of the internal control audit, 
including the identification of weaknesses, also depends on the coordination of 
the audit (Lin et al., 2011). During the case study a number of meetings between 
internal and EA was observed. According to the head of IAF, these meetings are 
primarily related to detailed planning and sharing of results of the work 
performed. The nature of these meetings indicates a joint-audit approach, which 
can be seen as a way of utilising the combined knowledge and thus improve the 
overall level of comfort (Sarens et al., 2009). 
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5. To what extent do management letters affect internal controls? 
The detailed review of the management letter reporting covering the period 
2008 – 12 aims at clarifying to what extent the internal control audits affects 
internal controls through their total of 404 recommendations. The 
recommendations classified by IAF’s prioritisation and divided into new and 
existing controls are presented in table 1. The table also shows the number of 
recommendations included in the LFAR. 
 
 
Year ML LFAR ML LFAR ML LFAR ML LFAR ML LFAR ML LFAR ML LFAR ML LFAR
2008 21 9 7 7 13 2 1 0 62 6 3 3 48 3 11 0
2009 45 9 8 8 33 1 4 0 55 10 7 7 42 3 6 0
2010 12 3 1 1 9 2 2 0 59 12 7 7 42 5 10 0
2011 21 5 1 1 14 4 6 0 59 13 7 7 41 6 11 0
2012 19 5 3 3 14 2 2 0 51 7 3 3 40 4 8 0
Total 118 31 20 20 83 11 15 0 286 48 27 27 213 21 46 0
Year ML LFAR ML LFAR ML LFAR ML LFAR
2008 83 15 10 10 61 5 12 0
2009 100 19 15 15 75 4 10 0
2010 71 15 8 8 51 7 12 0
2011 80 18 8 8 55 10 17 0
2012 70 12 6 6 54 6 10 0
Total 404 79 47 47 296 32 61 0
New and existing controls
1 2 3
Total/Priority
Total/Priority
1 2 3
New controls Existing controls
1 2 3Total/Priority
 
Table 1 - Summary of recommendations in management letters by priority 
The only year with a significantly higher number of recommendations for new 
controls is 2009 – following the financial crisis and an increase in new 
requirements from FSA (Van der Stede, 2011). Apart from 2009, the number of 
recommendations for new controls is stable at around 20 on an annual basis. 
The only classification in the management letters is the prioritisation of 
recommendations (1 – 3). In order to understand the nature of the requirement 
for recommendations, a review of the wording was performed. If the 
observation or the risk evaluation include a reference that can be related to 
“legal”, “regulatory” or “internal policy”, they are classified as such. According 
to IAF, it is preferable that a specific reference is included, since it can make the 
interaction between auditor and client less judgmental. If no reference is 
included, the recommendation is based on the auditor’s professional evaluation 
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and classified as “Audit”. The recommendations classified by nature of 
requirement are listed in table 2: 
Nature of 3 1 2 3
requirement ML LFAR ML LFAR ML LFAR ML LFAR ML LFAR ML LFAR ML LFAR ML LFAR
Legal 4 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 15 2 0 0 10 2 5 0
Regulatory (FSA) 34 15 10 10 21 5 3 0 50 12 9 9 29 3 12 0
Internal policy 4 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 16 3 2 2 14 1 0 0
Audit 76 16 10 10 54 6 12 0 205 31 16 16 160 15 29 0
Total 118 31 20 20 83 11 15 0 286 48 27 27 213 21 46 0
New controls Existing controls
1 2Total/Priority Total/Priority
 
Table 2 - Recommendations classified by nature of requirement 
 
The nature of the weaknesses which the recommendations relate to for the two 
major groups “Regulatory (FSA)” and “Audit” are specified according to 
Manson et al. (2001) in table 3: 
Nature of weakness Total 1 2 3 Total 1 2 3 Total %
Adequacy of accounting system 12 2 10 0 13 2 7 4 25 33%
Segregation of duties 3 1 2 0 5 2 3 0 8 11%
Administration 3 3 0 0 2 1 1 0 5 7%
Markets 1 0 0 1 4 0 3 1 5 7%
Lending 11 4 7 0 12 4 7 1 23 30%
Business advice 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Documentation 4 0 2 2 6 0 0 6 10 13%
Regulatory FSA - total 34 10 21 3 42 9 21 12 76 100%
Adequacy of accounting system 13 1 11 1 48 4 38 6 61 22%
Segregation of duties 13 2 8 3 38 6 27 5 51 18%
Administration 14 2 11 1 21 2 19 0 35 12%
Markets 10 0 8 2 22 1 19 2 32 11%
Lending 20 4 13 3 38 2 34 2 58 21%
Business advice 5 1 3 1 6 1 5 0 11 4%
Documentation 1 0 0 1 32 0 18 14 33 12%
Audit  -total 76 10 54 12 205 16 160 29 281 100%
New controls Existing controls All controls
 
Table 3 - Recommendations FSA and Audit classified by priority and nature of 
weakness 
Comparing the recommendations referenced “Regulatory FSA” with those 
referenced “Audit”, the regulatory part has a higher share in the areas of 
“Adequacy of accounting system” and “Lending”. These two areas relate to the 
quality of reporting required by FSA and impairment of loans. This result is not 
surprising, since following the financial crisis, FSA has paid much attention to 
the value of the loan portfolio (Rangvid, 2013). On the contrary, segregation of 
duties, administrative procedures and markets are all areas initiated by IAF. 
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The review of the management letters also covered the management comments, 
including a deadline for when specific risks will be mitigated. There are some 
examples that mitigating actions are delayed compared to the initial plan. The 
main explanation is that a number of recommendations are used as input to the 
implementation of a new system, which might result in a redesign of supporting 
processes and internal controls. Based on a review of the database of 
recommendations maintained by IAF, all issues have, however, been closed or 
are in a planned process of being closed by an implementation project. 
In summary, an average of 20 new controls are implemented annually in direct 
response to the auditor’s recommendations. This indicates that management 
letters and thereby internal control audits affect internal controls. Another 
finding is that approx. 30% of recommendations for new controls are justified 
by regulatory requirements, and 65% by IAF’s professional judgment without 
reference to any specific requirement. 
 
6. Interaction between internal audit and client 
In order to understand how and why internal control audits affect internal 
control, the interaction in the management letter process between auditor and 
client has been analysed. The result is presented in two sub-sections: 
6.1 - Core interaction – “how” does internal control audits affect internal 
controls? 
6.2 - Contextual features – “why” does internal control audits affect internal 
controls? 
 
6.1. Core interaction – “how” does internal control audits affect internal 
controls? 
The analysis focuses on five interactions at different stages in the management 
letter process, see appendix 1: 
70 
 
1. Meeting about initial observations 
2. Meeting about recommendations 
3. Meeting about draft audit memo 
4. Meeting about draft management summary 
5. Meeting about draft long form audit report 
 
6.1.1. Meeting about initial observations 
The audit typically results in a number of observations which are documented in 
the appendix to the audit memo. An observation is the most detailed level in the 
management letter process and is the subject of the first interaction between 
auditor and client. The objective of this interaction is to get a common 
understanding of the observations. The basis for this agreement is that the audit 
manager sends a draft of the appendix to the client staff who has been involved 
in the audit. If necessary, a meeting is held between the parties in order to 
clarify any misunderstandings and if needed to prepare adjustments to the 
description in order to make it as precise as possible. Depending on the 
observation, the presentation typically starts with the auditor saying: 
 “We have been informed that …” 
 “We have observed that …” 
 “Based on test of controls we have identified a variation from the standard 
procedures …” 
 
The auditors’ objective of the meeting is to verify the written presentation of the 
observation. Based on a review of changes to the draft appendices, working 
papers, memos, mails and supporting interviews with audit staff, no unsolved 
disagreements were identified regarding the description of the observations. 
Neither have I been able to identify any “differing preferences” (Salterio, 2012) 
which were not solved by the presentation of facts. I did not identify any 
indications of an insisting behaviour from the auditors. This is supported by two 
managers representing different business units who jointly expressed the 
interaction with the auditors as follows: 
 
“If they (internal audit) have got a wrong impression of a procedure – they are 
willing to listen to valid arguments”. 
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If there are different views, it is up to the client to present further documentation 
to support adjustments. Therefore the meeting is an argumentative exchange of 
information supporting, adjusting or rejecting the observation, and the outcome 
a joint product. 
 
6.1.2. Meeting about recommendations 
When the observation has been agreed upon, IAF prepares a risk evaluation and 
recommendation which is included in the appendix to the audit memo. The 
recommendations that are the issue of the second interaction is sent to the same 
client staff who previously agreed on the observation. 
From an audit perspective, the objective of the recommendations is to improve 
the level of internal controls and thus obtain audit evidence from test of controls 
when the improvement is implemented (Eilifsen et al., 2010). IAF prepares the 
recommendation, but according to an audit manager they are open to changes: 
“Regarding the recommendations it is of less importance how the issue is 
solved. When we have agreed on an observation, it is up to the client to suggest 
a solution – as long as it works. But the recommendation should mitigate the 
risk – otherwise we must try again. We need to close the observation, how it 
happens is actually of minor importance.” 
This view is supported by the head of IAF: 
“There is no point in preparing a recommendation if the client has no practical 
options for implementing an improvement. Then it is better to suggest another 
solution as long as the risk is mitigated”. 
This practical approach is also illustrated by the way the client handles the 
recommendation. Since it is the client’s responsibility at a later stage to 
implement a solution, the client staff often goes back to local management to 
agree on a solution. 
Both the audit and client nature of interaction can primarily be classified as 
argumentative. There are, however, indications that the auditors could insist if 
necessary. The statement “… the recommendation should mitigate the risk” 
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indicates minimum requirements to the solutions. The combined behaviour is, 
however, still a discussion aimed at describing a recommendation and a solution 
which can be implemented and fulfil the audit requirements. Therefore the 
outcome of the interaction is a joint product, since both parties take part in a co-
operative manner. 
 
6.1.3. Meeting about draft audit memo 
When the recommendations are agreed upon, the appendix is finalised. This 
includes a prioritisation of observations. There are no formally defined criteria 
for the prioritisation, and according to the head of IAF it is based on 
“professional judgment”
3 . The prioritisation is of interest, since priority 1 
recommendations are always reported in the LFAR, together with some priority 
2 observations. Furthermore, IAF prepares a draft audit memo, which is a 
summary of observations and recommendations included in the appendix. This 
document is the issue of the third interaction. The prioritisation is essential for 
the local management, and it is the main item on the agenda for the draft audit 
memo interaction (meeting). The situation is clearly stated by the head of IAF: 
“The local managers don’t mind our recommendations, and they prefer to have 
well-controlled business processes. If we are reasonable with our 
recommendations, they comply. They do, however, not like priority 1 
observations. Being exposed to the board of directors and FSA is not seen as a 
desirable situation”. 
A local manager agrees: 
“It is obvious that priority 1 recommendations can lead to reactions from the 
board of directors, which may cause unnecessary turmoil in the organisation – 
a situation we want to avoid for obvious reasons; but in general, the 
recommendations from internal audit are reasonable.” 
A detailed review of draft and final audit memos indicates that the number of 
priority 1 recommendations is reduced as a result of the interaction. IAF 
                                                     
3 ”Auditor’s professional judgment” is also used by IFAC as a guideline for ranking findings 
(IFAC, 2009).  
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sometimes encounters a desire from local management to change the priorities. 
The head of IAF explained that: 
“… we might sometimes agree on a priority 2 instead of 1. It is, however, a 
bargaining situation - if we change priority from 1 to 2, we could perhaps agree 
to speed up the deadline for the implementation”.  
The “deadline for implementation” refers to the final element of the appendix, 
which is the management comment. In this section, local management 
comments on the observations and recommendations and commits to a deadline. 
The deadline for mitigating the risk is important, since IAF follows up on the 
agreed deadlines on an ongoing basis. 
The behaviour by both auditor and client is classified as argumentative in the 
direction towards insisting, and the combined nature as a negotiation. This is 
mainly due to the potential exposure to the board of directors and FSA. This can 
be seen as an example of “Tone from the top”, indicating that the board of 
directors seeks well-controlled processes (Sarens et al., 2009). When the 
management comments have been finalised, the audit memo is signed by both 
parties, and due to the active interaction the outcome is a joint product. 
 
6.1.4. Meeting about draft management summary 
Based on the audit memos, IAF prepares a management summary. This 
document is the fourth interaction issue and is presented at a meeting with the 
executive board. An example is included in appendix 3. 
As part of the case study, draft and final management summaries for the period 
2008 – 12 were compared. Only a very few changes were made, and they all 
concerned how to prioritise the various implementation projects aiming at 
mitigating the identified risks. Since the executive board has a consolidated 
view on these projects, this might have an impact on the solutions and the 
deadlines agreed with local management. According to head of IAF: 
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“It is a management decision how to prioritise the resources – and it is clearly 
not our job to be involved in this process. We accept the decisions and plan our 
audit accordingly”. 
This is seen as a permissive attitude based on a professional understanding of 
roles and responsibilities, including potential independence issues (IESBA, 
2013). 
The final management summary is the outcome of the interaction. Since the 
only changes to the draft management summary are the result of management 
decisions, the outcome is classified as a client product. 
 
6.1.5. Meeting about draft long-form audit report 
The fifth issue is the LFAR report, which includes a description of all priority 1 
and some priority 2 recommendations from the management summaries. This 
document is sent to the audit committee and presented at a meeting 
(interaction). At the meeting, internal audit presents the LFAR, which includes 
other issues besides observations from the internal control audit (BEK, 2013). 
According to the head of IAF, the meeting with the audit committee is of a 
formal nature, and the document is owned by IAF: 
“It is our document and our professional responsibility. Further, we have been 
involved in the whole process and therefore it is not acceptable if the audit 
committee changes our professional judgment.” 
We see this as an indication that the behaviour of the auditors is argumentative 
in the direction of being insisting, and the meeting should be classified as an 
exchange of information. A review of draft and final LFARs revealed no 
substantive changes. This indicates that the behaviour by the audit committee 
regarding the LFAR is permissive and of a rather ceremonial nature (Beasley et 
al., 2009). This can also be explained by the fact that the audit committee is 
involved in the management letter process at a rather late stage where all other 
parties have agreed on the details. 
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The outcome is the final LFAR, which is signed by the board of directors. The 
document is an audit product, since the directors have both the formal (BEK, 
2013) and the actual responsibility. 
 
6.2. Contextual features – “why” does internal control audits affect internal 
controls? 
The analysis of the contextual features will examine “why” internal control 
audits affect internal control. The combined interaction model (figure 1) has 
three contextual features that can explain the impact on the core audit/client 
interaction: 1) “regulatory / legal”, 2) “general interaction” and 3) 
“audit/client”. 
Regulatory / legal context 
All activities in the Group are subject to mandatory inspections by FSA. An 
inspection normally covers a business area, and a total of 4 – 6 inspections are 
carried out annually. The reports from FSA must be published on the Group’s 
homepage (BEK, 2013b). As a consequence of the regular inspections, all 
business managers are familiar with the procedures and consider them 
“necessary but time-consuming and burdensome exercises”. The regulatory 
legal context and the fear of being caught (Fearnley et al., 2011) also have an 
impact on the client behaviour in relation to internal control audits. It is a 
generally held view that proper internal controls can help ensure compliance 
with regulatory requirements. A client manager explained that: 
“FSA is at present not as flexible as in the old times, so we might as well keep 
things in a good shape”.  
This view is also supported by the head of it-security (2nd line defence function), 
who also serves as an internal consultant in relation to internal control issues: 
“1st line functions prefer to develop solutions that are reasonable secure - that 
way they avoid potential problems with internal audit, us or FSA at a later 
stage”. 
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It seems that there is a general concern regarding FSA. A client manager 
expressed it very clearly: 
“They (FSA) hang like a black cloud over us. There are virtually no limits to 
what they can ask for and what they demand in terms of material - we must 
surely hope that it is useful.” 
The inspection reports from FSA regarding internal controls are of a general 
nature and often without any description of specific weaknesses. Therefore I 
suggested the view that there might be confusion between internal controls and 
reporting requirements. The client manager’s reply to this was: 
“No matter how we look at it we need to have the necessary internal controls in 
place to protect us against inspections by the FSA”. 
The issue regarding protection and the value of being prepared for FSA 
inspection is also related to knowledge-sharing with other financial institutions. 
A 2nd line manager explained the situation: 
“It is a well-known fact that FSA copies the same orders and recommendations 
between companies when they are on inspections. We know that from 
colleagues in other financial institutions.” 
In order to measure the value of the improved or new internal controls, 10 
significant recommendations were evaluated by representatives from internal 
audit, 2nd lines of defence and local management. The evaluation included a 
classification of the recommendations as “high”, “medium” and “low” 
depending on the internal controls’ ability to mitigate audit and business risks. 
Examples of the recommendations are included in appendix 3. 
The evaluation of the audit value was based on a discussion with the head and 
deputy of IAF. They explained that 9 of the recommendations were the result of 
internal control audits executed according to the annual audit plan, and 1 audit 
was an ad-hoc request from the board of directors. All audits were performed 
according to standard audit instructions, but for 50%, additional work was 
performed due to requirements from FSA. The head of IAF explained: 
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“Due to information from various sources including network groups we pay 
more attention to areas which we know that FSA is aware of. If for example 
another bank has struggled with FSA regarding real estate loans, we use 
additional resources to ensure that all risks are mitigated. You might say that 
the audit serves both a traditional audit purpose and at the same time as a kind 
of defence against FSA. We should avoid being in a situation where we have 
performed an audit with no findings if FSA at a later stage identifies major 
weaknesses in the same area. After all, we prefer to have a good reputation and 
working relations with FSA – it makes things much easier”. 
These comments lead to a question about the extent of this extra work related to 
internal controls initiated by FSA. The head of IAF summarised the discussion: 
“It is impossible to measure how much extra work we perform due to this kind 
of pressure from FSA. It is also quite difficult to isolate the effect of FSA, but all 
the 10 significant recommendations would have been included in the 
management letters if the audit had been performed in a situation where we 
don’t have to consider regulatory requirements. The only difference is that 2 
recommendations – those we evaluate as “low”- would most likely not have 
been included in the LFAR”. 
IAF’s evaluation of the audit value resulted in an average classification of 
“high/medium”. This evaluation supports the statement that recommendations 
would have been included in the management letters independent of the 
regulatory requirements and that they add value seen from an audit perspective. 
The business value of the internal controls was discussed with local 
management based on the same 10 recommendations. The evaluation revealed 
an average of “medium” in the ability to mitigate business risks. The main 
reason for a lower average score compared with IAF is that some 
recommendations are evaluated as being rather formalistic. It is recognised that 
the related internal controls mitigate business risks, but the supporting 
formalistic documentation is mainly seen as a defence against FSA and does not 
serve a business purpose. A business manager explained regarding a specific 
recommendation (appendix 3 no. 5): 
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“This is a typical recommendation primarily for the benefit of FSA. The control 
is performed as expected, but not documented according to requirements from 
FSA. From a business perspective it makes no difference – but we accept the 
recommendation and see it as a defence when we have inspections from FSA.” 
The recommendations were also discussed with a representative from 2nd line 
who has both professional audit and business experience. In general he agreed 
on both the audit and client evaluation and summarised the situation as follows: 
“It is recommendations which FSA would no doubt report - most likely as 
orders – and with good reason. However, we should have proper internal 
controls in place in these areas no matter what FSA might say.”  
Regarding a specific recommendation (appendix 3 no. 1) he was even clearer: 
“The recommendation and our mitigation of the risk is totally independent of 
whether FSA exists or not. The issue is too important from both an audit and a 
business perspective to be affected by FSA’s assessment. Of course it would 
have resulted in an order if they had identified the issues before we did.” 
Based on these discussions it seems that both 1st, 2nd and 3rd line functions 
recognise pressure from FSA and try to establish a defence by having well-
controlled business processes. These initiatives take place regardless of the fact 
that it seems difficult to have an inspection from FSA without a 
recommendation or an order. A client manager expressed his experiences with 
FSA:  
“Inspections from FSA have always been a burden - they simply continue until 
they find something”. 
The deputy head of IAF supports this: 
“I have only experienced once that FSA issued a report without orders or 
recommendations. They keep searching until they find something – at least 
some minor formalistic details”. 
Even though the pressure from FSA is mentioned repeatedly, the improved or 
new internal controls seem to add value from both an audit and a business 
perspective. 
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General interaction context 
The risk of being caught also reflects the “tone from the top”, and compliance 
with financial legislation has a high priority for the board of directors. Without 
it being stated in a formal policy, the board does not find it acceptable if there 
are problems complying with FSA requirements. Both company and personal 
issues are involved in this view. One of the board members explained that: 
“Those who are on several financial services boards are more risk adverse. 
They tend to be very careful not to be exposed to FSA”. 
The issue of being exposed is related to the fact that both the internal and 
external LFAR, addressed to the board of directors, must be forwarded to FSA. 
Furthermore, FSA has issued an executive order on the content, which includes 
the requirement that the auditors must follow up and report on 
recommendations and orders issued by FSA and report the result in the LFAR 
(BEK, 2013). If critical matters are included, it should be expected that FSA 
will request further information, e.g. the supporting management letters and 
minutes from board meetings. These requests are formally addressed to the 
board of directors. As a consequence of this practice, problems related to 
internal control, identified by both IAF and/or FSA, are transparent to the audit 
committee and the board of directors (BEK, 2013b). 
The deputy head of IAF explained that: 
“Sometimes we use informal statements from the board of directors when 
arguing for a recommendation”. 
Another example of this internal pressure was described by the head of IAF: 
“An unexpected negative report from FSA might be quite painful to explain to 
the audit committee”. 
Even though the behaviour of the audit committee regarding the LFAR seems to 
be of a rather ceremonial nature (Beasley et al., 2009), this statement indicates a 
substantial general impact, and it is an objective of IAF to have good relations 
with the committee. A client manager explained an example of informal verbal 
communication from one of the board members: 
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“I got a very clear message from a board member: “We don’t want loans that 
exceed the collateral – none at all.” Needless to say, this gave rise to an 
internal review and a general clarification of the requirements to the 
employees.” 
From an overall perspective there is a pressure from the board of directors, and 
the root cause can be explained by a desire to comply with the requirements 
imposed by the FSA. This also indicates that even though there is no formal 
policy regarding compliance with regulatory requirements, the “tone from the 
top” has an impact on both the client and IAF. The fact that the 
recommendations for new or improved internal controls add value from a 
business perspective indicates that the business staff, despite complaints about 
FSA, hold respect for internal controls (Ashby et al., 2012) and the mitigation 
of business risks. 
Audit/client context 
The audit/client context is based on a working relation of mutual respect, at 
both the personal and the professional level. The interviews with both audit and 
client members describe the working relations as good. This is supported by the 
annual customer satisfaction survey, in which IAF in summary is evaluated as: 
“Excellent working relations – a constructive and objective partner”. The 
summary is supported by high scores in a number of areas including: “Meet 
expectations”, “do things right the first time”, “responsibility” and 
“understanding of the customer (client)”. These evaluations describe a high 
quality of relationship between IAF and client. This is also supported by the 
length of the relationship, since both the head of IAF, the deputy and a number 
of key staff members have a seniority of more than 10 years in the Group. In 
addition, the head of IAF and the deputy are state-authorised auditors and have 
for a number of years been professionally active in IIA, Danish Auditors, and 
have taught auditing at Copenhagen Business School. These qualifications 
provide IAF with authority and ease the way in which observations and 
recommendations are recognised by the client - and the client is willing to 
listen. It seems that the positive working relations affect the interaction in the 
management letter process and they help explain why all recommendations 
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result in improvement of existing or implementation of new internal controls. A 
client manager explained that: 
“We have only a very few examples of the recommendations from internal audit 
which seem unreasonable. We always ask for - and get - an explanation. In 
general the recommendations are reasonable." 
The analysis of 10 significant recommendations indicates that they add business 
value, which supports the view that recommendations in general are reasonable. 
It seems that IAF also seeks to strike a balance between the potential 
improvement of internal controls and the total number of recommendations. 
One statement from an audit manager indicates a balanced approach: 
“If we get a reasonable result (mitigation of risk), there is no need to go further. 
There is also the future working relation to consider”. 
This indicates that the auditors consider when “enough is enough” with the aim 
of supporting the long-term relationship (Stefaniak et al., 2012). In a discussion 
with the head of IAF about the specific interaction context it was mentioned 
that: 
“We don’t report minor details, it will just irritate the business and we will most 
likely have trouble getting through with the important issues. I believe that this 
approach explains why you don’t see examples of withdrawn 
recommendations.” 
It seems that the balanced approach regarding the number of recommendations, 
which results in issues with minor impact being excluded from the reporting, 
affects the interaction and helps explain why the client accepts all the 
recommendations included in the management letters. 
 
7. Conclusion and discussion 
Based on a single case study, the management letters from IAF and the 
supporting process in a large financial institution were analysed. In the case 
study, IAF is organised and staffed and working in such a way that EA can rely 
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on the work delivered (Bame-Aldred et al., 2013). IAF only does auditing and is 
not involved in any other roles (Arena and Sarens, 2015). This clear role 
definition is both supported by local regulatory requirements and recognised as 
agreed local practice (BEK, 2013; DR and IIA, 2013). Consequently, IAF 
complies with independence and ethical requirements (IESBA, 2013) and 
delivers a quality of internal control audits at at least the same level as EA 
(Stefaniak et al., 2012). 
As part of the study, a detailed review of the management letter reporting of the 
internal control audits for 2008 – 12 was conducted. The review clarified the 
extent to which management letters affect internal control. Based on an analysis 
of their wording, the recommendations were divided into a number of groups 
describing the nature of the information (Manson et al., 2001). The most 
important division was between new and existing controls. In total, 30% of the 
observations result in recommendations for implementation of new controls. 
The remaining 70% relate to improvements of existing controls including 
documentation. Independent of the nature of the recommendations, they are 
without exception implemented, both regarding new and existing controls. 
Viewed in isolation, the review of management letters does thus support the 
anecdotes that auditors are to blame for the growing number of internal 
controls. 
As a basis for the analysis, a description of the management letter process was 
established, including a number of instances of interaction (appendix 1 and 2). 
In order to contribute to an understanding of how and why internal control 
audits impact internal controls, this interaction was analysed based on the 
theories of audit/client interaction (Fearnley et al., 2011; Salterio, 2012). 
How do internal control audits through the management letter process affect 
internal controls? The results of the analysis of the interaction are presented in 
table 4: 
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Meeting 
regarding: 
Behaviour  
Outcome Auditor (IAF) Client Combined 
1) Initial observations Argumentative Argumentative Exchange of 
information 
Joint 
product 
2) Recommendations Argumentative
/ insisting 
Argumentative Discussion Joint 
product 
3) Draft audit memo Argumentative
/ insisting 
Argumentative/ 
insisting 
Negotiation Joint 
product 
4) Draft management 
summary 
Permissive Argumentative/ 
insisting 
Exchange of 
information 
Client 
product 
5) Draft long form 
audit report 
Argumentative
/ insisting 
Permissive Exchange of 
information 
Audit 
product 
 
Table 4 – Summary of the nature of interaction viewed through the combined model 
(Figure 1) 
IAF seems to be argumentative in the direction towards insisting and the client 
on average argumentative when making decisions regarding internal control 
audits. These examples of mixed behaviour are as expected (Muningham and 
Bazerman, 1990). The combined behaviour is primarily an exchange of 
information where issues are presented at the meetings between auditor and 
client, and the quality of information decides the outcome of the interaction. 
There are, however, two exceptions, namely the overall prioritisation of the 
resources required to improve existing or implementing new controls and the 
LFAR. The prioritisation of resources is a management responsibility and thus a 
client product, and the auditors fully respect the authority of the executive board 
(BEK, 2010). The LFAR is the auditors’ responsibility, and their report to the 
board of directors (BEK, 2013), and consequently it is an audit product. Further, 
it seems that the board of directors respect the management letter process, since 
in all material aspects they take note of the LFAR as presented. This could be 
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explained by the fact that the audit committee is involved after all other parties 
have agreed to mitigate the risks identified by IAF. It might also be seen as a 
result of a management letter process with strong internal controls. The board of 
directors have an impact on the process through “tone from the top” (Lail et al., 
2015) based on a desire to have well-controlled business processes (Sarens et 
al., 2009). 
The outcome of the audit/client interaction is the decision on implementation of 
new or improvement of existing controls based on cooperation and should be 
considered a joint product. This joint product and understanding has been 
established by a detailed management letter process where disagreements are 
settled before the next step is started. The joint understanding between auditor 
and client has also been seen for a number of years regarding the annual report 
(Antle and Nalebuff, 1991). Consequently, this may indicate that the total, 
integrated financial and internal control audit (Kinney et al., 2013) could be 
seen as a joint product. This conclusion does not support the anecdotes about 
the roles of the auditors and the claim that they are to blame for the growing 
number of internal controls. Further, the conclusion regarding cooperation is 
different from that of a study by Hellman (2006), where the clients were more 
aggressive towards the auditors. This may be a consequence of differing case-
study settings, but it should also be noted that the two studies were conducted 
on either side of the financial crisis. The change in behaviour in a financial 
institution may have been influenced by the financial crisis (Van der Stede, 
2011). It is also noted that the recommendations in the management letters are 
based on a strict internal control evaluation (Eilifsen et al., 2010), including 
compliance with regulatory requirements, and that less than 5% classified as 
“business advice”. This may be explained by the fact that IAF in the case study 
is only allowed to perform auditing (BEK, 2013). 
Why do internal control audits affect internal controls through the management 
letter process?  
The analysis of the contextual features indicates that FSA is an issue and that 
auditor/client cooperate to deal with the regulatory regime and mitigate the risk 
of being caught (Fearnley et al., 2011). This conclusion is no surprise, since the 
summarised result of the management letter process is reported to FSA in the 
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LFAR. If critical matters are reported, it should be expected that FSA will 
request further information, i.e. the supporting management letters. Therefore it 
seems a logical consequence to establish a defence to comply with the 
regulatory requirements (Van der Stede, 2011). However, this view is also a 
convenient explanation of why it is necessary to spend considerable resources 
on improving existing and implementing new controls. Based on the case study 
it seems that both the improvement of existing and the implementation of new 
controls add significant audit and business value, and that this would have been 
initiated independent of FSA. 
FSA has an impact on the management letter process, but not on the detailed 
level. Instead it seems that informal information from other financial 
companies, e.g. internal auditors sharing experiences regarding FSA, has a 
significant impact on the scope of the internal control audit. This finding could 
indicate that regarding internal controls, FSA should focus on a principle-based 
regulation rather than the longstanding practice of seeking to establish more 
detailed rules (Franks et al., 1997; Ho et al., 2013). This change in the 
regulatory approach could also be supported by the observation that the client, 
despite complaints about FSA, respects internal controls, which is supported by 
the “tone from the top” (Lail et al., 2015). 
IAF has indicated that they use additional resources due to pressure from FSA, 
but that it is difficult to measure. Despite this view it could be of interest for 
future research to explore the nature and magnitude of the burden imposed by 
the FSA. One area could be to analyse how much additional work FSA requires 
from IAF in excess of what is needed to mitigate the audit risk (Eilifsen et al., 
2010). At the company level it could also be of interest to explore whether the 
burden is primarily related to implementation of new or improved internal 
controls or to management accounting and controls issues, including liquidity, 
capital and reporting requirements. For both areas it could be of interest to 
isolate the effect of the financial crisis, which may have impacted the behaviour 
of both the regulatory regime, IAF and the financial companies (Van der Stede, 
2011). 
There are some weaknesses in and limitations to the study. The analysis of 
“how” and “why” is based on an analysis of a specific set of interactions 
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between auditor and client and the auditor is an IAF in a major financial 
institution. The management letter process, including the interactions, and the 
co-operation between IAF and external audit might be different in other 
companies. These limitations notwithstanding, the study has contributed to an 
understanding of the extent, how and why internal control audits affect internal 
controls. 
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Appendix 1 – Management letter process – internal control audit – 
overview 
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Appendix 2 – Management letter process – internal control audit – 
supporting description 
Below is a description of the key documents in the management letter process 
(appendix 1): 
Audit memo 
The most detailed document in the management letter process is the audit 
memo, which describes the result of the internal control audit, focusing on the 
identified weaknesses. The main purpose is to communicate the result of the 
audit, mainly to the staff responsible for the reviewed processes. The appendix 
to the audit memo (see appendix 3) includes the following headings in a table 
format: 
 Observation 
 Risk evaluation 
 Recommendation 
 Local management’s comments 
 
A prioritisation (1 – 3) of the observation is also included. 
The internal control audit is based on test of controls, observations and 
interviews with staff responsible for performing the detailed process tasks. In 
order to avoid any misunderstandings, the appendix with the detailed 
observations is forwarded to the client staff. The first interaction in the 
management letter process is a meeting between the audit manager and client 
staff, in which the observations are presented and adjusted if necessary. The 
overall aim is to establish an objective description of the observation. In 
appendix 1, this interaction is described as “meeting about initial observations” 
and marked with a handshake figure. 
The next step for the auditor is to prepare a description of the potential risk 
resulting from the identified weakness. The risk description is the auditor’s 
evaluation of the risk before any mitigating actions are initiated, e.g. 
improvement of existing or implementation of new controls. Further, the risk 
evaluation is based on a practical approach aiming at addressing the following 
questions (Apostolakis, 2004): 
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 What can go wrong? 
 How likely is it? 
 What are the consequences? 
 
Based on the finding and the risk evaluation, a recommendation for mitigating 
the weakness is prepared. The second interaction is a meeting about the 
recommendation, which to some extent has been prepared by the client staff 
responsible for the process. This is done because the main objective is to 
mitigate the identified risk. Consequently, the recommendation should describe 
potential actions which can be executed and thus avoid suggesting activities 
which cannot realistically be implemented. From a business perspective this 
will ensure that after the necessary improvements have been implemented, the 
process will mitigate the risk identified. From an audit perspective, the primary 
objective is to ensure that the evaluation of internal controls will mitigate the 
audit risk going forward. 
When the above steps have been finalised, including an internal quality review, 
a draft report with observations, risk evaluation and recommendations will be 
forwarded to local management. The main objective is for the local 
management to prepare comments to the observations. These comments should 
include a description of specific actions which have been or will be executed in 
order to mitigate the identified risks. The actions should also include deadlines 
for the implementation. The third interaction is a meeting between local 
management and internal audit, in which the draft audit memo is presented. 
Besides aiming at agreeing on the description of the observations, actions, 
deadlines etc., an important issue is prioritisation of the observations. This issue 
is important, since all priority 1 and some priority 2 observations are included in 
the LFAR, which is forwarded to FSA. 
After the local management and IAF have agreed, the audit memo is finalised 
and signed by both parties. 
90 
 
Management summary 
Based on the signed audit memos, IAF prepares a management summary to the 
executive board covering the 2nd, 3rd and 4th quarter. The 1st quarter is dedicated 
to reporting regarding the audit of the financial statement. The management 
summary provides an overview of the observations from the audit memos, 
including prioritisation and a status (open/closed) on the action items from the 
local management comments. The fourth interaction is a meeting in which the 
draft management summary is presented to the executive board. At this 
meeting, the executive board comment on the conclusion, but the main issue is 
the open action items and a potential prioritisation of them at group level. 
Following an agreement between the executive board and IAF, the management 
summary is finalised and signed by both parties. 
Long form audit report 
Every quarter, IAF prepares a draft LFAR for the board of directors (audit 
committee). The report at an overall level describes the audit performed and 
provides a summary of the results, including all priority 1 observations and 
some priority 2 observations. There is no specific rule for the selection of 
priority 2 observations, but observations related to compliance with FSA 
regulations are often included in the LFAR. The fifth interaction is a meeting 
with the same structure as those held with the executive board, but the reports 
presented are the signed management summary and the draft LFAR. Upon 
agreement, the LFAR is finalised and ready for the board of directors. Since the 
audit committee members are also part of the board, the presentation is 
considered a formality, where the LFAR is signed by the board members and 
thus formally approved. 
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Appendix 3 – Management letter – example 
 
92 
 
93 
 
94 
 
95 
 
Appendix 4 – Interview guide 
The interviews were conducted as responsive interviews (Rubin and Rubin, 
2012) based on a number of key questions. During the case study I discussed 
issues with both audit and client staff, and several staff members were 
interviewed more than once. As part of the introduction to the first interview I 
made a brief presentation of the project and the research question. This included 
an introduction to the overview of the management letter process (appendix 1) 
and the combined audit/client interaction model (figure 1). The introduction 
also included a clarification of the confidentiality issue. 
After the introduction the discussion started. Depending on area, the interview 
was focused on either “how” or “why” questions: 
Main “how” questions 
1. Based on the description of the management letter process, where do you 
see yourself? 
2. What is your role in the process (or interaction)? 
3. How would you describe your working relation with internal audit (or the 
client)? 
4. Could you give examples of how you interact with internal audit (or the 
client)? 
5. I have established a graduation of the behaviour of internal audit (or the 
client) – see figure 1. Where do you see internal audit (or the client)? 
6. The part of the process you are involved in – what is the outcome? 
7. Do you have an impact on the outcome, and could you give some examples? 
8. I have established a graduation of the outcome. You can see that in figure 1. 
How would you classify the outcome?  
 
The discussion could be supported by specific examples of recommendations 
(appendix 3) if required. 
Main “why” questions 
The interviews regarding the “why” questions were done after the conclusion of 
the “how” part had been established. Consequently, the introduction included a 
brief summary of the result of this work (joint product based on objective 
arguments). 
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1. I have established 4 categories of contextual features (figure 1). Do you 
think that any of these have an impact on your cooperation with internal 
audit in the management letter process? 
2. As part of the “how” questions – I asked about the working relation with 
internal audit. Do you think that this has an impact? 
3. In your view, what is the impact of the board, i.e. “tone from the top”, and 
the behaviour of the management in general? 
4. Can you provide examples of how the board or management has intervened 
in the process or has otherwise had an indirect impact? 
5. In your view, what is the impact of FSA? 
6. Can you provide examples of how FSA has intervened in the process or has 
otherwise had an indirect impact? 
7. Which one (management of FSA) do you consider to be the most important 
– and why? 
8. Regarding the specific meeting – are there examples that the agreement on 
one issue could have an impact on the rest of the issues to be discussed? 
 
Some of the interviews included an evaluation of the audit and business impact 
of 10 significant internal controls. The evaluation was supported by the 
following template: 
 
# Year Description of recommendation
Au
di
tp
la
n
FS
A
Bo
D
Pr
of
es
sio
na
l e
va
lu
at
io
n
Ad
 h
oc
Hi
gh
M
ed
iu
n
Lo
w
N/
A
1 2008 Compliance with legal requirements      
2 2008 Confidential   
3 2009 Confidential    
4 2010 Access to Group systems   
5 2010 Calculation of individual impairment   
6 2011 Confidential    
7 2011 Trade Conformation on derivatives     
8 2012 Valuation of property - real estate loan     
9 2012 Confidential      
10 2012 Confidential   
Reason for audit Mitigation of risk
 
At the end of each meeting it was agreed that I could come back and ask further 
questions, including clarification of issues.  
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Abstract 
The financial crisis in Iceland was of an extraordinary magnitude, as all the banks 
went bankrupt. The return from bankruptcy to fully operational entities in 2008 is 
used in this paper to explore how administrative controls are part of the 
organisational response to financial crisis. Three Icelandic banks were compared 
with three Danish banks in order to separate the crisis-driven response from 
ordinary market-driven reactions. The responses have been explored in a 
comparable case study and evaluated through an institutional theory lens. The 
result shows that all the banks have introduced a number of formalised and visible 
changes which can be verified by audits and inspections from FSA. One 
significant difference is that the Icelandic banks have increased the risk 
management functions to a size five times as big as is the case in Denmark. 
Furthermore, all Icelandic banks established new values as an extraordinary action 
immediately after the financial crisis, and in Denmark this was done as part of the 
ordinary strategic process. The case study indicates that more detailed 
formalisation will not improve the effectiveness of controls. Consequently, further 
improvements have to rely on using cultural controls as a management tool. 
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1. Introduction 
The financial crisis hit the financial sector hard globally, but in Iceland the 
crisis was of an extraordinary magnitude (IMF, 2014). All three banks in the 
country went bankrupt, and the banking system collapsed in the course of one 
week in October 2008. Immediately after the bankruptcy, the banks were re-
established on the basis of their prior domestic operations in order to continue 
banking in the country (Thorgeirsson and Noord, 2013). The only immediate 
changes in connection with the re-establishment were replacement of the 
executive boards and boards of directors in all three banks. The new 
management did, however, face considerable challenges, since the market had 
lost trust and confidence in the banks (IMF, 2014; Jännäri, 2009). Further, the 
banks were facing a systemic risk exposure (IMF, 2008). However, re-
establishment of the banks had to succeed due to their importance to the 
Icelandic economy. This transition from bankruptcy in 2008 to operational 
entities is a unique opportunity to explore how management controls have been 
used in a crisis situation. 
Over the years, much has been written about management controls, but detailed 
studies are lacking in the banking sector (Gooneratne and Hoque, 2013). 
Furthermore, there is limited knowledge on how management controls have 
been changed in response to the financial crisis (Janke et al., 2014). According 
to one of the seminal articles, management control can be defined as: “The 
process by which managers ensure that resources are obtained and used 
effectively and efficiently in the accomplishment of the organization’s 
objectives.” (Anthony, 1965). Management controls are later also described as a 
process aiming at influencing the behaviour of employees (Flamholtz et al., 
1985). This process involves a number of elements (Chenhall, 2003), which can 
be seen as a package of controls (Otley, 1980; Malmi and Brown, 2008). 
Administrative controls, which is a part of management controls, consist of: 
“Governance Structure”, “Organization Structure” and “Policies and 
Procedures” (Malmi and Brown, 2008). They are also the foundation of the 
“core control system”, which includes planning, cybernetic controls, and reward 
and compensation (Flamholtz et al., 1985). This means that administrative 
controls ensure the validity of information used to make management decisions 
(Simons, 1999). This is one reason why regulatory authorities focus on 
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administrative controls as an area of new requirements following a crisis 
(Wintoki, 2007; Basel, 2011). From a management perspective, administrative 
controls are also important tools when initiating and embedding substantive 
behavioural changes (Walker, 2009) or behavioural intentions (Coombs, 2007). 
They are used to direct employees’ behaviour, since they enable managers to 
delegate responsibilities and monitor subordinates’ performance (Marginson, 
2002). This becomes particularly important when the organisation has to 
respond to financial crisis, and even more so in the financial sector due to the 
severity of the impact (Van der Stede, 2011). The banks were forced to “stop 
dancing” - meaning sources of liquidity dried up4 - which required a significant 
behavioural change (Erkens et al., 2012). In addition, an immediate, significant 
and sustained response was initiated from the regulatory regime (Van der Stede, 
2011). The environmental and external contextual features, including the 
regulatory regime, are not mentioned in Malmi and Browns definition of 
management controls. However, according to Flamholtz et al., (1985) the 
external environment is regarded as an important element that sets the frame for 
and impacts on management controls. It is therefore an ongoing challenge to 
design the package of controls in such a way that they accommodate 
environmental changes and external stakeholder influence (Dowling and 
Pfeffer, 1975). 
Given this importance of administrative controls in the banking sector in 
general, and in response to financial crisis in particular, the aim of this paper is 
to explore how they have been used as a response to the financial crisis of 2008 
and the extent to which these changes are embedded in the organisation. This 
contributes to an understanding of how administrative controls can be used to 
respond to a crisis as well as an understanding of the nature of these changes 
and of how embedded they are in organisations. It thus adds to our limited 
knowledge of management control in banking (Gooneratne and Hoque, 2013). 
Three Icelandic and three Danish banks were used as a basis for the case study 
to explore this issue. As a starting point for the case study, the individual 
                                                     
4 “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the 
music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.” Citigroup CEO Chuck 
Prince - Financial Times, July, 2007. (https://next.ft.com/content/80e2987a-2e50-11dc-821c-
0000779fd2ac) 
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elements of administrative controls were defined, and the regulatory 
requirements in Iceland and Denmark that govern these elements were 
identified. This served the purpose of distinguishing between what elements 
were governed by mandatory regulation and what elements were subject to 
voluntary management decisions. This was then studied further using semi-
structured interviews in the six banks. Changes to the administrative controls 
were viewed through an institutional theory lens focusing on the sources and 
embeddedness of changes. The sources of the changes were analysed using the 
concepts of isomorphism; coercive, mimetic and normative change (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983), and the embeddedness of changes based on the stages of 
institutionalisation: encoding, enactment, reproduction and institutionalisation 
(Burns and Scapens, 2000). 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 defines the elements of 
administrative controls and identifies those elements which are not restricted by 
regulatory requirements and thus can be changed by management initiatives. 
Section 3 presents the organising framework, and section 4 describes the 
research method. In section 5 the results of the case study are presented. The 
results are discussed and conclusions drawn in section 6. 
 
2. Administrative controls in a banking environment 
According to Malmi and Browns (2008) framework, administrative controls 
consist of three elements, “Governance Structure”, “Organizational Structure” 
and “Policies and Procedures”. In order to align Malmi and Brown’s definitions 
of these three elements with the regulatory requirements, a literature review was 
carried out (Webster and Watson, 2002). Based on this review, the 
administrative controls where divided in two groups: One group which the 
banks had to change due to mandatory legal or regulatory requirement, and one 
group which could be changed voluntarily based on management decisions. The 
voluntary group is shown in table 1. 
The governance structure defines the structure of the board of directors and the 
formal lines of authority between the board of directors and the executive board 
(Abernethy and Chau, 1996). This includes the agenda for the board of 
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directors’ meeting as well as cooperation with the executive board. The 
cooperation with employees is influenced by the “Tone at the Top” (Lail et al., 
2015). Even though this may be affected by the regulatory requirements, it is 
still a management decision to define the “Tone at the Top”.  The “Tone at the 
Top” can be reflected in the code of conduct, which is a way of documenting 
and communicating boundaries to the organisation (Simons, 1994; Widener, 
2007). Even though they are not part of the administrative controls, values that 
have been developed in the work environment are closely linked to the “Tone at 
the Top” (Birnberg and Snodgrass, 1988; Alvesson and Kärremann, 2004). 
Based on this, changes in governance structures focus on the “Tone at the Top”, 
code of conduct and formal lines of authority. 
The organisational structure is defined as the process of adapting the 
organisation to its environment and thereby enabling it to achieve its purposes 
(Otley and Berry, 1980). The design of the organisational structure is restricted 
by local company acts and more specifically by Financial Supervisory 
Authorities (FSA) requirements (e.g. BEK, 2010). According to local Icelandic 
and Danish banking requirements, the organisational structure is a traditional 
European two-tier model, and the boards of directors are not allowed to take 
part in the day-to-day management of the banks. Besides the traditional 
organisational chart, the “Three Lines of Defence Model” is used as a reference 
in both Denmark and Iceland by all the banks (BIS, 2012). This model defines a 
process and structure for managing risk and internal controls in a bank. The 1st 
line of defence is the business units responsible for managing risks and controls 
associated with the performance of their duties. The 2nd line of defence is 
support functions to the business units, including Compliance, Risk 
Management and Accounting. The 3rd line function is Internal Audit. There are 
a number of regulatory minimum requirements regarding staffing, activities and 
tasks. These requirements, which have been defined by local practices 
following inspections from FSA, are primarily related to 2nd and 3rd defence line 
functions. Additions to these minimum requirements are subject to management 
decisions. Therefore, this study focuses on changes to activities and staffing 
above the minimum legal requirement. 
The establishment of a formal set of policies is a mandatory requirement for 
banks (Basel, 1997). The extent and content of the policies and how they are 
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communicated to the organisation are, however, a result of the design of 
management controls. Procedures – also a mandatory requirement (Basel, 1997) 
- are a detailed decomposition of policies describing operating procedures and 
practices (Macintosh and Daft, 1987). The specific content and communication 
of the procedures is, however, subject to management decision and is therefore 
also a result of the design of management controls. Internal controls are an 
important part of the procedure element of administrative controls. In general, 
there is a pressure on companies to establish internal controls (Ashbaugh-Skaife 
et al., 2009; Power, 2004; Power 2005), and in banks it is a mandatory 
requirement (BIS, 2012). The specific design of the internal controls and their 
operation is, however, a result of management decisions. According to Simons 
(1994), internal controls are designed to ensure data integrity, and it is assumed 
that they are in place before management controls are implemented. 
Consequently, this study focuses on the changes in design and use of policies, 
procedures and internal controls. 
Table 1 summarises the above and shows the elements of administrative 
controls that managers can influence beyond basic regulatory requirements:  
Administrative Controls 
Governance Structure Organisation Structure Policies and Procedures 
“Tone at the Top” and 
organisational values 
1st line structure Design of policies, 
procedures and internal 
controls 
Code of conduct Activities and tasks of 
functions 
Operation of policies, 
procedures and internal 
controls 
Formal lines of authority Staffing above regulatory 
minimum requirements 
 
 
Table 1: Administrative controls elements the designs of which depend on voluntary 
management decisions  
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3. Conceptualising changes in administrative controls 
In order to conceptualise changes in administrative controls, the study draws on 
institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) to analyse the sources 
of changes in administrative controls and the process of institutionalisation 
(Burns and Scapens, 2000) to describe the embeddedness of change.  
In conceptualising sources of chance, DiMaggio and Powell define three types 
of institutional isomorphism: “1) Coercive isomorphism that stems from 
political influence and the problem of legitimacy; 2) Mimetic isomorphism 
resulting from standard responses to uncertainty; and 3) Normative 
isomorphism, associated with professionalization.” (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983, p. 150).   
Researchers have applied these concepts in studying change in the financial 
sector. Munir et al. (2011) include all three types of isomorphisms in their study 
of changes to performance management systems. They see coercive 
isomorphism as driven by “regulatory control” and “financial legislation”; 
mimetic isomorphism as driven by “modeling successful banks” and normative 
isomorphism as driven by “professionals”, “top management” and “corporate 
culture”. All three types of isomorphism are also used in a post-financial crisis 
study of regulatory compliance in the area of IT (Gozmann and Currie, 2014). 
Further institutional theory has also been utilised to analyse a bank where the 
three major catalysts for change were financial losses, major regulatory change 
and appointment of new management (Munir et al., 2013). The understanding 
of institutional theory in all these studies is aligned with DiMaggio and 
Powell’s version of institutional theory (Munir et al., 2011; Gozmann and 
Currie, 2014; Munir et al., 2013).  
Based on the above and for the purposes of the study, the sources of change are 
defined as: 
 Coercive isomorphism is change-driven by a pressure to comply with 
formal legal and regulatory requirements, including reporting requirements. 
It also includes complying with informal pressures from other organisations 
and societal expectations. An example would be pressure to comply with 
regulations from FSA. 
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 Mimetic isomorphism is change-driven by uncertainty. To deal with 
uncertainty, an organisation copies other organisations which they see as 
role models, or rely on advice from consulting firms. An example would be 
copying best practice models from other banks. 
 Normative isomorphism is change-driven by professionalization. This 
means that employees have the power to define conditions and methods of 
their work, based on their formal education, technical skills and professional 
networks. An example would be increased influence of risk management 
and internal auditing professionals. 
 
The different types of isomorphism can be combined to create a change 
(Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006). For example regulatory requirements issued by 
FSA can be supported by internal auditors and risk management professionals.  
The level of embeddedness of the changes can be conceptualised by the four 
phases of institutionalisation described by Burns and Scapens (2000). This 
model includes the relations between actions and institutions that lead to four 
levels of embeddedness: The first one - “Encoding” - are the establishment of 
rules and routines. In relation to administrative controls, an example would be 
that policies and procedures have been formally documented. The second level - 
“Enactment” – means that rules have become actual routines applied in the 
organisation. The third level – “Reproduction” – means that the routines have 
been used for a period of time. When the routines become a taken-for-granted 
behaviour or the unquestioned way of doing things, they reach the fourth level 
which is “Institutionalization” (Burns and Scapens, 2000).  If a behaviour is 
deeply institutionalised – has been the unquestioned way of doing things for a 
longer period – it should be expected that there will be resistance to changes 
(Burns and Scapens, 2000). This might also explain why it is difficult to 
implement acknowledged changes to management controls (Zoni et al., 2012). 
Rules are important to drive the emergence of routines, but the importance of 
formal rules is reduced as participants gain experience in performing the 
“routines”, which indicates that experience reduces the need for formalised rule-
based descriptions (Van der Steen, 2011).  
The analysis framework is illustrated in figure 1: 
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Figure 1: Institutional lens – sources and embeddedness of changes 
 
4. Method 
A comparative case-study (Eisenhardt, 2007) was used to explore how 
administrative controls can be used to respond to a crisis. This method is 
appropriate, since the focus is on a real-life situation aiming at answering how 
and why questions (Yin, 2009). The case study will seek to illustrate the actual 
changes in the administrative controls by means of institutional theories 
(Keating, 1995). The empirical data was collected using semi-structured 
interviews in six banks in Iceland and Denmark (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). 
The result of the interviews in the three Icelandic and the three Danish banks 
were grouped and considered as two case units. This formed the basis for a 
comparative case study between Iceland and Denmark, aiming at identifying 
similarities and differences between the two countries (Yin, 2009). This 
approach is considered appropriate for analysing changes (Van de Ven et al., 
1990).     
A study of banks in both Iceland and Denmark was chosen in order to separate 
the crisis-driven changes to the administrative controls from ordinary market-
driven reactions. The reason why Danish banks were selected for comparison is 
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the common historical background of Icelandic and Danish banking systems. 
Icelandic banks were established on the basis of Danish law and practice, since 
Iceland was a part of Denmark until 1944. After the independence, the close 
link with the Danish banking system has continued (MoU, 2003; CBI, 2015). 
The Icelandic Banks were matched with the Danish banks using several key 
variables based on the paired comparison method (Gisselquist, 2014). When 
selecting the Danish banks, the most important criteria was that they had 
managed the financial crisis without being dependent on specific governmental 
support. From this group, three banks were selected which matched the 
Icelandic banks with respect to a number of key variables. This included similar 
numbers of employees (approx. 1,000) and similar levels and nature of 
activities. This match was based on an analysis of the 2013 annual reports and 
public information available on the homepages. None of the six banks were 
listed on any stock market. 
An important element in the case study is the design of the semi-structured 
interview, as these were the primary source of generating the empirical 
evidence (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). As a basis for the interviews, an 
interview guide was developed that focused on identifying the elements of 
administrative controls as well as the changes made to them as a result of the 
financial crisis in 2008 (Malmi and Brown, 2008). The interview guide is 
shown in Appendix 1. Some of the questions aimed at getting an assessment of 
the perceived value of various elements of the administrative controls.  It is, 
however, not only the assessment, but also the underlying arguments, 
descriptions and stories of the respondents that are important. Therefore the 
semi-structured interview approach was supported by a responsive element 
(Rubin and Rubin, 2012). This approach requires that the researcher has 
detailed knowledge about management controls, administrative controls and the 
banking industry (Morse and Field, 1995; Richards and Morse, 2012). To fulfil 
this requirement, at least two researchers took part in each interview. This also 
helped mitigating the risk that the information cannot be trusted, since the 
answers may immediately be evaluated based on the interviewer’s experiences 
(Kvale, 1994). 
The information generated is considered confidential by the banks. Due to the 
confidentiality agreements we were not allowed to remove information (except 
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the recorded interviews) from the premises. To deal with the confidentiality 
requirement and to get sufficient evidence that the observations and quotes used 
in the paper fairly represents the informants’ attitudes, relevant sections were 
reviewed by the respondents. This procedure aims at ensuring that any 
misunderstandings are corrected and minimises the risk of biased data 
collection (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
A total of 26 interviews each lasting 45 – 75 minutes were conducted between 
June and August 2015. The respondents were members of the executive board 
and employees with significant controls responsibilities (Merchant and Van der 
Stede, 2007). Most of these employees have worked with the bank for many 
years and have knowledge of practices before the crisis. The recorded 
interviews were transcribed and coded to reflect the changes to the 
administrative controls viewed through the institutional “lens” described in 
section 3. Most of the changes are subject to audit, and they were confirmed by 
interviews with internal audit. Further, an interview with the Icelandic FSA and 
reviewed of inspection reporting from the Danish FSA confirmed the changes. 
 
5. Changes in administrative controls in response to the financial crisis 
In the following sub-sections – drawing on the elements in table 1 - the actual 
changes to the administrative controls are described. 
 
Governance structure 
The “Tone at the Top” is primarily defined by the board of directors and 
communicated on a daily basis to employees by the executive board. Even 
though “values” are not part of the administrative controls as defined by Malmi 
and Brown (2008), in all the banks they are closely linked to the “Tone at the 
Top”. When the Icelandic banks were re-established, new CEOs were hired to 
drive the restructuring phase. One of the primary roles of the CEO was to 
encourage the employees to move on after an event which was described by 
some in terms such as: “chaos”, “panic”, “turmoil” and “shock”. An example of 
this situational crisis response (Coombs, 2007) was to identify new values that 
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would enable the banks to distance themselves from the practices of the old 
banks (Jännäri, 2009). For example: 
“In the beginning of 2009 the CEO set up meetings where all the employees 
were invited. People thought the CEO was crazy, as most employees were 
concerned with putting out fires and had no time for thinking about strategy. 
We counted about 700 employees at that meeting. One of the tasks of the 
meeting was to define new values. It was a very democratic approach and 
actually very good for the bank.” (Icelandic Manager) 
Organisational values are often presented in the form of “value statements” and 
are often summarised in single words. Examples of words that the Icelandic 
banks wanted to distance themselves from were “Smart” and “Fast”, which had 
been used by some of the pre-crisis banks. Instead they introduced new values 
that were represented by words such as: “Listen”, “Learn” and “Serve”. All the 
words describing the values are closely related to the expected behaviour of the 
employees and are developed in the work environment (Birnberg and Snodgrass 
1988).  To emphasise the importance and to support the institutionalisation, the 
values are included in training courses for new employees. 
The involvement of employees in defining values has also been seen in the 
Danish banks. It was, however, part of the ordinary strategic process and only 
included employees at manager level and above. This strategic process is driven 
by a desire to meet best practice (mimetic). 
In all the banks, the “Tone at the Top” and the organisational values have 
become more important after the financial crisis as a tool for influencing 
employee behaviour: 
“When we introduced the new values, we said that it is how you act (as an 
employee), that is the cornerstone, regarding the values. In effect, it governs 
how you will develop within the company. So if you do not relate to the values, 
then maybe you are not in the right place”. (Icelandic CFO) 
The overall objective seems to be the same in all the banks, the aim to drive the 
behaviour of the employees: 
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“This is about being proud of what you deliver – then you can go home and say 
– I delivered my best today – based on my prerequisites, and the skills I got.” 
(Danish HR manager) 
There was a strong coercive pressure in Iceland that things should change 
(Jännäri, 2009). The Icelandic banks sought to deal with this pressure by 
establishing new values a few months after the re-establishment. Since the 
maintenance of values in Iceland is not part of the strategic process, they might 
not be institutionalised but they are recognised by all groups of employees 
(enactment). This strong coercive pressure did not exist for the Danish banks, 
but the respondents including management (“Tone at the Top”) emphasised the 
importance of the values and the desire to have them institutionalised. 
The behaviour of the employees is also guided by the code of conduct, which in 
all banks have been documented and formally introduced to the employees after 
the financial crisis. However, there is a sceptical attitude: 
“This code of conduct is just some compliance thing. If you want to do 
something, then you should do it the right way. If you want to live by it, it is not 
enough just to publish it on the intranet. I have never experienced a business 
which has done a proper implementation of a code of conduct.” (Danish audit 
manager) 
During the interviews, the employees were asked if they were aware of the code 
of conduct and to what extent it had had an influence on behaviour:  
“Well…it is the “Tone from the Top” – it is the signal from the management – 
and what they do. I don’t think that many employees – now that you ask – have 
read the code of conduct – but it is there.” (Danish internal audit manager) 
The Icelandic response was the same: “We have a code of conduct – in my 
opinion it is a weak tool.” (Icelandic manager) The sceptical attitude is also 
seen at employee level. One of the Icelandic banks established a sign-off 
procedure, and the employee response was in general: “You want me to sign 
this – what is that supposed to change?” (Icelandic manager) 
The implementation of a code of conduct in all the banks may be classified as a 
result of a mimetic pressure (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), since no 
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environmental or regulatory requirements have been identified. Despite the fact 
that the code of conduct is formalised, it is apparent that many employees have 
not read it and it may therefore not be embedded (Burns and Scapens, 2000). 
The last element in the governance structure is the formal lines of authority 
between the board of directors and the executive board (Abernethy and Chua, 
1996). After the financial crisis, the FSA in both countries have issued formal 
orders governing both management levels and the formal lines of authority (e.g. 
BEK, 2010). One of the Icelandic managers explained the situation: 
“The regulatory pressure on banking is extreme, and it is a global phenomenon. 
And it is very much the responsibility of the board of directors to make sure that 
those requirements are met. But it is not just the boards, it is the whole system 
that is more aware of the regulation. It is much stricter now. The employees and 
the management are really careful. We have always been careful to comply – 
but now it is much more than ever before.” (Icelandic manager)  
The boards uses checklists with “all the regulatory issues that they have to be 
concerned with” (Icelandic manager), since the requirements are both subject 
to inspection from FSA and a mandatory area for internal audit. The situation is 
the same in Denmark, and many of the board members see the changes in the 
regulatory requirements following the financial crisis as an administrative 
burden. Internal audit does, however, see it as an advantage supporting their 
work: 
“It is good for us – no doubt – it has made things more structured. The 
regulatory requirements are quite good in supporting the establishment of 
structured lines of authority.” (Danish audit manager)  
The similar responses in both Iceland and Denmark are a combination of 
coercive (regulatory) and normative (internal audit) pressure (Ribeiro and 
Scapens, 2006). Even though management sees these changes as “too much 
time is spent on ticking the boxes” and resistance should be expected, the 
combined pressure has resulted in a reproduction (Burns and Scapens, 2000) 
complying with regulatory requirements. 
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Organisational structure 
As a consequence of the same underlying legal and regulatory requirements 
(Basel, 1997), the organisational structure is basically the same in all banks: 
Board of Directors
Executive Board
Internal audit
3rd line function
Business units
1st line functions
Risk Management
Compliance
2nd line functions
Accounting
2nd line function
 
Figure 2: Basic organisational structure 
Internal audit (3rd line of defence) reports to the board of directors, and risk 
management and compliance (2nd lines of defence), together with the other 
support functions, report to the executive board. In all the banks in the case 
study, the business units in the 1st line are structured as a “flat” organisation. 
This means that the executive board - primarily due to the size of the banks - 
has what they describe as “real involvement” in the business operations. This 
situation has been stable since the financial crisis, and only minor organisational 
changes have been introduced in the business units during that period. 
Since the financial crisis, IT has gained increasing attention.  Before the crisis, 
all of the Danish banks had outsourced the operation of their core banking 
systems. The argument for doing this is related to the cost of operation and 
maintenance of systems: 
“I don’t think that it is possible for a bank of our size to operate IT. We get the 
operations much cheaper and we are not – considering the present regulatory 
requirements – capable of keeping up operations alone. That will cost a 
fortune.” (Danish manager) 
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The reference to the regulatory requirements addresses both the ongoing and 
future changes in the liquidity and capital requirements (Basel, 2014). The 
Danish banks only have small IT departments with approximately 25 
employees, and in-house they operate some of the more specialised systems, 
e.g. risk management applications. 
In contrast, all the Icelandic banks have always operated the core banking 
systems in-house. As a consequence, the IT departments have an additional 75 – 
100 employees compared to the Danish banks. Further, the level of support to 
the business units initiated by the changes in the regulatory reporting 
requirements after the financial crisis is lower in Iceland. As a result, the 
Icelandic banks use more resources on generating this reporting. This was 
illustrated by a statement from one of the Icelandic risk managers: 
“We also do all reporting for the Icelandic FSA, the Icelandic central bank … 
so I think that more or less 8 people are full-time reporting employees.” 
(Icelandic risk manager) 
The difference in IT service levels also has an effect on the staffing in other 
functions. As an example, one of the planning and analysis departments in one 
Icelandic bank has hired five additional employees with IT capabilities to 
manage the changes in reporting requirements. 
Even though the regulatory requirements date before the financial crisis, the 
implementation of the compliance function began after the financial crisis 
(Basel, 2005). Therefore the establishment of these functions can be seen as a 
reactive coercive response to regulatory requirements, and they seem to have 
become institutionalised. In compliance with the Basel requirements, activities 
and tasks are identical in Denmark and Iceland, as is the number of employees – 
on average 5 full time employees. 
The risk management functions perform the same tasks and activities in 
Denmark and Iceland, a fact which is directly linked to the regulatory 
requirements (Basel, 2011).  Regarding staffing there is, however, a significant 
difference. In Iceland the risk management functions employ on average 30 
full-time employees. The average number in Denmark is 5 employees.  Due to 
regulatory requirements and practice, the risk management functions are subject 
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to ongoing review by internal audit and FSA including an evaluation of the 
staffing. In both countries, internal audit made no significant findings regarding 
the quality of work delivered or the staffing. The Danish evaluation is supported 
by the inspection reports from FSA, which, due to local practice, are available 
on the banks’ homepages. No orders or recommendations for additional staffing 
were reported. 
The number of employees in the Danish risk management functions has been 
stable since the financial crisis.  The huge difference in size is explained by an 
increase in the Icelandic banks after the crisis. In addition, there have been a 
number of changes in how risk management is carried out in Iceland. Compared 
with the Danish banks, risk management functions in Iceland have worked more 
on formalisation of the function. As part of this process, the board of directors 
in one of the banks asked the risk management function to propose a framework 
for how they should work: 
“A lot of the work and proposal for the framework came from us, the risk 
management professionals.” (Icelandic manager)  
The proposals were accepted by the board of directors and the risk management 
functions established accordingly. This way, the normative pressure from the 
professionals materialised as board decisions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
The size of the Icelandic risk management functions was discussed with one of 
the Danish CEOs. He was asked if it would be possible to reduce the number of 
employees from 30 to 5 employees, which would be the typical size in a similar 
Danish bank: 
“The more employees you have, the more power, and it is difficult to remove 
power. At the same time, the people in the 2nd line are very reluctant to move 
outside their comfort zone. They would rather change a decimal figure on page 
249 than be placed in the 1st line and asked to prepare a PowerPoint of 4 pages 
with a strategy and then do the implementation.” (Danish CEO)  
Further, he believed that it would be very difficult to get acceptance from FSA 
for such a huge reduction. We then asked whether the consequences of 
increasing external pressure in combination with shifting power balance would 
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be that the size of the function should be considered permanent - the answer to 
that was: “Yes!” (Danish CEO). Based on these comments, which are supported 
by combined pressure from both internal audit and FSA (Ribeiro and Scapens, 
2006), the risk management functions in both countries have reached a level 
where they have become institutionalised. 
In Denmark, the accounting functions responsible for bookkeeping, external and 
internal reporting (management reporting) employ on average 10 full-time 
employees.  Even though there has been pressure on the accounting functions 
after the financial crisis due to a rise in the regulatory reporting requirements, 
the number of employees has remained almost stable. The Icelandic accounting 
functions employ three times as many employees, i.e. an average of 30. It 
should be mentioned that as part of the accounting function, the Icelandic banks 
have IT staff, an average of 5 employees, to assist with the reporting. The 
Danish banks do not have such IT people, since IT has been outsourced. No 
other elements that might explain the difference in staffing were identified, 
since both the Danish and the Icelandic accounting functions cover the same 
type of activities. It should be mentioned that the number of employees in the 
Icelandic accounting functions has remained at a stable level after the financial 
crisis. The changes in the external reporting requirements (Basel, 2014) 
following the financial crisis is a coercive pressure, which is mainly managed 
by the well-established and institutionalised accounting functions.  
In all banks, the internal audit functions have the same structure and perform 
the same activities. They report to the audit committees, and there is an agreed 
level of cooperation with external audit. This means that it is an integrated 
financial and internal control audit (Kinney et al., 2013). In all the banks, 
internal audit’s primary activity is the internal control audit and the related 
management reporting (Manson et al., 2001), whereas external audit primarily 
focuses on the financial statement. This uniform sharing of work between 
internal and external audit also explains why the staffing of internal audit in all 
banks are at the same level, namely 5 – 9 employees.  The development of 
internal audit since the financial crisis has also been the same in all the banks, 
driven by the regulatory requirements and practice (Basel, 2011). The internal 
audit functions in all the banks are institutionalised: 
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“We have a very good sparring with the head of internal audit. What we are 
trying to do is to turn legal requirements into practical tools and business tools 
in such a way that it is not just implementation of requirements but a new way 
to operate the business.” (Danish CEO) 
Another example illustrating the integration is the working relations between 
risk management and internal audit: 
“Our working relations are not formalised as in policies, but we understand 
that we need close cooperation, like for example I look at what they do in 
operations areas, credit risk areas and risk management areas, (the internal 
auditor) also looks at our reporting, and we discuss and we try to meet as much 
as possible.” (Icelandic risk manager) 
 
Policies and procedures 
Formalised policies and procedures are a regulatory requirement, and therefore 
they should be present in all the banks. To some extent it is the pressure from 
the regulatory regime which has initiated that internal audit has driven the 
formalisation of policies and procedures, and the pressure has been increasing 
after the financial crisis: 
“Yes – but I would say that it is primarily due to our work – the things 
regarding segregation of duties and all this. It is internal audit who has driven 
this, where before the crisis you had one focus – sell, sell, and sell. The issues 
regarding control were boring.” (Icelandic audit manager) 
It is a common situation for all the banks that policies and procedures have 
become more important as a management tool after the financial crisis: 
“The importance has increased in recent years. And the board of directors has 
promoted good corporate governance and sent the “Tone at the “top” down to 
management and the staff to comply with rules and so on.” (Icelandic audit 
manager) 
It is, however, a balance between compliance with regulatory pressure and 
practical considerations: 
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“Sometimes you may prepare a procedure just to prepare one. We miss this and 
we miss that – then we write a procedure. Then we miss that.” (Danish audit 
manager) 
In Denmark, more policies and procedures were formalised at the beginning of 
the financial crisis. Icelandic banks, on the other hand, had to increase the level 
of formalisation and have therefore spent a substantial amount of resources on 
reaching a level that may be comparable to the Danish banks: 
“We obviously have more rules, we have more work processes that we have 
tried to nail everything down.” (Icelandic head of internal audit) 
Based on the discussions with Icelandic heads of internal audit, it seems that the 
level of compliance with the formalised policies and procedures can still be 
improved due to a lack of awareness regarding responsibility for internal control 
in the 1st line of defence. We then asked if the 1st line of defence works as it did 
before the financial crisis: 
“No they do not, but it is a bit like raising children. You tell them the rules and 
the boundaries – but you have to check if they respect the boundaries – and act 
as they are not. You have to give your employees feedback. They have to be 
aware that it is not a negative control, it is a supporting control.” (Icelandic 
head of internal audit) 
The comment regarding “raising of children” indicates that the Icelandic banks 
have some difficulties moving the level from enacting to reproduction. Even 
though there is a combined pressure (Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006), any resistance 
might be explained by the short timeframe the Icelandic banks use for the 
implementation of these major changes. 
Regarding the external pressure for formalised policies and procedures, the 
situation is the same in all the banks. Further, the procedure for preparation, 
approval and implementation of both policies and procedures are also uniform 
in all the banks in both countries. The procedure includes a formal approval by 
the board of directors and roll-out to the employees. The use of policies and 
procedures is also assessed by internal audit: 
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“We audit everything. We audit all significant areas where a policy is required 
according to the “Executive order on management”. In all these areas, we 
audit the policy approved by the board of directors – and report back to them.” 
(Danish head of internal audit)  
In the same bank, the CEO explained a situation where compliance with 
policies and procedures imposed an unintended restriction on business 
development: 
“In 2014 we had an objective of getting more business customers and to lend 
more money to small and medium-size business customers – but we have not 
fully succeeded. When we analysed this, the reason was that we had complied 
with our risk policies. We have a number of risk measures. If they are not met, 
they suppress our growth objectives.” (Danish CEO) 
It was also during the interview process questioned whether the implementation 
of policies and procedures was seen as a reactive or a proactive process: 
“It is a proactive process. It is a desire to do this. We want these things in a 
proper condition. And this has been discussed at meetings with the employees – 
and everybody agreed that the more we have formalised – the easier it is for all 
parties.” (Danish Head of internal audit) 
Further, policies and procedures are used as a management tool: 
“We have it because it works. It is not the situation that we write a policy and 
lock it in a closet – just in order to be able to present them to FSA – and then do 
something different on a daily basis. That’s not how it works. There we are in a 
pretty good shape. We use this as a management tool – definitely.” (Danish 
audit manager)  
In Denmark, most of the policies and procedures were documented prior to the 
financial crisis, and it seems that routines (reproduction) are established. 
However, there seems to be a downside to this, since the changes in regulatory 
requirements (coercive pressure) have resulted in a situation where formal 
procedures are encoded as a mechanical response without a clear business-
driven need. The Danish employees are experienced in performing the routines, 
which has reduced the need for formalised descriptions (Van der Steen, 2011). 
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When evaluating the importance of policies and procedures, a Danish audit 
manager made the following comment: 
“Now I will try not to give a complicated explanation. I think that the issue with 
the strongest impact on an employee’s behaviour is culture. Of course 
procedures are important – but a process alone does not do anything. It is the 
focus from the management and management’s involvement and our input – 
since we look at it from the perspective of whether they fulfil the requirements 
stated in the processes. It is very much culture and environment that have an 
impact on these issues. But the short answer is that – yes, it is important, but it 
is not the most important factor.” (Danish audit manager) 
The administrative controls are considered both a necessity and a burden due to 
the ongoing changes in the regulatory requirements, which has been a long 
lasting situation in the financial industry (Franks et al., 1997; Van der Stede, 
2011). The banks seek a balance between compliance with the regulatory 
requirements, the business-driven need for having proper administrative 
controls, and the resources spent: 
“One of the things that we have discussed - and this relates back to the 
regulatory environment - is that there is less time at board level spent on 
strategy and more time spent on ticking the boxes…in a way, too much time is 
sort of spent on ticking the boxes and making sure that we comply with the 
regulatory environment. Fine, that has to be done. But as a proportion of all 
tasks it takes up too much time. And in many ways, the board’s time would be 
better spent on more important issues” (Icelandic CFO) 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
The re-establishment of the Icelandic banks included a replacement of the 
executive board and the board of directors in all banks. The new managements 
decided to implement a number of changes to administrative controls (Malmi 
and Brown, 2008), assisted by other employee groups (Merchant and Van der 
Stede, 2007). The changes identified in Iceland and Denmark can be 
summarised as follows: 
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Table 1: Changes to administrative controls and additional action in Iceland 
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The areas with significant additional management initiated actions in Iceland 
are: ”Tone at the Top” (values), risk management, and policies and procedures: 
Almost immediately after the re-establishment of the Icelandic banks, the new 
managements initiated the implementation of new values. Based on the 
interviews it seems that the new values in Icelandic banks, supported by the 
“Tone at the Top”, have initiated a behavioural change (Walker, 2009; Erkens 
et al., 2012). This is also supported by observations during our visits to the 
Icelandic banks; the headquarters as well as the branches gave the impression of 
conservative banking, which is rather distant from the image portrayed prior to 
the financial crisis (IMF, 2014). However, compared with Denmark, the 
maintenance of values is not a part of the ordinary strategic process and has at 
present not reached a level of reproduction (Burns and Scapens, 2000). 
Another significant difference between Iceland and Denmark was within risk 
management. Even though banks in both countries are governed by the same 
regulatory requirements and perform the same tasks (Basel, 2011), the risk 
management function in Iceland have grown from an average of 5 to 30 fulltime 
employees since the financial crisis. In Denmark, the average number of 
employees is 5, which have been almost stable since the financial crisis. Both 
countries respond to the coercive pressure from FSA supported by a mandatory 
review by internal audit. Further, they copy the other banks and thus expose 
themselves to a mimetic pressure. In addition, the Icelandic risk management 
professionals have managed to establish a normative pressure since the board of 
directors followed their recommendations regarding the establishment and 
staffing. In both countries, this combined pressure (Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006) 
has led to a situation where the risk management functions are institutionalised 
(Burns and Scapens, 2000). As a consequence it seems that “…it is difficult to 
remove power” (Danish CEO) and that the staffing levels should be considered 
permanent. Consequently, the additional staffing should be considered a fixed 
expense going forward. This is supported by the view that institutionalised 
functions are difficult to change (Burns and Scapens, 2000). 
Policies and procedures is an area where there have been significant changes to 
the regulatory requirements (Van der Stede, 2011). The formalisation of 
policies and procedures had different starting points in the Icelandic banks than 
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in the Danish banks. At present, the Icelandic banks seem to have difficulties in 
moving from enacting to reproduction. The difficulties can be explained by the 
fact that fundamental changes are more difficult than evolutionary changes 
(Zoni et al., 2012). Resistance can also be explained by the short timeframe the 
Icelandic banks use for the implementation of major changes (Burns and 
Scapens, 2000). In Denmark, most of the policies and procedures were 
documented prior to the financial crisis. However, there is a downside to this. In 
the Danish banks, the changes in regulatory requirements have resulted in a 
situation where formal procedures are encoded as a mechanical response 
without a clear business-driven need, which leads to ineffective solutions 
(Munir et al., 2013). Another interesting observation is that the need for 
encoded rules seems to be replaced by employees’ experience in some of the 
Danish banks (Van der Steen, 2011). This is an indication of institutionalisation 
of procedures (Burns and Scapens, 2000). In both countries, policies and 
procedures are seen as a management tool (Flamholtz et al., 1985; Margison, 
2002). Although the literature on management controls sees policies and 
procedures as important for changing behaviour, the managers interviewed saw 
culture and values as being even more important. This indicates that the use of 
administrative controls as a management tool should be combined with the use 
of cultural controls. It also indicates that there might be limitations as to how 
much reliance can be put on policies and procedures to change behaviour, both 
from a business and an audit perspective (Eilifsen et al., 2010). 
In the area of IT, the operational models in Iceland and Denmark have been 
different and unchanged since before the financial crisis. The Icelandic banks 
have operated IT in-house, whereas the Danish banks have chosen to outsource 
their core banking systems. The changes to the external reporting requirements 
(Basel, 2014) following the financial crisis have had an impact on the banks. 
The Icelandic banks seem to experience challenges with the required IT support 
and have, as a response, hired additional staff, whereas the Danish banks have 
outsourced these services. 
Formal lines of authorities have undergone significant changes caused by the 
regulatory requirements, since FSA in both countries issued formal orders 
governing the management of the banks. Furthermore, FSA issued orders to 
internal audit on mandatory reviews in this area. The responses in both 
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countries, are seen as a combination of coercive (regulatory) and normative 
(internal audit) pressure (Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006). Even though both 
management and employees see these changes as “too much time is spent on 
ticking the boxes” and resistance should be expected, the combined pressure has 
resulted in a reproduction (Burns and Scapens, 2000) complying with regulatory 
requirements. 
There are two areas with the same changes in both countries, namely code of 
conduct and increased as well as more formalised compliance processes. It 
should be expected that pressure can lead to ineffective solutions or difficulties 
(Munir et al., 2013; Zoni et al., 2012). The implementation of code of conduct is 
an example of that. Since all the banks have implemented a code of conduct, it 
may be a result of a mimetic pressure (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Despite 
the fact that it is formalised, it is obvious that many employees have not read it, 
and it may therefore be considered as a minor encoding (Burns and Scapens, 
2000).  
In summary, the crisis of 2008 led to administrative control responses in the 
Icelandic banks, including a definition of new values based on a new “Tone at 
the Top”, implementation of large risk management functions, formalisation of 
policies and procedures, and hiring additional IT staff to handle the regulatory 
reporting. In addition, banks in both countries have responded to a coercive 
pressure by establishing restructured compliance functions and formalising the 
lines of authority. Even though the actions have been initiated by changes in the 
regulatory requirements, they have led to solutions which can be classified as 
reproduction. All the banks have also implemented a code of conduct based on 
a normative pressure, but these changes have had a minor impact. 
This contributes towards an understanding of how administrative controls have 
been used to respond to the financial crisis. The changes in the administrative 
controls excluding values are of a mimetic nature, where the banks provided the 
necessary resources to implement the required solutions. Further, they are 
documented, which is a prerequisite for auditing and inspection by FSA. The 
response is visible and can be seen an example of compliance with changes to 
the regulatory requirements (Van der Stede, 2011; Franks et al., 1997). Viewing 
the changes to the administrative controls through an institutional lens (figure 
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1), these responses can, however, also be seen as a prerequisite for establishing 
a taken-for-granted behaviour (Burns and Scapens, 2000). In relation to Malmi 
and Brown’s (2008) definition of management controls, this institutionalisation 
of administrative controls can also be seen as complimentary to and supportive 
of changing the cultural controls (Walker, 2009; Erkens et al., 2012).  
All the banks have changed their values in response to the financial crisis. 
Except for the actual wording of values, these changes are not visible and are 
therefore more difficult to audit or review by FSA. To succeed with the changes 
to the values developed in the banks (Birnberg and Snodgrass 1988), the 
employees should have established a taken-for-granted behaviour (Burns and 
Scapens, 2000). Following this view, the response to the administrative controls 
can be seen as a management tool aiming at supporting the changes to the 
cultural controls rather than a compliance exercise with regulatory 
requirements. 
There are some implications of the findings in relation to the response from the 
regulatory regime which for a long time has been composed of more rule-based 
and “box-ticking” formalisation (Franks et al., 1997). When the level of 
embeddedness reaches reproduction, the need for more formalised rules seems 
to be replaced by employees’ experience (Van der Steen, 2011). As a 
consequence, further formalisation will only be an administrative compliance 
burden without adding to the quality of controls. This could have implications 
for how the regulatory requirements should be defined and how FSA and 
auditors should ensure compliance. Further, it is important for the banks to 
know when to focus on administrative controls as a management tool and when 
to use other management controls. The banks seek to balance compliance with 
regulatory requirements, a business-driven need for satisfactory controls and an 
optimisation of the resources used.  It could therefore be of interest for further 
research to analyse how the configuration of management controls can be 
optimised. As a basis for this research it might be beneficial to gain an 
understanding of how the total package of management controls (Malmi and 
Brown, 2008) has been used as a response to the financial crisis 
There are some weaknesses in and limitations to our study. The analysis is 
based on interviews, and the actual use of the administrative controls has not 
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been reviewed. Further, the identification of changes to the controls after the 
financial crisis covers a period of more than seven years. In addition, some of 
the respondents have not been employed for the entire period and therefore they 
rely on information gained from their colleagues. These limitations 
notwithstanding, our study has contributed to an understanding of how 
administrative controls have been used to respond to the financial crisis. 
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Appendix 1 – Interview guide 
Governance structure 
1.1. How many members are there in the Board of Directors? 
1.2. How many are male vs. female 
1.3. What is the average experience as a board member? 
1.4. How often does the board meet? 
1.5. How does the board meet?  
1.6. Who participates in the meetings: Always or periodically? 
1.7. What main regulatory/best practice requirements does the board have to 
comply with? 
1.8. Does the board of directors perform an annual self-assessment? What does 
it contain? 
1.9. How is responsibility divided between the board of directors and executive 
board/c-level? 
 Approval of loans 
 Investments 
 Other exposures 
 
1.10. How does internal auditing review the governance process? 
1.11. Have there been major changes in governance structures? If so which? 
Organisational structure 
2.1. How is the bank structured? 
2.2. How is the accounting function organised? 
 Management accounting/reporting (function/person) 
 Public reporting (function/person) 
 Regulatory reporting (function/person) 
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2.3. How many employees does the accounting function have? 
2.4. Do you have an internal audit function or a dedicated person responsible for 
internal audit? 
 How many employees if a department? 
 How is it organised?  
 
2.5. Is your IT function in house or outsourced? 
 How many employees if a department? 
 How is it organised?  
 
2.6. Do you have a risk management function or dedicated risk manager? 
 How many employees if a department? 
 How is it organised?  
 
2.7. Do you have a compliance function or a dedicated compliance manager? 
 How many employees if a department? 
 How is it organised?  
 
2.8. How are projects managed in the bank? 
 2.9. What level of change has these projects introduced? 
2.10. Have there been major changes in organisational structure? If so which? 
Policies and procedures 
3.1. As a tool for influencing employee behaviour (management control tool), 
how important do you perceive: 
 Organisational design - roles and responsibilities including management 
supervision? 
 Policies defining overall requirements? 
 Procedures and rules? 
 
3.2. To what extent does the bank rely on written company-wide codes of 
conduct, policies or similar statements to influence the behaviour of employees? 
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3.3. Are there written policies and procedures for:  
 Segregation of duties 
 Authorising activities 
 Planning reviews 
 Ethical conduct 
 Risk taking 
 Others 
 
3.4. Describe the process for creating these?  
 Who prepares them? 
 Who approves them? 
 Who implements them? 
 
3.5. How is compliance with codes of conduct, policies and procedures 
monitored? (ref: Basel) 
 Compliance function 
 Controller function 
 Internal audit 
 External audit 
 FSA 
 Are FSA reports publically available? 
 
3.6. Is there a formal procedure (at least annual) for reporting on compliance to 
different stakeholders? Please describe. 
3.7. Are there areas where the bank relies on informal procedures and processes 
to influence employee behaviour? 
3.8. Have there been major changes in the way policies and procedures are 
initiated, implemented and controlled. If so, which? 
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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the quantitative and qualitative factors associated with how 
preparers and auditors perform materiality assessments of note disclosures in 
the annual report. Drawing on a series of interviews with experienced 
professionals, the study illuminates the way preparers and auditors assess 
disclosure materiality, which is compared to the way users view it. The study 
finds that both preparers and auditors tend to consider assessment of disclosure 
materiality in the same way as materiality of misstatements. This assessment 
style is misaligned with current initiatives among standard-setters. Furthermore, 
preparers and auditors appear to be uncoordinated with the way in which users 
view disclosure materiality. These findings indicate confusion and operational 
difficulties in relation to the concept of materiality. These difficulties have to be 
managed by standard-setters if their aspirations about encouraging assessments 
of materiality and cutting the clutter out of disclosures are to be realised.  
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1. Introduction 
Materiality is one of the most critical terms in accounting because it determines 
which items end up being disclosed in the annual report (Brennan and Gray, 
2005). Despite its importance, there seems to be a lack of common 
understanding and use of the concept “materiality” (Barker et al., 2013). The 
basic meaning of materiality is “that there is no need to be concerned with what 
is not important or with what does not matter” (Bernstein, 1967), which means 
that the annual report should not include information that is not important or 
does not matter to users (IAS 1.31). Seen from the user’s perspective, 
materiality decisions are made behind closed doors, and only little information 
is available on how these judgements are made and how they affect the users 
(Fearnley et al., 2011; Messier et al., 2005). These decisions are made by 
preparer5 and auditors, and the users only see the final result of this assessment, 
which is the annual report (Brennan and Gray, 2005; Acito et al., 2009). The 
primary users are identified as existing and potential investors, and one of the 
most advanced groups of users is sell-side financial analysts (Brown et al., 
2015). Consequently, together with preparer and auditors the financial analysts 
can be considered the primary stakeholders of the annual report. 
There are two types of materiality: Materiality regarding misstatements and 
materiality regarding omissions. Misstatements are normally related to amounts 
in the primary financial statement (Hussain et al., 2014). Materiality of 
misstatements is measured on predetermined aggregated amounts (Eilifsen and 
Messier, 2014). Omissions can relate to both amounts and other types of 
information, including text sections. If a disclosure is considered immaterial, it 
can be omitted. Since decisions regarding materiality are judgmental, the risk of 
omitting material information can be mitigated by adding disclosures; however, 
this might lead to information overload, which can be a problem for users 
(Lawrence, 2013). Information overload is a recognised problem, and EFRAG 
(2012) has suggested a framework for disclosures which could help align the 
contents of the notes in the annual report with users’ needs. While Barker et al 
(2013) do not agree with the perception of disclosure overload, they do, 
                                                     
5 We refer to preparers of financial statements as “preparers” throughout the paper. The term 
refers to employees in mid- to high-level management positions with significant influence on the 
preparation of annual reports. 
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however, support a call for guidance on disclosure materiality. Thresholds 
guiding materiality for the primary financial statement cannot automatically be 
applied to disclosures in the notes (Eilifsen et al., 2014). To add further aspects 
to the understanding of the concept it is therefore of interest to explore how 
materiality regarding disclosures is perceived by different stakeholders. This is 
important since additional disclosures have accounted for a substantial part of 
the total growth in both volume and complexity of the annual report. A better 
understanding of the differences in the perception of materiality between 
preparers, auditors and users can improve guidance on the subject and lead to 
more focused financial reporting. 
The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) reports an 
increasing trend in the size of annual reports for UK firms, and the notes alone 
accounted for an average of 55 pages in the FTSE 100 companies 2014 annual 
reports (ACCA, 2012; PwC, 2015). In response to this tendency of increasing 
size and complexity, in 2009 the UK Financial Reporting Council published the 
“Louder than Words: Principles and actions for making corporate reports less 
complex and more relevant”, which suggested guiding principles for corporate 
reporting and calls for action (FRC, 2009). Since this publication, interest in 
improving the readability of financial reports has grown, and the complexity of 
disclosures and regulatory requirements has been questioned (FRC, 2011; 
NZCA and ICAS, 2011; EFRAG, 2012). Based on the number of pages in the 
annual report, these initiatives do not, however, seem to have had much impact. 
Preparers, auditors and users of annual reports are aware of the perceived 
problems, but effective solutions solving the paradox of how to increase 
transparency without adding length and complexity to the disclosures have not 
been yet identified (EFRAG, 2012). 
We have explored preparers’ and auditors’ methods and approaches to 
assessment of disclosure materiality in the annual report. This assessment has 
been compared with the ways users view disclosure materiality, which we find 
entirely different. The empirical material for the analysis has been collected on 
the basis on a multiple-case study including three groups of respondents: senior 
members of the staff preparing the annual report, Big 4 audit partners with IFRS 
experience, and sell-side analysts. A total of 36 interviews were conducted 
covering 12 non-financial companies listed on the OMX Nasdaq Copenhagen in 
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Denmark who prepare annual reports according to the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS). Each interview was based on the notes in the 
company’s annual report, which the respondent had analysed prior to the 
interview. This analysis and the interview provided information about the 
individual respondent’s perception of materiality regarding disclosures. 
The result of the case study shows that preparers’ and auditors’ perception of 
disclosure materiality is based on a frequency of three steps. The first step uses 
the size of the amounts as thresholds, which is similar to an assessment of 
misstatements. The second step considers the changes to the disclosure 
compared with previous year. In the final step, it is assessed whether the 
disclosure adds value for the user. This last assessment includes an evaluation 
of whether the disclosure is read and understood by the user. Users’ evaluation 
is different, as they primarily consider if the information is relevant as input to a 
financial analysis. Even though preparers and auditors claim that they consider 
users’ needs, they miss the target since they do not consider these analyses.  
Consequently, there is a gap between preparers’ and auditors’ perception of 
users’ needs and the actual need for this information. This indicates that the 
actual understanding and use of materiality does not address the long-standing 
key requirements including “influence” on users “judgement” (Kohler, 1957; 
Barker et al., 2013; EFRAG, 2012; IASB, 2015). 
This paper contributes by adding further details to the understanding of 
preparers’ and auditors’ approach to disclosure materiality and users’ 
assessment of the result, which are the notes presented in the annual report. The 
result of the case study also supports the opinion that too much immaterial 
information is disclosed (EFRAG, 2012) and that clarification regarding the 
practical use of disclosure materiality is needed (ISAB, 2015). By taking the 
differences in perception into account, standard setters can improve guidelines 
on disclosure materiality by addressing preparers’ and auditors’ misalignment 
with users’ perception. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 defines and discusses the elements 
of materiality, and section 3 describes the research method. In section 4, the 
result of the case study is presented. Finally, in section 5 the results are 
discussed, and section 6 presents the conclusions. 
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2. Disclosure materiality 
Disclosure materiality is a sub-component of materiality and is related to 
omissions of information (IASB, 2015). A decision can either result in the 
disclosure or the omission of an individual piece of information. Unlike errors 
in amounts recognised in the primary financial statements, errors related to 
omission of disclosures cannot be measured in the same way as misstatements, 
since the disclosure might not contain amounts or have any effect on the 
reported profit. 
Materiality is one of the most critical terms in accounting because it determines 
which items end up being disclosed in the annual report (Brennan and Gray, 
2005). It is a component of accounting quality relevance (IASB, 2010). In the 
area of auditing and accounting, materiality has been subject to academic 
research for more than 100 years, both the recognised figures and the supporting 
disclosures. According to Dicksee (1907), “an account is not primarily a 
collection of figures, the narration (or wording) is as least as material as the 
figures themselves”. 60 years later Bernstein (1967) stated that: “The concept of 
materiality is part of the wisdom of life.” His basic meaning was that there is 
“no need to be concerned with what is not important or with what does not 
matter”. He raised the key question: “What is material?”, and his own answer 
includes: “… lack of guidance is due to the fact that the assessment of 
materiality is purely a matter of judgment”. A guideline was, however, defined 
suggesting a border zone of 10 – 15% of net income after taxes. This guideline, 
which only relates to quantitative evaluations, defines the threshold of 
materiality. Since then a large number of academic papers have analysed 
various aspects of materiality. Most research on materiality has been done from 
the perspective of recognition and measurement due to its direct impact on 
reported net income, assuming that only one level of materiality applies to one 
set of financial statements. One of the first definitions of materiality was 
published in 1957: 
“The characteristic attaching to a statement, fact, or item whereby its disclosure 
or the method of giving it expression would be likely to influence the judgment 
of a reasonable person” (Kohler, 1957). 
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Even though this could be seen as a broad definition, until the 1970s almost all 
materiality decisions were based on quantitative measures. In the 1970s, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) introduced the notion of 
qualitative materiality. As a consequence of the initiative, one of the most cited 
legal contributions regarding materiality is a Supreme Court decision from 
1976, which is referenced in a paper on “Qualitative materiality” (Fedders, 
1998), and later by PCAOB in 2010 (PCAOB, 2010). According to this 
decision, a fact is material if there is: 
 ”A substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have 
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the “total 
mix” of information made available”. 
Except for the fact that the statement relates to an “omitted fact”, the decision 
does not provide much guidance regarding materiality. According to Fedders 
(1998), the SEC initiative regarding qualitative materiality “died at the bar of 
common sense. It’s intended beneficiaries – investors – ignored corporate 
qualitative disclosures.” 
According to the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), 
companies are required to meet all disclosure requirements in the standards if 
these disclosures are “material” (IAS 1.31). They do not need to apply specific 
disclosure requirements if the related information is not material. A piece of 
information is material if omitting or misstating it could influence decisions that 
users make based on financial information about a specific reporting entity. 
IASB asserts that materiality is entity-specific and is based on the nature and/or 
magnitude of the items to which the information relates in the context of a 
financial report. They explicitly state that they “cannot specify a uniform 
quantitative threshold for materiality or predetermine what could be material in 
a particular situation” (IASB, 2010). This is because materiality is a judgmental 
decision, and when deciding if a disclosure is material, the preparer needs to 
make some assumptions about the users and their use of the annual report as a 
whole and that specific piece of information in particular. 
Primary users are identified as existing and potential investors, lenders and 
other creditors who are expected to have reasonable knowledge of business and 
economic activities, and who review and analyse the information diligently. The 
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types of decisions users’ make based on financial statements involve buying, 
selling or holding equity and debt instruments, and providing or settling credit. 
The information they relate to is expected returns, future cash flows, resources 
and the extent to which management has discharged its responsibilities (IASB, 
2010). Because the users have different information needs, the preparers cannot 
reasonably be expected to meet all the needs of all of the entity’s primary users 
(EFRAG, 2012). Cascino et al. (2014) find that there is significant variety in 
different capital providers’ information needs, and different sources of 
information sometimes compete. One reason for this is that financial reporting 
has two different roles; financial decision-making and stewardship. Information 
required for financial decision-making is mainly ex-ante oriented with the 
purpose of supporting valuations. Stewardship information is ex-post oriented 
with the purpose of monitoring management’s use of capital after it has been 
invested in the company.  
IASB has initiated a project on materiality, which seeks “to help preparers, 
auditors and regulators to use judgment when applying the concept of 
materiality.” It is mentioned in the project objectives that: “How the concept of 
materiality is applied in practice is seen by many as a major cause of the 
‘disclosure problem’. Not making appropriate materiality judgments can result 
in both the disclosure of too much irrelevant (i.e. immaterial) information and 
not enough relevant (i.e. material) information.”6 In October 2015, IASB 
proposed a draft practice statement on the application of the concept of 
materiality about disclosure of information.  The draft practice statement 
provides guidance on how to apply the concept of materiality when making 
decisions about presenting and disclosing information, as well as on how to 
assess whether omissions and misstatements are material. They consider both 
quantitative and qualitative factors and see quantitative factors as “a helpful 
tool” that “provide[s] the basis for a preliminary assessment that an amount is 
likely to be material or immaterial; for example if it is below a specified 
percentage of profit or net assets”. This is elaborated by: “However, a 
materiality assessment also requires consideration of the nature of the item and 
the entity’s circumstances” (IASB, 2015), which indicates that qualitative 
                                                     
6 http://www.ifrs.org/Current-Projects/IASB-Projects/Disclosure-Initiative/Pages/Disclosure-
Initiative.aspx 
148 
 
factors play a prominent role in determining materiality for omission of 
disclosures. IASB are, however, sparse when it comes to suggesting which 
qualitative factors need to be considered when deciding if a disclosure is 
material.  
The definition of materiality is divided into two distinct types; misstatements 
and omissions.  Misstatements are mainly quantitative and often relate to errors 
in the reported amounts in the primary financial statements, e.g. net profit 
(Hussain et al., 2014). Because of the quantitative nature, auditors can add the 
sum of identified misstatements to determine if they are above or below a 
predetermined aggregated materiality level (Eilifsen and Messier, 2014).  
Omissions and misstatements regarding disclosures, which are supporting 
information displayed in the notes (Schipper, 2007), have no impact on the 
primary financial statements. Consequently, quantitative benchmarks for 
misstatements cannot be used when evaluating materiality of omissions of 
disclosures (Eilifsen et al., 2014). Disclosure literature suggests that additional 
disclosures in the annual report will reduce the information gap between a 
company’s management and its shareholders and thereby reduce the cost of 
capital. While previous research indicates that more disclosure reduces 
information asymmetry, it has, however, been difficult to measure disclosure 
and reporting outcome (Leuz and Wysocki, 2015). Research on the omission 
aspect of disclosure materiality is scarce and has focused on individual 
disclosure areas, e.g. environmental, social and governance (Szabo, 2012; 
Amel-Zadeh, 2015), postretirement benefits (Liu and Mittelstaedt, 2002) or 
segment information (Doupnik and Seese, 2001). Their studies generally find 
that the level of disclosure (combination of volume and content) varies 
considerably across annual reports and that higher levels of disclosures are 
perceived positively. This is supported by a number of other studies which find 
that additional disclosures in the notes have a positive impact by reducing 
information asymmetry, investors’ estimation risk  and companies’ cost of 
capital (Botosan and Plumlee, 2006; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Botosan, 
2006). 
The opposite of omissions is information overload (Eppler and Mengis, 2004). 
In the publication “Towards a Disclosure Framework for the Notes” (EFRAG, 
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2012), it is stated that: “Disclosure requirements should be principle-based and 
detailed rules should be avoided” and “Care should be taken in applying the 
materiality principle in practice, bearing in mind that disclosing immaterial 
information (and information on situations that do not apply in practice to the 
reporting entity) reduces the relevance and the understandability of 
disclosures.” This could indicate that a saturation point could exist, and that 
additional disclosures would increase the information asymmetry because the 
users have difficulties in finding relevant information. In a response to the 
paper, Barker et al., (2013) say that “if a disclosure overload problem exist, it 
may not be caused by the current standards within IFRS. Rather, it could be 
driven by the action of enforcement agencies and preparers”. This situation 
might be explained by the lack of clarity on the application of materiality 
especially for qualitative disclosures (EFRAG, 2012). 
Standard setters have attempted to increase the level of transparency by adding 
further disclosure requirements. The resulting increased length of the notes has 
done little to improve the quality of information. On the contrary, it may 
decrease the quality due to information overload (FRC, 2009; FRC, 2011; 
EFRAG, 2012). To reduce information overload, EFRAG (2012) suggests that 
an assessment of disclosure materiality must be split into considerations 
regarding specific amounts and the materiality of each piece of information 
related to each of these amounts. If an amount is material, related disclosures 
are not necessarily material. They acknowledge that there is a risk that guidance 
on materiality can be interpreted as a checklist by preparers and auditors, and 
that too many scenarios, facts and circumstances might influence the 
assessment. On the other hand, they argue that lack of guidance makes it more 
difficult for entities to resist external pressure to comply with all requirements 
in the standards. They stress that the accounting literature is thin on the 
application of materiality, and they hope to advance the debate by proposing 
examples of different materiality indicators and types of information to be 
included in the notes if an item is material.  
In summary of the above: the key issues in the definition of materiality over the 
past 50 years have been the “influence” on a “user” (person) related to a 
“decision” (judgment) based on the annual report. The decision on what 
information is material – and should be disclosed in the annual report – lies with 
150 
 
the companies (DCA, 2010). The decision is individual and should be based on 
the users’ perception of financial reports and whether they would change their 
behaviour based on the information provided in the annual report. Auditors 
have the possibility of influencing the decision, but users can only rely on the 
outcome of this process (Brennan and Gray, 2005), namely the public annual 
report. 
 
3. Method 
The objective of this paper is to explore how materiality with respect to 
disclosures is perceived by different stakeholders. To explore this, we have 
conducted a multiple-case study (Eisenhardt, 1989). This method is appropriate, 
since the focus is on a real-life situation aiming at answering a how- and why-
question (Yin, 2009). In order to address the objective of the paper, the case 
study will seek to illustrate how stakeholders use the concept of materiality and 
thereby add further aspects to the understanding of the concept (Keating, 1995). 
The respondents representing the preparer were selected among the large-cap 
companies listed on the OMX Nasdaq Copenhagen. From this population we 
excluded companies in the financial service industry, as they are subject to 
special accounting regulations and inspection (FBA, 2011). We ended up with a 
population of 12 companies which were willing to participate in the study and 
used their 2014 annual reports as a basis for our analyses. All the annual reports 
had been prepared according to the IFRS regulations and must consequently 
meet the disclosure requirements of the standards if they were material (IASB, 
2007). 
To ensure that we generated adequate empirical evidence from the case studies, 
we used semi-structured interviews (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). For each 
company we interviewed three respondents; a preparer of the disclosures 
included in the annual report; an auditor and a user, all of whom take part in the 
materiality decision process (Brennan and Gray, 2005). 
Even though the management of a company is ultimately responsible for the 
annual report (DCA, 2010), technical considerations regarding preparation of 
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disclosures are typically the responsibility of accounting function staff. 
Therefore, we interviewed a senior member of the accounting staff with detailed 
knowledge about preparation of financial statements including disclosures and 
the company’s materiality decisions. 
The issue of confidentiality restricted our access to auditors in their capacity as 
auditor for the specific company. They did, however, agree to participate in the 
study by analysing and discussing annual reports from companies that the 
auditing firm they represented had not audited. To ensure a consistent level of 
qualification, the respondents should be state-authorised auditors and partners in 
a Big 4 audit firm with experience in auditing listed companies. As part of a Big 
4 audit firm, these auditors have to regularly undergo internal training in order 
to ensure continuously updated skills in IFRS regulations and requirements. 
The users are represented by sell-side analysts covering the specific companies. 
They all represent multinational financial institutions and issue signed written 
reports regarding the company they are interviewed about. . Further they have 
technical capabilities at a level compliant with the requirements defined by CFA 
Institute.7 Sell-side financial analysts represent an important and advanced part 
of the users of financial information (Brown et al., 2015). This view was 
supported by responses from preparers and auditors who consider analysts the 
primary users of the annual report. 
All respondents have more than 10 years of professional experience in financial 
reporting. 
Due to the entity specific nature of materiality we found it necessary to discuss 
the concept in the  context of a specific set of notes. Prior to all respondent 
interviews, we forwarded a copy of the 2014 notes for the company to be 
discussed to each respondent. The respondents were asked to prepare an 
evaluation of the materiality of the individual disclosures before the interview 
and mark them as follows: 
 No marking – relevant and/or material information which should be 
included in the notes. 
                                                     
7 https://www.cfainstitute.org/pages/index.aspx 
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 Yellow marking – information which is relevant and/or material but should 
be presented differently (e.g. too complicated or too detailed). 
 Red marking – information which is irrelevant and/or immaterial.   
 
In addition, preparers and auditors were instructed to evaluate the notes without 
considering the regulatory requirements, but only focusing on their professional 
opinion about materiality. The evaluated notes were used as a basis for the 
interviews. The purpose of these evaluations was to identify specific details at 
disclosure level that determine the individual respondent’s perception of 
materiality. 
To support the discussions, an interview guide was developed aiming at 
clarifying the underlying arguments for the respondents’ evaluation. The 
interview guide is shown in appendix 1, and an overview of the respondents is 
found in appendix 2. Since the notes are different across companies, and the 
respondents are different with respect to both qualifications and level of detail 
in the evaluation, the semi-structured interviews were supported by a responsive 
element in order to clarify the underlying arguments (Rubin and Rubin, 2012). 
36 interviews, each lasting 30-40 minutes, were conducted between July 2015 
and January 2016. They were recorded, transcribed and coded together with the 
individual respondent’s analysis of the notes. The coding was supported by 
NVivo and performed according to the organising framework described below. 
The transcribed interviews and the respondent’s colour-marked evaluation of 
the notes provided information about the individual perception of materiality 
regarding disclosures, and form the basis for the analysis. Based on the analysis 
common details at disclosure level forming the generalized perception of 
materiality were identified for each group of respondents. 
For the FTSE 100 companies’ 2014 annual reports in the UK, the notes 
accounted for an average of 55 pages (ACCA, 2012; PwC, 2015). In the annual 
reports of the 12 Danish companies included in the case study, the notes 
accounted for an average of 46 pages, ranging from 29 – 75 pages. The average 
number of total pages in the annual reports is 120, of which the notes account 
for 38%. The ratio of notes pages to total number of pages in the case-study 
annual reports is illustrated below: 
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Figure 1 – Note pages and total number of pages in the 2014 annual reports 
Prior to the case study, we performed a literature review (Webster and Watson, 
2002) in order to clarify the current understanding of materiality regarding 
disclosures and thresholds related to both quantitative and qualitative issues. 
The search included academic papers, practice literature and publications by 
standard-setters. This information has been used to describe the current 
understanding in academia and practice of materiality regarding disclosures 
related to both quantitative and qualitative issues. It has furthermore been used 
to identify elements in the organising framework. 
The information from each respondent consists of the transcribed interviews 
and the marked notes (white, yellow and red) from the 2014 annual report. In 
order to structure the coding and thus establish the foundation for the analysis, 
the information has been organised according to the following model: 
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White - Relevant and/or material 
information which should be 
included:
• Quantitative material
• Qualitative material
Red - Information which should be 
removed from the notes as it is 
irrelevant and/or immaterial:
• Standard text / Boiler plate
• Information overload
• Information not evaluated as white or 
yellow notes.
Information:
• Transcribed interviews
• Respondent’s  color marked evaluation 
Yellow - Information which is 
relevant and/or material but 
should be presented differently:
• Combination of white and red the 
notes.
Percieved level of materiality
• notes.  
Figure 2 – Organising framework – perceived level of materiality 
The definitions of quantitative and qualitative materiality are primarily used to 
explain why disclosures have been assessed as “white”. The understanding of 
quantitative and qualitative materiality is based on the definition provided in 
section 2 above. 
In the “red” column of the framework, the information is classified as “standard 
text” or “information overload”. In the interviews, “standard text” is 
perceived as synonymous with “boilerplate”. “Standard text” is defined as 
information that has been copied from other sources, e.g. a reproduction from 
regulatory requirements. “Boilerplate” is defined as standardised disclosures or 
part of a disclosure that is so prevalent that it is unlikely to be informative (Lang 
and Stice-Lawrence, 2015). “Information overload” is defined as a situation 
where the user has to process more information than required (Eppler and 
Mengis, 2004). 
 
4. Findings - Perceived level of materiality 
Following the analytical framework presented in figure 2, below we have 
mapped common traits regarding the perception of disclosure materiality within 
each of the three stakeholder groups interviewed. These traits include whether 
the respondents’ views are in accordance with IASB’s definition of materiality, 
the balance between qualitative and quantitative factors, the order in which the 
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factors are considered, and key words or phrases used when arguing in favour 
of disclosure materiality. By considering both the arguments for why some 
disclosures are material and some are not, we are able to produce a 
comprehensive picture of perception of materiality. Finally, we have compared 
the three groups with each other to identify similarities and differences. 
 
Preparers of the annual report 
Without exception, all preparers in the case study consider the users of the 
annual report when making decisions regarding materiality. This is in 
accordance with the present requirements and practice (IASB, 2015). When 
preparers refer to users, they mention analysts as the primary group, and most of 
them also mention shareholders: 
“I have written analysts and shareholders as the primary users since we are a 
listed company with a relatively high trading volume of our shares. Our second 
priority must be creditors and banks” (Company A - Preparer) 
Preparers do not just consider the analysts at the overall level, but also when 
preparing the individual disclosures. There is, however, not a direct link 
between preparers and users, since questions from analysts go through the 
investor relations department: 
“Sometimes investor relations ask if we could include some additional 
information since they always get questions from the analysts in that area. 
Actually - perhaps not that much when we prepare the annual report but more 
often regarding our quarterly reports. But it happens.” (Company H - 
Preparer) 
If investor relations cannot provide an answer themselves, they consult the 
accounting department. The accounting department gives the information to 
investor relations, but the staff do not reflect on why the analysts have requested 
it. In some cases, disclosures are added because of these requests, and they may 
remain in the notes in subsequent years without any reflection on their purpose. 
None of the respondents indicated the opposite reaction where they were told 
that there were too many disclosures and that they should leave out information. 
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This could indicate that it is easier to add than omit information and may help 
explaining why disclosures are increasing (Barker et al., 2013). 
Quantitative factors 
Without exception, the preparers’ primary assessment of materiality is based on 
quantitative factors, more specifically the amounts that are used as thresholds.  
This approach of considering the size of the amounts is similar to how an 
auditor evaluates misstatements in primary financial statements. In contrast to 
the audit practice, the assessment of disclosure materiality is not based on 
standardised amounts or rates as used by the major accounting firms (Eilifsen 
and Messier, 2014). Instead, the assessment is based on individual 
considerations.  The amounts can relate to the primary financial statement, the 
specific line item or the disclosure. An example of a threshold from the primary 
financial statement is a situation in which a preparer was considering omitting 
notes specifying employee cost, but decided to keep it with reference to a 
quantitative materiality threshold, even though the company did not operate 
with one: 
“I decided to keep it because – you can’t omit a note accounting for half of our 
costs. We exceed the thresholds for materiality. But I don’t think that such a 
specification adds much value for the user.” (Company D - Preparer) 
This preparer was considering whether the disclosure added value for the user, 
but the amount as the primary criterion overruled this consideration. These 
kinds of considerations, where the preparer assesses a disclosure as being 
material due to quantitative characteristics and disregards other considerations, 
are common. The amount of the related line item can also be decisive for 
including a specification: 
“In principle this note about other liabilities should have been marked red. But 
it’s difficult since it is x billion. There is something about the amount that says – 
ok – even if the note doesn’t provide any valuable information.” (Company F - 
Preparer) 
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Even though most of the preparers’ considerations regarding quantitative 
materiality are based on the primary financial statement and specific line items, 
the assessments can also include an isolated view on the notes: 
“I decided to omit a note regarding sale of an activity in 2013, and we had 
nothing in 2014. It was a relatively insignificant amount in 2013 – obviously 
immaterial. Therefore we omitted it.” (Company K - Preparer) 
In this situation, the respondent had not been responsible for the 2013 annual 
report, and the decision to omit the 2014 disclosure was based on an evaluation 
of the amounts for both years. 
The use of quantitative factors is prevalent and overrides the sparse indications 
that users are considered. This approach does not comply with the requirements 
and practice as described by the standard-setters (IASB, 2015). 
Changes from previous year 
The assessments of materiality are primarily based on a comparison between 
disclosures and amounts in the annual report for the current year. If the amounts 
are considered material, the disclosure is included in the annual report. They 
may, however, also be combined with developments from the previous year and 
expectations. When comparing an amount to the previous year, it is considered 
material if the development is unusual or significant. The size of the amount is 
secondary, which indicates that the preparer makes a qualitative assessment of 
the disclosure. In some cases, this is due to a change in trend, but in general it is 
similar to when an auditor considers trends in order to mitigate the risk of 
misstatements. The examples of qualitative considerations are, however, of an 
arbitrary nature, which may be explained by the sparse guidance from standard-
setters (IASB, 2015). Furthermore, preparers rarely consider how a user would 
benefit from a disclosure and whether an omission would have any impact on 
the financial analysis. 
Changes from previous year are primarily considered in the financial statement 
line, but the detailed disclosure level can also be decisive even when the totals 
are unchanged. In this example, we discussed a specification of changes to 
working capital: 
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“There are fairly small changes in our working capital. But I think that if you 
look at previous year, some rather big changes are hidden in the totals, and I 
think that it could be of interest to know if the total change can be explained by 
a rise in accounts receivable.” (Company I - Preparer) 
There are several examples of assessments where changes compared to previous 
year were considered of interest at the specification level. This supports the 
view held by IASB and others that there is no uniform quantitative threshold for 
materiality of disclosures (IASB, 2010; EFRAG, 2012). When a line item 
follows an expected trend, the amount needs to be larger before the related 
disclosures are considered material. This assessment at the detailed disclosure 
level can also be combined with considerations regarding the users and what 
information they might need: 
“Our warranty provision at first glance – perhaps they seem rather small. But 
we see it as a focal point, and we also get a number of questions from the 
analysts. Therefore, I think it is relevant to show the movements in our warranty 
provisions. It also gives an indication of how good we are at making estimates.” 
(Company K - Preparer) 
Adding value for users 
Besides the materiality assessments, which are entirely or partly based on 
quantitative elements, solely qualitative considerations are also taken by 
preparers. The case study provided many examples which were primarily 
characterised by referring to expectations of what users might need. A common 
example is the note where group companies are listed: 
“And then we have this list of companies – I wonder who looks at that? We 
could tell in which countries we are present – but the names of the companies. I 
don’t see that this adds any value.” (Company I - Preparer) 
Another general characteristic is that the preparer questions the use of 
boilerplate and standard text since this is perceived as adding no value for the 
users: 
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“When we look at accounting policies it is my assessment that it is redundant, 
since it is primarily a copy and paste of IFRS requirements.” (Company J - 
Preparer) 
The preparers make a clear distinction between standard text and descriptions 
specifically related to the company. One example is sections in which 
companies include descriptions of specific accounting policy choices or 
decisions: 
“The yellow markings are sections which I think could be of interest - it is 
critical accounting estimates. If we explain it in a decent manner and provide 
some specific information, then it would be a service to the users. But we have 
to be specific.” (Company D - Preparer) 
The qualitative assessment also included considerations regarding how 
complicated the disclosures are and the number of pages used to describe the 
details. The preparers generally view it negatively if a note is too complicated 
or too comprehensive, and they identified three types of disclosures: financial 
instruments, share-based payment and defined benefit plans: 
“Then there are financial instruments - it is yellow. I think that it is an 
important disclosure if you look at the contractual values, but I think that it 
takes up too many pages” (Company F - Preparer) 
The preparers’ evaluation of share-based payment is the same: 
“Share-based payment – it is important, but the level of detail describing what 
has been added to and withdrawn from the share pools – it is simply too much” 
(Company F - Preparer) 
Previous-year figures were also mentioned as information that adds limited 
value for the users, since they already have these available in their Excel 
models. 
Order of assessment 
The preparers’ assessment of disclosure materiality is primarily based on 
quantitative measures and more specifically the size of the amounts. As a 
second priority, changes to the amounts are compared with previous year. The 
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amounts may relate to the primary financial statement, the specific line item or 
the specifications included in the disclosure. This assessment of disclosure 
materiality is based on the same approach as used when evaluating 
misstatements, but the thresholds are different. If after these assessments, the 
disclosure is not evaluated as material, then it is considered whether it adds 
value for the user. Adding value for users is the term used by preparers. It seems 
more appropriate to consider this as if the information seems to be requested by 
the users, since the preparers do not consider how the analysts use the 
information. This third level of assessment is based on qualitative 
characteristics similar to those proposed by EFRAG (2012). These qualitative 
elements included risk, uncertainties, expectations and to some extent 
stewardship. Such considerations may be summarised by the following 
example: 
“If we cross the thresholds – and we are talking about amounts – then it is by 
definition material. But what if the information in the disclosure is not relevant? 
My assessment of these specifications is basically that they only add value for 
the users if there are significant changes compared with previous year.” 
(Company D - Preparer) 
 
Auditors 
The auditors’ overall perception of disclosure materiality and definition of users 
are the same as the preparers’, and they claimed that they took a user 
perspective when making their judgments. Auditors also share the preparers’ 
view and consider analysts and shareholders as the primary users of financial 
information; however,  some doubt that shareholders read the annual report: 
“One of my clients has 80,200 users of the annual financial information. There 
are 200 professional users, primarily analysts, and 80,000 non-professionals, 
including shareholders, who only use the “light” version of the annual report” 
(Company G - Auditor) 
The view that ordinary shareholders only use the “light” version of the annual 
report was stated by several auditors. 
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At the overall level, one of the auditors added a comment regarding materiality 
and the more specific requirements regarding control notes: 
“There are different kinds of materiality depending on whether you have to 
consider “true and fair view” and refer to the financial result or if you consider 
control notes. Control notes are not related to materiality, and they have 
nothing to do with the “true and fair view.” (Company G - Auditor) 
Another auditor considered the control aspect of management’s remuneration 
from the users’ perspective and concluded that even though it is a control note, 
not all the required disclosures were automatically material. The respondent 
appreciated the overall information that the note contributes, but it includes too 
many details: 
“Share-based payment is marked red. Four pages and I lost the overview. It is 
compliant with the requirements, but all that information – it is simply too 
much. From a governance perspective I simply just need to know how much 
they pay the management.” (Company A - Auditor) 
Quantitative factors 
As with preparers, the auditors also consider quantitative materiality as the 
primary factor when making decisions regarding disclosures. Even though the 
interviews were only intended to concern the notes, some of the auditors clearly 
indicated that the overall assessment of materiality of the full financial report 
should be considered when looking at the notes: 
“Before I started, I thought that it would be nice to have an idea about the 
materiality level. I looked at the annual report and decided on a general level of 
materiality around x million. Just to have a place to start. I know that it is 
primarily the notes you asked me to look at, but I just want to get the overall 
relation to each line in the balance sheet.” (Company J -Auditor) 
This materiality assessment is similar to the definition of thresholds used by 
auditors when evaluating misstatements (Eilifsen et al., 2014). While the 
respondent said that this threshold was not appropriate for considerations about 
disclosure, materiality was referred to several times during the interview. It was 
obvious that he could not depart from it in his assessment of disclosure 
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materiality. Apart from this example, none of the auditors indicated the use of a 
specific quantitative threshold for materiality when assessing the notes. Instead 
they referred to an undefined amount resulting in an individual judgment based 
on the assessment of the specific disclosure: 
“When I leafed through the notes – most of them are specifications of line items. 
Since I am an auditor I generally like specifications – except when it is 
insignificant amounts.” (Company L - Auditor) 
Auditors, like preparers, were not able to distinguish considerations regarding 
omissions from misstatements, and the use of amounts when assessing a 
disclosure was prevalent but not well-defined. This resulted in a number of 
situations where the auditors discussed with themselves as part of the process of 
assessing disclosure materiality: 
“You can say that this note - financial income - should be included in the 
annual report – yes. But then – on reflection you might say that when the 
figures are as small as here – then it should be omitted since it is insignificant 
amounts.” (Company H - Auditor) 
In total, the amounts included in the specification of financial income and 
assessed as “insignificant” accounted for less than 0.1% of the revenue and 3% 
of profit for the year.   
Other assessments referred to the amounts of the specific note – in this case a 
specification of other receivables amounting to less than 3% of total assets and 
specifying the total in four items: 
“I would have omitted this note – simply due to the size of the individual figures 
included in the specification.” (Company D - Auditor) 
Thresholds in amounts are the primary assessment factor for auditors, but as in 
the case of preparers, there was some sparse indication that the users’ 
perception was considered when making disclosure decisions: 
“And then we have other operating income – I would say that this note is only 
relevant if the amounts are material. It should only be included if it is assumed 
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that the amounts in the specification are material to the users.” (Company D - 
Auditor) 
The auditor did not consider if the specification is actually material to the user, 
but compared with revenue it accounted for less than 3%. As with the preparers, 
the use of amounts is prevalent and does not comply with the requirements and 
practice as described by the standard-setters (IASB, 2015). 
Changes from previous year 
The alignment between auditors and preparers is also in evidence when the 
assessment of disclosure materiality is based on developments in amounts. The 
most commonly used elements relate to expectations and development: 
“It is rather large amounts, but there are not really any surprises. Of course, 
they have some liabilities regarding employees, some accruals and VAT. But 
since there are no surprises, I don’t think that it adds any value.” (Company F - 
Auditor) 
As with the preparers, it is difficult to generalise the use of combined 
quantitative and qualitative assessments. This can be illustrated by an example 
of opposite reasoning: 
“I consider the amount – x millions - in relation to this company. It is 
completely immaterial. But since there might be a judgmental element, I think 
that it is important to know how the figures have developed.” (Company D - 
Auditor) 
The notes assessed were trade receivables, and the development related to 
receivables past due date but not impaired. They accounted for less than 6% of 
trade receivables and less than 1% of total assets. 
The development in figures is also important when identifying disclosures that 
should be improved: 
“Looking at financial income in the primary financial statement you can see 
that they have more than doubled in a year. When this kind of things occur I 
would like to see maybe a little more explanation of the development trend in 
this note.” (Company A - Auditor) 
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The considerations regarding trends and previous-year figures are not 
consistent, and general use of previous-year figures is not considered as 
valuable and material information. This assessment is based on the assumption 
that users may require and have access to annual reports from previous years: 
“I am looking at fixed assets - and for that matter also many other items - I've 
considered the comparative figures. I think that they can be omitted since it is 
fair to assume that the user has access to last year’s annual report. However, 
whether they should include a full specification of last year’s tangible assets – 
this I would question. If you are interested in the development, you can go back 
to last year’s annual report. Then we come back to the question of materiality. I 
guess that it was just a general comment regarding previous year’s figures.” 
(Company J - Auditor) 
It seems that there is some element of bookkeeping and reconciliation skills 
involved in these assessments: 
“Fixed assets including a full set of comparative figures – there is a limited use 
for that. But on the other hand, when I assess this I think that it is something 
that we as auditors believe should be included.”  (Company D - Auditor)     
These practitioner issues are an integrated part of the auditors’ assessment, and 
they include the notion that figures should be reconciled.  These considerations 
were expressed when discussions concerned fixed assets including previous-
year figures: 
“If you want to understand what is happening here, I think that both tangible 
and intangible fixed assets add value. Perhaps that is because of my 
bookkeeping gene, but I think that it adds value to see that figures are 
reconciled. I know that when we get to financial instruments, I have a different 
point of view. But here I really like it.” (Company H - Auditor) 
The respondent referred to the specification of movements from beginning of 
the year to year-end. 
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Adding value for users 
In parallel to the preparers’ view, the auditors’ qualitative assessments focused 
on the users as the third step. These assessments also considered how much 
information should be included and how to present the disclosures, and they 
addressed the expectations of users’ needs. The themes were also the same, and 
the most significant was the use of boilerplate and standard text: 
“Accounting policies, if you take an overall view, they are just a copy of the 
IFRS requirements. I don’t think that anybody dares remove them, since it is a 
requirement to describe accounting policies, but standard text does not add any 
value. Company specific evaluations and decisions are of interest and should be 
described.” (Company L - Auditor) 
This view is aligned with suggestions from EFRAG (2012), as considerations 
regarding materiality should be related to specific information in order to reduce 
information overload. Another example of this type of assessment, which is 
common for preparers and auditors, is the disclosures presenting group 
companies: 
“What does the reader need? I think that they need to know which countries we 
are in - rather than the legal entities. Just again as an example - instead of 
displaying 700 subsidiaries – here are the 200 most important. The rest can be 
seen on the website” (Company G - Auditor) 
Disclosures regarding financial instruments, share-based payment and pension 
are considered by the auditors as being too complicated and difficult for the 
users to understand. From a risk perspective, financial instruments are generally 
seen as important information. There is, however, a problem with the 
presentation: 
“Financial instruments and especially derivatives are a potential risk for the 
company, and therefore I have difficulties in marking them red. But the notes 
are difficult to read, and there are very few users who understand it. My guess 
is that there are only 20 people in Denmark who really understand the details. 
There is a need to consider how to communicate this in an understandable 
way.” (Company F - Auditor) 
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This assessment clearly indicates that these notes include disclosures which 
should be classified as information overload (Eppler and Mengis, 2004). 
Order of assessment 
Auditors use the same order of assessment as preparers. First, they consider the 
absolute size of current-year amounts, then the changes to the amounts from 
previous year, and finally they evaluate if the information adds value for the 
user. The assessment of disclosure materiality based on the concept of 
misstatements (Eilifsen et al., 2014) is even more prevalent compared with that 
of the preparers. 
 
Users of the annual report 
When assessing disclosure materiality related to the annual report, preparers and 
auditors claim they consider users. Some of the auditors questioned who 
actually read the annual report, indicating that except for professional users, it 
seems there is a limited use. The analysts supported this view, and it seems that 
they also have a limited use of the annual report: 
“Regarding this company all information is available prior to the release of the 
annual report. It is available in the quarterly statements.” 
Then you don’t need the annual report? 
“I can live without it.”  (Company B - User) 
 Another analyst was very clear regarding the notes included in the annual 
report: 
“I have not read the notes since the company was introduced on the stock 
exchange.” (Company I - User) 
These remarkable statements by the primary users of annual reports could 
suggest that the notes to the annual report are completely redundant and could 
be abandoned all together without any impact at all on the assessment of the 
company. However, while the notes might be considered superfluous, the 
information they provide is still to a certain degree required by the analysts. 
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They told us that most of the information they require is available prior to the 
release of the annual report through company announcements, investor 
presentations or external sources. This does not mean that the information is 
considered immaterial but only that when it is presented in the annual report, it 
is already known by the users. 
“If they have additions to share-based performance programmes, then I will get 
that from the annual report. Furthermore I need detailed notes regarding 
tangibles and intangibles and perhaps distressed debtors, including outstanding 
amounts; 30, 60 and 90 days. The rest is available in the quarterly 
announcements.” (Company I - User) 
In order for an analyst to consider a disclosure material, it had to be required in 
their valuation model, either as direct input or as a moderator for developments 
in future periods. Information that does not contribute to this are considered 
immaterial. The analysts use Excel models, which they update on an ongoing 
basis. The intensive use of Excel also explains why - if they use the notes at all 
– they have marked most of them yellow. The analysts generally do not 
consider quantitative thresholds or qualitative factors when determining 
disclosure materiality. They only use the figures, whereas the text is generally 
not read, the assumption being that if it is important to disclose a certain piece 
of text, it would have been presented in the management’s discussion and 
analysis. If an amount is required in their valuation it is considered material no 
matter the size. Most of the figures they need are drawn from the primary 
financial statement, including cash flows and changes in equity. This 
information is generally provided at a more aggregated level compared with a 
specification included in the notes. 
Some of the companies provide the analyst with electronic data sheets which 
include all the figures from the annual report. This service helps explaining the 
statements made by some analysts that the annual report is not used at all. 
While there are significant variety in what kinds of disclosure the different 
groups of stakeholders consider material, the users generally agree with the 
preparers and auditors in their assessment of which disclosures are immaterial: 
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“Regarding accounting policies I have not read that for many years. I only 
focus on changes.” (Company G - User) 
This assessment is fully aligned with the assumption made by preparers and 
auditors on behalf of the users. Boilerplate and standardised text add no value, 
whereas changes to accounting policies are considered important by all analysts, 
even though they do not search for that information in the notes: 
“Changes in accounting policies – if they are important – I am sure that they 
are presented in the first part of the annual report. Therefore - do I need to read 
the accounting policies – no. They might as well post it on the website.” 
(Company F - User) 
Disclosures that can moderate developments in valuation models may include 
information about risk: 
“The question we typically get from investors or our sales staff is – what 
happens if the US$ fall 5% over night, and how will it impact on the estimates? 
The information in this disclosure – this specific table – is used as input to 
answer that question. But then again I would not say that it is required 
information in the annual report. Such information is only used by analysts and 
is discussed at analysts’ meetings with the company. It is also included in our 
Excel models.” (Company C - User)     
This statement adds to the understanding of the importance of other sources of 
information than the annual report. Meetings with the companies are in general 
considered an important source of information for analysts (Barker et al., 2013). 
The users agree with the assessment by preparers and auditors that disclosures 
covering share-based payment and pensions are too complicated. Regarding 
share-based payment, it seems that the most important information is whether 
liabilities are covered by treasure share: 
“The important thing is whether it has a potential impact on the share price. Is 
it covered by treasure share or do they have to issue new shares? We just need 
to know the potential impact on the share price.” (Company B - User) 
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A general comment made by the analysts relates to previous-year figures, which 
are assessed as immaterial since they are already listed in the Excel models. 
Even though the analysts gave the impression that they did not use the 
disclosures in the annual report, they were interested in information regarding 
the company and the specific line items: 
“Intangible assets – that is marked red. Of course I am looking at intangible 
assets – but this disclosure – it never crossed my mind to use that note.” 
(Company L - User) 
When confronted with the fact that there would not be much left if all 
information marked red was omitted, an analyst replied: 
“No, but you should remember that all those notes have no impact on the share 
price. Are we clear on that? It’s information overload! We have the insights 
from the balance sheet – the total figures. All these notes are unimportant.” 
(Company L - User) 
It seems that the primary financial statement, which is also included in the 
quarterly announcements, is an important source of information, but that the 
level of detail in the disclosures is of limited value to the analysts. 
 
5. Discussion 
While the annual report is the responsibility of the preparer (DCA, 2010), it is 
also the result of an interaction with the auditors (Brennan and Grey, 2005). A 
key issue in the assessment of the disclosures is if users would change their 
decisions depending on whether the information is omitted or not (IASB, 2010). 
In this respect, it is necessary to understand what decisions the information is 
used for, and to consider the thresholds. When preparers and auditors assess 
whether a disclosure adds value for the user, they do not consider the 
information as input to a financial analysis. While they claim they consider 
whether the information might be useful, this consideration does not include 
whether it could have an impact on buy, sell or hold decisions. Preparers’ and 
auditors’ considerations about users’ needs for information are different from 
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the actual needs. Consequently, preparers and auditors do not follow the long-
standing key requirements regarding “influence” on “user’s decision” (Kohler, 
1957; Barker et al., 2013; EFRAG, 2012; IASB, 2015). This is a contributing 
factor to the perception of information overload. 
The professional relationship between preparers and auditors has lasted for 
years, and many of the respondents in the preparers’ accounting departments 
have at some point during their career worked as an auditor for one of the Big 4 
audit firms. Consequently, it is no surprise that preparers and auditors generally 
have the same perception of disclosure materiality, including a common 
understanding of the users, where analysts are seen as the most important. This 
is as expected, since sell-side analysts are considered advanced users (Brown et 
al., 2015). Instead of considering users’ needs as the primary assessment 
criterion, preparers’ and auditors’ perception of disclosure materiality can be 
illustrated in the following steps: 
Is the disclosure or the related line 
item quantitative material? in the 
notes.
Is there a significant change to the 
disclosure or related line item 
compared with previous years?
Does the disclosure add value to 
the user?
• is read by the user and
• Is it understood by the user
The disclosure is not material
No
No
No
The disclosure is material
Yes
Yes
Yes
 
Figure 3 – Preparer’s and auditor’s perception of disclosure materiality 
The primary assessment by both preparers and auditors is based on using the 
size of the amounts as thresholds. These thresholds can be based on the 
financial statement, the related line item or each line in a specification. The 
structure of this assessment is comparable with the approach used when 
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misstatements are evaluated. The difference is that evaluation of misstatements 
is based on standardised thresholds (Eilifsen et al., 2014), whereas assessments 
of disclosure materiality are context-specific and more judgmental. 
Preparers and auditors assess disclosure materiality in stages, and the first stage 
is based on current-year figures. If this assessment does not result in a decision 
that the disclosure is material, respondents in the second stage compare the 
figures with previous year. This stage of the assessment is also judgmental and 
based on the same types of amounts as in the first stage. If the development 
deviates from an expected trend, it is more likely that the related disclosures are 
assessed as material. In a situation where the absolute change from previous 
year might be immaterial, a large relative change can be assessed as being 
material. 
If the first and second steps do not result in a decision that the disclosure is 
material, a third step is considered. The third step includes qualitative 
characteristics, and the respondent assesses whether the disclosure adds value 
for the user. The qualitative characteristics consider a number of company-
specific elements related to the entity’s financial report. Examples are 
information about risks and uncertainties, accounting policy choices, 
expectations or stewardship. It is also considered whether the disclosure is read 
and understood by the user or if it is too complicated. As examples, preparers 
and auditors assess notes regarding financial instruments, share-based payment 
and pensions as valuable to the user, but they find the level of detail too 
complicated and believe that the users do not read them. 
An important response from the analysts in our analysis is that they only to a 
limited extent use the disclosures as presented in the annual report. They have 
most of the required information available without reading the annual report. 
The main reason is that the required information is provided in the quarterly 
statements. These are available on the company’s website or have been 
communicated directly at meetings with the companies, which is an important 
source of information. This practice is aligned with previous findings (Brown et 
al., 2015; Cole et al., 2009). We were, however, surprised that some of the 
analysts stated that they did not use the notes to the annual report at all, but only 
the primary financial statements. 
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When disregarding the annual report as a medium and focusing exclusively on 
the disclosed information – independent of what source it came from – the 
assessment made by the users is consistent: Users find disclosures that they use 
in their valuation models either directly or as modifiers of trends and numbers 
material. They find other disclosures immaterial.  Because they use Excel to 
store information, calculate valuations and prepare reports, they focus on 
current year to update the figures. Standard text, boilerplate and previous-year 
figures are not useful. If the results of the financial analysis do not meet 
expectations, then the analysts assume that management will provide an 
explanation in the first part of the annual report, and not in the notes. At the 
detailed level they agree with the assessments made by preparers and auditors 
that disclosures regarding financial instruments, share-based payment and 
pensions are too complicated and not read. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper contributes by adding further aspects to the understanding of the 
perception of disclosure materiality, which for preparers and auditors takes 
place in three steps. Their assessment is based on tools for misstatements, which 
may be due to a lack of guidance in the area. Preparers representing listed 
multinational companies and auditors representing Big 4 audit firms are not 
aligned with the users of annual reports when assessing disclosure materiality. 
The users are financial analysts representing multinational financial institutions. 
Consequently, there are too many disclosures presented in the notes to the IFRS 
based annual report, indicating an information overload (EFRAG, 2012). This 
supports the view that clarification regarding the use of disclosure materiality is 
needed (IASB, 2015). The findings can be used when standard-setters develop 
guidance on application of disclosure materiality. 
The paper also indicates that the annual report as a source of information 
competes with the company’s website and investor relations (Brown et al., 
2015). If analysts need additional information, they prefer to search the 
company’s website or other sources rather than consult the annual report. In that 
respect, they consider information made available at the company’s website as 
credible, even though it might not be subject to external audit. 
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Our case study supports the risk indicated by EFRAG (2012) that too much 
immaterial information in a note might obscure useful or relevant information 
(IAASB, 2014). Even though these considerations are relevant, this is, however, 
not seen as a major problem because the analysts simply do not use irrelevant 
disclosures. One of the analysts made this evaluation and stated that “… all 
those notes have no impact on the share prices. It’s information overload.” 
(Company L - User) 
There are some important implications of these findings. First, it raises the 
question why companies prepare an average of 46 pages of disclosures when 
the use and value of this is limited? Furthermore, there seems to be a need for 
alignment between the users’ needs for information that is based on input to 
financial analysis, and preparers’ and auditors’ perception of disclosure 
materiality. IASB’s drafted practice statement (IASB, 2015) does not clearly 
address this difference. The annual report has a long tradition, and the auditors 
have seen it as the most important assurance object. If users primarily use other 
sources of information, preparers and auditors might consider if the companies’ 
websites should be the main focus of assurance services going forward. These 
implications could be of interest for further research. In relation to this, a 
quantification of the potential for cutting clutter (FRC, 2011) seems to be of 
immediate interest. 
There are some obvious weaknesses in and limitations to the study. The 
analyses of the perception of materiality are based on a limited number of 
respondents, and users are only defined as sell-side analysts. Other user groups 
could be included in order to support the findings further. The analyses could 
also benefit from extending the population to include stakeholders from other 
countries. These limitations notwithstanding, the study contributes to the 
understanding of how disclosure materiality is perceived. 
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Appendix 1 – Interview guide 
 
1. Assessment of relevance of disclosure for the user 
 
1.1. Who do you consider to be the primary user of the annual report? (only 
preparers and auditors) 
 
1.2. Which elements did you consider in your assessment? 
 
1.3. Are there any differences in these elements depending on whether the 
disclosure is relevant to the user – and if so – which elements? 
 
1.4. How do you balance the elements included in your assessment of 
materiality? 
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Appendix 2 – Respondents 
Company Preparer Auditor User 
A Female - Vice president 
Males 
State Authorised 
Auditor 
Big 4 
Partner 
Males 
Senior Equity Analyst 
B Male - Vice president 
C Male - Director 
D Male - Director 
E Male - Vice president 
F Male - Senior manager 
G Male - Director 
H Male - Senior manager 
I Female - Senior manager 
and  
Male - Vice president 
J Female - Director 
K Male - Vice president 
L Male - Manager 
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